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The study «iin« At th» varioua aspects of ths Afghsii 
problem and their Impaet on Xn<3ia*P*kistan re la t ions . Zt 
c e n s e s round the f ive prcq;>ositionst 
(i) Afghanistan hsd always been the tnost important imetrnt 
in inlnuencing India before 1947. After the energence of 
Pakistan , i t has a lso cx>ntint»lly been inf lueneing Zndia-4>akistan 
relations} 
( i i ) The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan* both the cause 
as %fell as the consequence of the Si;qper-po»fer rivalry in the 
Indian Ocean areat particularly the 'Arch of cr i s i s* extending 
from AfghBnistan to Ethopia vdth Iran in the middle* takes both 
India and Pakistan in th i s geopol i t ica l 8«ieep; 
( i i i ) India and Pakistan as such iwre isiinediately and direct ly 
involved in the c r i s i s created by the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistani 
(iv) India»paki8tan relations* instead of being a model of 
«K»od>neighbourly relations* have been characterised by suspicion 
and h o s t i l i t y since 1947. In the %#ake of the Soviet intervention 
i n Afghanistan* increasing mi l i tar isat ion of Pakistan* ever 
developing Sino^^pak-US axis and a l so growing Aaoiestic instabl i ty 
in India* have added new dimensions to India-pakistan relational 
(U) 
Cv) TtuB impUofttloiw arising oufe o£ stieh dtveloijawnlM point 
out tht ii0««Mity of cQ«-opec«tioii betuMii tlie two coiantriM so 
«• to Riiniaiis* tli« •uiHtr-powir preaencat in ths region and 
thoreloy reauo* tensions* 
I t i s in the context of tHese propositions that the 
present iiork deals Xnaia-paklstsn relations in the shadow of 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan* 
Ths Method of presentation 9i the oaterial i s nsinXy 
eonparative with a ehronologioal order* the dissertation* 
though involving csonsiderable empirioal research* takes on 
analytical approach to explain the essentials of the Riatter* 
I have iMised the study largely on the periodicals* journals* 
SMgssines and nei«ipapers« In addition^ rich and varied 
literatiare on Afghinistan* both imiore and after the Soviet 
intervention* and India-Pakistan relations has also been utilised* 
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An a t t e n ^ t has hemn made In these pages to study the 
Impact of the Soviet in te rvent ion i n Afghanistan on India-
Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . Afghanistan has been the v i t a l factor in 
I n d i a ' s securi ty* as i t provided the h i s t o r i c a l invasion routes 
to the Indian sub«<x>ntinent« Also^ she formed the cu l tu ra l 
province of Ind ia . But the constant s t ruggle over t h i s s t r a t e g i c 
highland began froro the competition and confrontat ion between 
Cza r i s t Russia* which v&s expanding to the South to have* as 
t he B r i t i s h saw* an access tov«rdB the warm waters of the Indian 
ocean* and the B r i t i s h Empire* which wanted t o p ro tec t the outer 
perimeter of i t s &miaikOn over I n c i a . Also^in o der to have 
the B r i t i s h BK>re conc i l i a to ry in Europe* the Russians t r i e d to 
humil ia te them on Indo-Afghan borders . Thu»» Afgharistan has 
been very s ign i f i can t i n the regional as well as the global 
s t r a t e g y influencing not only the course of events in the Indian 
swb-continent but a l so i n Europe and the world a t l a rge . 
The emergence of Pakistan somewhat lessened the s t ra teg ic , 
importance oi Afghanistan. Even before the b i r t h of Pakistan* 
on Ju ly 17* 194 7, the US sec re ta ry of s t a t e George h^arshall* in 
a nrnBRoranduro to the pres ident Truman re fe r r ing to Pakistan said* 
•Pakistan . . . wi l l be the laraest Mt»lln» country in the w r i a 
and wi l l occupy otm of tha rooat s trategic areas in the world." 
After the energence of Pakistan* the United States sought to 
develop better relat ions both with Pakistan and India, by 
extending al l iances to thero. IndlA declined but Pakistan Joined -
perhaps in view of her disputes with India over Kashmir, and 
with Afghanistan over pakhtoonistan. Consequently* Afghanistan 
received low priori ty in the US strategy t i l l the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. And she was 
eventually iiqpelled to go to the Soviet s ide for economic and 
mil i tary a id , trade, and external sti¥>port on Afghanistan's stand 
over pakhtoonistan* 1!1he cumulation of the relations aris ir^ out 
of the Soviet sv^port and the situational compulsions arising out of 
i t s neglect by the united s t a t e s , along with internal po l i t i ca l 
dissensioixB among the p o l i t i c a l leaders in Afghanistan, resulted 
in the Soviet military intervention. 
The Soviet intervention had certain implications in 
India-Pakistan re la t ions . As i t wi l l be seen in the followir^ pages, 
there has been a mutual acrimony between the two coimtrirs from 
the very beginning since 194 7. In addition to the Kashmir problinn, 
mutual distrust and suspicion Inherited from the partit ion hasv 
characterised their relat ions result ing into three wars in three 
d e c a y s . Besides their bi lateral i ssue , certain external factors 
have also influeix^d their re lat ions . India's stand over 
pakhtoonistan in favour of Afghanistan after 1960s, Indo-Soviet 
cooperat ion with the Soviet support t o the Indian cause on the 
one hone", iS-pak-Chino s t r a t e g i c consensus on the other are such 
fac to rs adversely a i fec t iny the r e l a t i o n s between India and 
Pakis tan . Fur ther , Atghanistan*s stand over Kastoir s l i g h t l y in 
I n d i a ' s favour and her relatior^s with the Soviet Union supporting 
her cause a l fec ted Afghan-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , vhich a l so had 
implicatioris i n India-Pakis tan r e l a t i o n s . In add i t ion , the Sit»* 
Pakistan axis aga ins t India , which s t a r t e d developing in the early 
s i x t i e s , v;a8 extended in to a global one b^ the growing rapproachment 
between the USA and China in the l a t e s i x t i e s and ear ly seven t i es . 
This se r ious ly threatened the secur i ty ot I nd i a . As a r e s u l t . 
Indie had been qui te f r iendly with the Soviet Union. Further, the 
Soviet support to Incia on the Kasl»nir problem and t o Afghanistan 
on the pakhtoonistan issue became a gesture of f r iendsnip between 
India , Afghar4.stai- and the Soviet Union. This led a l i ena t ion 
between Pakistan and India on the one hand and between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan on the o the r . Consequently, Pakistan developed 
good r e l a t i o n s with China and the united S t a t e s , creat ing the 
s e c u r i t y problem for India and thus (nakii^ India lean more and 
more to the Soviet imion. So a l so Afghanistan went to the Soviet 
s i de in view o^ such deve 1 opinents, 
In the ^^ake of the Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan became a f ron t l i ne s t a t e in the US global s t r a t egy . After 
the e> i t of the Shah of I r an , only Pakistan was s t r a t e g i c a l l y so 
placed and capable of playing the ro l e of the US policeman of the 
Persian Gulf. M professor Stephen Cohen has pointed out.Pakistan 
belongs to that c lass o£ s tates wh^ie very svrvlval Is uncertain* 
whose legitimacy Is ooubted and whose security related resources 
are inadequate ••• wi l l not go avray nor can they ise Ignored. 
Pakistan lias the capacity to £lyht# to go ni^lear* to Influence the 
global s trateg ic balance (If only by collapsing) • Obviously> 
Pakistan could serve as an entrepot for the RTF (Rapid Deployment 
Force) to protect Western access to o i l . The new contours on the 
US*pakl8tan relations mftde direct American aid to Afghan rebels 
possible* keeping Soviet resoiarces and attent ion engaged In . 
Afghanistan and avay from areas of greater Interest to the US l ike 
Europe* typical of the Brit ish policy In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries* 
This new trend develqped In the US-pak relat ions In the wake 
of the Soviet Intervention which ims direct bearing on India. The 
Indian sub.K:ontlnent Is the s trategic divis ion bet««een India and 
Pakistan. The massive rearming of Pakistan was taken by ineia with 
grave concern. These a^ inB have been ueed only against India. 
Moreover* the apprehended central role of Pakistan in the REf 
(Rapid Deployment Force) Is l i k e l y to adversely affect India's 
security and develcqpment for which Indian ocean Is v i t a l . With 
such apprehensions,India has gone a l l -out to match the capability 
of Pakistan by purchasing arms fr«xn the Soviet Union* France and 
other countries and by modernising Its o*m R&D, incurring the 
huge amount of the scarce resources which might have otherwise been 
u t i l i s e d for the economic aevelopment and upXlftment o£ the poor. 
Besides* inaia*s stand vis--a~vi8 the Soviet pre8en<» in 
Af^ar . i s tan created b i t t e rne s s between I r^ i a and Pakistan. Ind ia ' s 
po l icy of c r i s i s diffusion in dealing with the Afghan problem* as 
we sha l l see in tirw following pages* en<ited without any concrete 
outcone. Moreover* the ro l e of the press and other media in 
Pakistan in giving represen ta t ion t o a n t i - i n d i a n postures in the 
context of the Punjab c r i s i s in India fur ther worsened the re la t ions 
bet%feen the tvo coun t r i e s . And several armed skirmishes between 
the armed forces of both the countr ies over Siachen Qlacier have 
been ac t ing as set -back to the process of normalization bet%feen the 
two coun t r i e s . 
However* the Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan has a lso 
made both the countxies r e a l i z e the need of cooperation in various 
f i e l d s . In 1981 General 2ia-ul-Haq put for**ard the proposal 
of having a No-^ar or K(Xii«-aggression pact with India , i n response 
to t h i s proposal* India proposed a Treaty of Peace* Friendship ar^ 
co»qperation in 1982. The fozmer was a l imited and a negative 
concept for India <^a«ling with one aspect of relations»namely« 
secur i ty while the l a t t e r was too prefnature for Pakistan to have. 
However* the agreement signed on March 10* 1983 to cons t i tu te a 
Jo in t Co!nmi8Sion of India and Pakistan having four sub~coromissions 
including various f i e ld s was the hallmark in t h i s r e spec t . There 
have been three meetings of the ccwnmission along with four sub-
commisaions (1983) (1984) (1985). In add i t ion , the recent f lur ry 
of diplomatic e f fo r t s embrace the e n t i r e gamut of Indo-pakistan 
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r«latiorai and havtt yielded cer ta in results* eepoiaeing hopes for 
the good-neighbourly relatione iwtween the tnfo countries* 
An atteiapt has been taade to study the s t ra tegic inportance 
of Afghanistan in India-Pakistan relat ions before and after t\m 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan* The main concern of the study 
i s to point out the impact of the Soviet intervention on India-
Pakistan relat ions mainly in s t ra tegic and po l i t i ca l terms. Drawing 
upon some of the r i ch and varied l i t e r a t i r e on Afghsinistan and 
Indo-pak relations* various periodicals* and newspapers* e t c . , i t 
describes and analyses the Afghan problem and i t s implications 
regarding India-Pakistan r e l a t ions . 
The scheme oi th is disser tat ion is as follows* Chapter I 
reviews Afghanistan's role in regional and global strategy* her 
re la t i e r s with the Soviet union and tim United States and her 
internal po l i t i ca l s ^ne r io before the Soviet intervention in 
AfgtAnistan on Deeee^ber 27*1979. Chapter I I analyses the trends 
of the Afghan factor in Inc:ia»pakistan relat ions frcxn 1947 t i l l 
the Soviet intervention. Tim reactions and repercussions espotMied 
by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan* 
' fona- the subject of Chapter I I I . 
Chapter IV analyses the mtwce of re la t iors between India and 
Pakistan t i l l the Soviet intervention. Chapter V i s 
devoted to a discussion <»£ the Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan on India-pakistan relations* I t analyses new 
regional and global developments brought about by the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and their jUnplications in 
XnaiA-pakifltAn relationsf sunnnarlses the recent trends adversely 
affecting Indla-pakietan re lat iom* and evaluates the recent 
diploimtic flurry between the ttio countries to have good neighbotxrly 
re la t i ons . Chapter VZ discusses the various efforts made hy 
India, Pakistan and the united nations to resolve the Afghan 
problem and analyses Xndia-paKistan relations in th i s content. 
Lastly, conclusion dra%« together the suminary of the impact of the 
sov ie t intervention in Afghanistan on Zndo«pakistan relations 
and makes certain suggestions for improving these relations. 
A s e l e c t bibliography i s indicative df the material consulted for 
th i s study. 
A F G H A N I S T A N 
A S T R A T E G I C L O C A T I O N 
U S S R 
C H I N A 
I N D I A 
I N D I A N O C E A N 
200 
I r ± 200 400 KM I I 
I PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR 
CHINA OCCUPIED KASHMIR 
AREA CEDED TO CHINA BY PAKISTAN 
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M9m^mm r m mi9Ksmi! wyCTgfi m Tiff m^mwii fm ^wmk 
Afghanistan i s •tzmtegioally very important £or ths 
Indian aub-oontinent• Thara had aliaya baan a closa coimaction 
betwaan what i« h i s tor ica l ly cal led India and what today i s 
1 
ca l led AJghaniatan. There are referenees to the rivera of 
2 
Afghanistan region in the Wdas* as ttw Aryans canae to India 
along th i s route. Apart from the Aryans* the Greeks, the Huns, 
the Scythians ana the Turks, a l l came to India by crossir^ the 
3 
passes in the Hindukush and Sulaiman ranges o£ mountains. 
Afghanistan had formed the parts of the empires of Persians, 
4 S 6 
the QtmekBt the Mauryas, the Kushans, the Guptas, the Turks and 
7 
Hughals. In such conditions the safeguarding 3f Indian frsntiers 
from the side of Afghanistan has alv^ys been a pcimm occupation 
o£ the Indian rulers* 
2 . Rigveda, X. 7S 
3 . R.I. Melhotra, h^qmu gfftfff^ l9ff IfifHtJlrfeY^ Delhi, 1982, p . l 
4 . r .J . Fleet , gpiofphlB li^dipa, Vbl. x x x i i i , Calcutta, p. 333. 
5 . V.A. Srol»th, The Esrlv History of Ii^ df^ ^ London, 1908, p. 244. 
6 . R.C. Majumdar and A«S. Altekar, The VL katak Quota Aoe. p. 168. 
7* V.A. smith, op^cit.^ p« 126. 
<») 
A£ghanlatan was given a d e f i n i t e shape by Ahmad Shah Abdali 
8 
i n 1947 by unit ing i t a various autonomous p r i n c i p a l i t i e s in to an 
9 
organised s t a t e . But modern Afghanistan i s the r e s u l t of the 
boundary se t t l ements with Imperial B r i t a i n and Imperial Russia 
i n the Nineteenth Century. Afghanistan* as a resul t« came to be 
10 
regarded as a buffer s t a t e * Both Russia and Br i ta in had r iva l ry 
over Afghanistan » former*^in search of vara waters ' and l a t t e r 
11 
seeking a ' safe and s c i e n t i f i c front ier* i n the north«west* "This 
circumstance r e s u l t e d i n the crea t ion of the v^khan corridor - a 
s t r i p of Afghan t e r r i t o r y projec t ing t o the north-east* along 
the wakhan Ridge of tlie Hindukush for almost 200 miles* i n placesi 
12 
i t i s only seven miles wide." The narrow v a l l e y of wakhan 
prolor^^s the north-eastern f ront i er as far as Chinese border in 
the Sarikal range of the Pamirs. From t h i s point^the eastern 
and southern l i m i t s are bounded by Kashmir and f^kistani the 
northern boundary with the Asian Republic of the USSR fol lows the 
Amu Xxirya r iver t o Kham-i-Ab* and thence i n a general south-
wes ter ly d i r e c t i o n t o Zulf iqar where i t meets Afghaxiistan's 
13 
western boundary with Iran . 
8 . p . Sykes. |V.iaiffWgY 9^ PfCTAff* London, 1951* VOI.II* p . 275. 
9 . Asghar H. Bilgraml* MfltWPl»lHIP ftHtil Br4t4t^^ Xn^ iUt« Sterl ing* 
Delhi 1972* p . I . 
1 0 . I b ^ t * p . 276 
12 . ]b,mY9l9ti^Sm, ^l,:UmA<^» Cnicoyo* 1973-74* Vol.I* p . 165. 
1 3 . Tr» gte,ff^^ff.'ff mS)t9l9W^PM§' LontSon* 1967* v o l . I* p . 120. 
10 
Thus# location oi Afghanistan i s of strategic importance 
not only because i t i s s i tuated in proxietiity to Russia in the 
north and the north-v^st but to the fact that to the west of 
Afghanistan lay Iran and to the riorth«-east of i t lay K&slwtir and 
Pakistan. Her physical configuration has been such that i t 
14 
const i tutes 'formidable natural defences for the country*. 
However* Afghanistan i s accessible to foreigners through a 
l imited number of passes. Most of them on the Russian* Persian 
and Indian (tow Pakistani) s ide remain intractable in winter. 
Of these* the Zulfiqar pass on the Russian s ide y&a regarded 
by the British Indian Governnent as the most vulnerable p o i n t . . . 
because of the threat posed by the Russian expansionism in the 
nineteenth century. Besidtes^ the high plateau and mountain 
ranges of the Hinduktish provided a formidable l ine of defence 
for the British Empire in India. There v^ere. however»dangerous 
chinks in this defensive armour - the Chitral* the Kurram and 
the Gomal V l l e y s , and the Khyber and Khojak - Bolan passes. 
Since time immemorial these valleys and passes «rere the invasion 
15 
routes into northern India. 
Afyhariistan covers an area of ^7497 sq. km. 
Geographically, i t i s divided into three regions by the great 
mountain ranges of the Hindwtkushf (i) a region of plains and 
14. Bilgrami* jCOEUfiiJa.' P* ^ 
i 5 . VnM 
11 
f o o t h i l l s , with gent le slopes towards Amu Earya to the north, 
( i i ) a region of high p la teau and sandy deser t t o the South, and 
( i i i ) a region of lof ty mountains and deep and narrow valleys 
16 
between the two reg ions . 
Afghanistan is a country of high a l t i t u d e s . The greater 
p a r t of Afghanistan i s s i t u a t e d a t 2000 and 10,000 ft^above the 
sea l e v e l , while other remaining pa r t s a re lof ty mountains and 
17 
extensive sandy deser t xxpto the Helmund r ive r and i ts t r i b u t a r i e s . 
The population of Afghanistan i s composed of people of 
diverse o r i g i n s , i t i s natural because i t i s a country through 
which throughout the ages vast hordes of invaders mac^ t h e i r 
18 
way in to Ind ia . The modern s t a t e s of Afghanistar and Pakistan, 
inhabi ted by pustun and pathan t r i b e s , have seen perhaps more 
invasions in the cotjorse of h i s to ry than any other country in Asia, 
or indeed the world. Each horde, as i t passed, wi l l have l e f t 
i t s mark on the inhabi tants of the country, one way of l i f e 
19 
constant ly overlaying another . Thus, i t s northern pa r t i s 
inhabi ted by the Uzbeks, the south-eas tern p a r t by Ghi lza is , and 
Herat by people of I ranian stock (Tajiks) who are mostly p>ersian 
speaking. Kabul, Kandhar, Ja la ' abad and Ghazni are inhabited by 
Afghans themselves who account more than half of the population 
16. Encvcj.ODaedia Bri t ann ica , o p . c i t . , p . 164. 
17. I b i d . , p . 165 
1 8 . Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 2 
19. Olaf Caroe, The pathans, London, 1958, p . 25 
12 
20 
of the country and enjoy thm h ighest power and p r e s t i g e . 
Geographical cDnditions have reinforced the ruyged independence 
and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y of i s o l a t e d rural communities, offcen 
separated from the i r immediate neighbours by race# eect» langtege 
21 
or t r i b a l d i f f e r e n c e s , and by hereditary f euds . 
There are scxne t%fenty main languages, and innumerable 
d i a l e c t s in Afgii^anistan. But pashto and Pezvian i n various 
forms are the tvfo l ingua franca, the mother-torques of 80 per cent 
of the populat ion, while Persian i s known by most of the non-
Pushtuns having a mother tongue of eas tern Turkish or other 
22 
o r i g i n . 
The fo l lowing tab le g ives a rough est imate of peculat ion 
of Afghanistan based on a var i e ty of sourcest 
20 . Bilgrami, pp.^it., p . 2 
2 1 . Anthony Hyman, ftffg^f f^ Jl^ ^^ ftfi m^I, §9H^% PaP>4-iRP.Ugy^ ,i 
London, 1981, p . 10 
2 2 . Ibi^f 
13 
population Q£ Agq y^ftJa.tHlflf „ miU fl^ f^t^ c qgg^f >—12JL 
Gro«^ Approx. nuober Location 
pushtun 7000000 
T a j i k s 
Hdzaras 
UzbmkB 
Aimaq 
Fars iwan 
( o r H e r a t i s ) 
Turkman 
Brahui 
B a l u c h i 
N u r i s t a n i 
3&00000 
1500000 
1300000 
800000 
600000 
300000 
200000 
100000 
100000 
Gonc»ntrated in south 
and south-east but set t lad 
far and wide. 
north and north«>«ast and 
Kabul region* 
centre (Hazarajat) and in 
Kabul. 
rK>rth* 
v e s t . 
west and south. 
north. 
8outh->%fest. 
west and north-west. 
eas t . 
Sources Anthony Kywan, op.eit«* p. 11 
Alinost 90 percent Afghan population i s rural« either 
l iv ing in v i l lages the wlK>le year* or se t t l ing for part of the 
year* ot the urban population* almost half i s concentrated in 
Kabul. This trend has been accentuated since 1979 by a flood o£ 
internal refugees frcxn bombed-out v i l lages too far from the 
23 
b o r e r s to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran. 
23. Ib id . . p. 10 
14 
AfghBnlstan au« to i t s location* topography and i t« 
roughly quadrilateral shape* «aa de«ned sonaewhat impenetrable and 
also unalKsidBible. Sir Herbert Edwardte remarkedt "Afghar istan mvmt 
be admitted to be a great physical diff iculty* I t i s d i f f i cu l t to 
conquer, di£f icult to hold* d i f f i cu l t to sustain an amy in , and 
24 
most d i f f i c u l t of a l l to leave^^ Napolean dreamt of conquering the 
East through Persia via Afghanistan. Russia,in order to 
discourage the Brit ish in Europe, approached the borders of 
AfghEinistan. The British policy vi«s also determined by the gradual 
advance of Russia south-wards and partly also by turbulent 
2b 
character of the people of Afghanistan.** Coraequently, the British 
had to fight three cost ly wars with Afghanistan to defend British 
26 
Indian «mpire. 
The success which the British met in keying Indian 
frontier safe and in checking the Russian influence in Afghanistan 
shows that i t s geographical character i s siich that i t can be eas i ly 
influenced by the outside forces i f they are powerful enough and 
wil l ing to do s o . Modern Afghanistan i s indeed a purely accidental 
24. Cited in Bilgraroi, jaaufiiLi.' P» l^*-
26. The f i r s t Afghan war was fought in 1839-42 between Ei^land 
under Lord Auckland and Doet Muhammad, the Afghan ruler* 
The war proved disastrous for the English* The Second Afghan 
war (1878-.80) was foi:^ht under Lord Lytton. The Victor were 
English. By the treaty of Gandamak, Yakub Khan accepted 
the d i s t r i c t s of Kurram, Pishin and S ib i . The third Afghan 
war (1919) was fought bet%«en Amanullah and Lord Chelmsford* 
By the treaty of Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was given freedom 
to pursue an independent foreign po l icy . 
15 
geographic unit* vihich has been carved out of the heart of 
centra l Asia by the sword of conquerers or the genius of individual 
27 
statesmen," 
p o l i t i c a l l y , Afghanistan has two f r o n t i e r s of major length: 
one on the north with the TurkRten# Uzbek and Tadzhik Republics of 
Sov ie t Union* the other on the South and e a s t with Pakistan, i t 
shares with the USSR an almost 2*000 mile border with 1.5 mi l l loB 
of the Uzbeks and the equal ly divided Persian speaking Tadzhiks 
between Afghanistan and t h e USSR. While with Pakistan* i t 
shares about 12000 kiicmetres border along with a substant ia l 
number of pathans creat ing the problem of pakhtoonistan. The whole 
controversy runs about the Durand Line drawn i n 1393 by the 
B r i t i s h ru lers and Mnir Abdur Rahtnan. 
Afghanistan e x i s t e d as buffer s t a t e by the B r i t i s h rulers* 
and Russia acceded to i t as such. Both the Br i t i sh and Russians 
played a diplomatic ro le for p o l i t i c a l gains and t a c t i c s they 
used was tha t of pressure . They never resorted t o any armed 
c o n f l i c t as t h e i r i n t e r e s t s rosver demanded i t . The main object 
of the B r i t i s h po l i cy %fas to keep Afghanistan out of RvjSsian 
in f luence and within that of B r i t i s h India , i t s po l i cy towards 
Afghanistan was l a r g e l y shaped by the cons iderat ions of Indian 
defence. I t s various f a c e t s were 'forward p o l i c y ' * 'pol icy of 
27 . Lord Curaon* quoted i n C .c . Daviesi TIH Pf9i^tffi» 9f U^ 
Worth>Weat fipogtier^ 1890-1908* Cambridge* 1982* p . 153 
16 
non-interference in the internal af fa irs kr^wn as 'Masterly 
Inac t iv i ty ' , attempts to constitute a 'i^utral zone* or buffer 
28 
s t a t e ' betvieen the British and Russian possessions. 
The object of Russia as v^iaely believed in the western 
world was to have an access to the warm waters of the Indian 
Ocean and 'to put pressure on Afghanistan t o gain concessions 
from the the tt-itlsh in Europe* who had supported the Ottoman 
Empire* AS regarcs this* an extract from the Moscow Gazette of 
29 
J\»ly 19* 1878 may be ci tedt 
"Tl^ tin>e has arrived for Russia to establ ish her influence 
over the %dhole of Central ASia« and th is i s a l l the more easy as 
the ruler of Afghanistan i s not on good terms with England •> our 
foe in Central Asia, ihe concentration of our influence on the 
frontiers of the terr i tor ies of the Express of India would be 
natural answer to the English seisure of Qfprus •••• In Asia there 
are two po l i t i ca l powers confronting each other, and they must 
Inevitably come into col l i s ion* England wishes to be Russia's 
nearest neigh^bour in Asia Minor* and i t i s only natural, 
therefore, that Russia, in her turn, should desire to approach 
30 
somewhat nearer to the English frontiers in India." 
So thwarted in Europe, Russia could aeek concessions by 
putting pressures on Britain through Afghanistan. General 
SkobelEjfT of Russia explainedt *the stronger Russia in Central Asia, 
the weaker England in India, and the more concil iatory she wil l be 
28. Bilgrami, SiStMSM" P' x 
29. UBM..* p. 185 
30. pari papers, 1847, LXXX, p. 141. c i ted in jQaJ^, p . 185 
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i n Europe.* 
Corjsequently, Russia apprcached the Central Asia, anO th« 
more probleroatlc I t grew to the B r i t i s h . So# they coiwiaeifea 
Afghanistan e s s e n t i a l to safeguard India from Russian expaiMionism. 
There aaeraed two schools of thought t o encounter Russian influence! 
32 
c lose Border pol icy School# and Porv^ard Policy School. 
The close border po l icy , r e l a t e d with conservat ives , 
meant d i r e c t B r i t i sh ru le only in the s e t t l e d areas of the f ront ier 
r eg ion . The t r i b e s were l e f t t o administer t h e i r a i t a i r s by 
thense lves . I t iraplied ron- interference in Afghanistan, 
33 
f r i end l iness and s t a b i l i t y in the country so as t.j deter Russia, 
Turing the 189C^ the close bor<ter pol icy was abandoned in 
favour of the Forv.ard po l i cy . I t included adn in i s te r ing ce r t a in 
t r i b a l areas ane c r ea t i ng gar r i son towards other pa r t s of the 
reg ion . Amir Abdur Raliiriau was forced t o s ign a border agreement 
which pushed ' the borcSer from the eas te rn foot of the border h i l l s 
34 
t o t h e i r crest? dividing tJ-»e pathsns from the ea^t of the Durand 
Lirie, 
3 1 , ibJkfi) p't^ < 
3 2, KaleeiT) Bahadur, Pak i s tan ' s pol icy Towards Afghanistan, 
XBl;fWll^AgBt; I §tr\lflJitff t ^ w Delhi, J .N.U,, October-December, 
1980, p . 643 . 
3 3 . Ii:|id. 
34 . Jawes, J , , p o l i t i c a l probl^ns of a Borderland, T. Einbree, ed, 
i^.Klft^ftp'i WfaiMtrfi ig.natr3>fB^,i »<»« Delhi, 1977, p . i i 
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Lord CursBon created the Horth West Frontier Province in 
1901 end subetitiited a policy o£ frontier garrisone dratm from the 
people thefiieelves for the coetly experiment of large forte and 
i so lated posts thrown fori«i«rd into a turbulent and fanatical 
country • a policy of n i l i t a r y concentration against diffusion 
35 
and of tribal conci l iat ion in place of exasperation* 
Treaty of GundBunek signed by the Afghan ruler, Yakub Khan 
and the British in 1879* ceded several d i s t r i c t s of Afghanistan on 
i t s eastern frontier to the Brit ish and also the control of the 
Khyber and Michini passes. The British Zndia government got the 
r ight to Control Afghanistan's external re lat ions and Afghanistan 
got assurance of support in external relat ions and also non-> 
interference in i t s internal affairs* As the Brit ish agent was 
stationed in Kabul, the people got enraged and furious. There was 
great uprising. Yakub Khan was forced to abdicate* And the treaty 
36 
lay nu l l i f i ed . 
Yakub Khan was succeeded by Abdur Rahfnan* Mow the internal 
conditions in Afghanistan took tarn frc»tt anarchy to an absolute 
monarchy with po l i t i ca l and administrative s t a b i l i t y . Abdur Rahman 
signed the Dwrand Agreement in 1993. All tribes l iv ing east of 
the Durand l ine were recognised as belonging to the British area 
of inflxience* "The agreement projected them into the 20th century 
35* Kalim Bahadur* op.ef^. . p. 646« 
36* Ibid.* p. 644. 
19 
heoikvmm of Im arbitrary alvlaion o£ tha j^ahtooo tribe* betwaan 
Afghaniatan ana what waa than Britlrti India* The ruling dynaatiea 
of A£9t«aniatan hava baan of paahtaon atock and thercfora bit ter ly 
37 
raaanted and raaiated what thay conaidarad to ba an aaipittatioD.* 
H@bibullah waa auccsaadad by Maanullah* Ha auccaadad in 
aeakiny independence from the Britiah tutelage* received atrangth 
frcKB Oantmonist Russia which reoogniaed Afghaniatan aa an independent* 
aovereign atete* Amanollah a^ppcurted the <sauaa o£ Xn<^ ian raKorlii 
ravoln^ionariea* declared var againat the Britiah Ctovernnent in 
May 1919* Thia war (third Indo«A£ghan war) did not reault in the 
to ta l victory for the Britiah* ""nie Indo-Afghan Treatiea of 1919 
and 1921 atrengthaned the poaition ^ Maanullah* Article XZ of 
the 1921 treaty recognised A^hanistan aa a bonafida party In ao 
far as t)% queation of tr ibal areaa was oonoerned* I t provided 
A€i|hani8tan %«lth the legal baa i s for i ta daima aocroaa the Dvrand 
38 
Line." 
Amanullah waa overthrotm in 1929* Itadir Khan* his sucoisatM' 
and Sahir Shah* the aoccaasor of Nadir Khan both followed the policy 
o£ neutrality to ards the tribal areas* 
3 7* Lean* B* poulla ^ « P^KtifcyntttiBni AfQhaniafeiin'a nameaiilc 
Mo* 1* pp< 12«»127. 
33* Lya Franck Forotba* pakhtuiiiatan»Z>iapated l^ispoaition of 
Tribal x^nd* Hlf iflla ffgafc gqwmlt waahington* D . c * vol . 6* 
p* 54* 
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The B r i t i s h signed th ree t r e a t i e s with Tsar i s t Russia 
about A£ghardstan« F i r s t* in Ju ly 2.887 a t St* Petersburg without 
the k»ov?leage of lifghanistan on the d e l t e i t o t i o n of Afghanistan's 
northern boundary; the second* in 188£ over the pasiir Bounciary 
Agreement; and t h i r d , the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. The 
Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y ended as the German empire rose t o threa ten 
t h e balance o£ pother i n Europe. 
The r e l a t ions between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan 
made a headway in 1921 by the t r e a t y of Friendship conclu<^d 
between the two coun t r i e s . The t r e a t y was 'based on the 
Pr inc ip les of equa l i t y , mutual respect anc non-interference into 
each o t h e r ' s in te rna l a f f a i r s . I t was concluded *with a view to 
consol idat ing f r iendly r e l a t i o n s between Russia and Afghanistan 
39 
and pro tec t ing Afghanistan's genuine independence. In terms o€ 
A r t i c l e 10 of the txeaty , the Soviet Union agreed ' t o render 
Afghanistan f inanc ia l and other mater ia l a s s i s t ance* . The Soviet 
Union provided a g i f t of one mi l l ion gold rubles to Afghai.istan, 
severa l a i rp lanes and &«000 r i f l e s , the construct ion of a 
te legraph l i n e l inking Kiwhka, Herat-Kandahar-i^abul, technical 
and other exper t s , and t r a i n i n g to Afghan p i l o t s . Many Soviet 
technic ians came to Afghanistan in 1924 in to Afghanistan's army 
and a i r force ^hen the then king Amanullah Khan organised the 
40 
Royal Afgnan Air Porce. 
39 . soviet-Afghan Rela t ions , 1919-1969, Documents and Material^, 
Moscow, 1971, p , 28. 
4 0 . YlW .Ute^M^fBTHlit* New Delhi, December 27, 1983. 
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In 1927 an agreement was signed between the USSR and 
Afghanistan. I t envisaged the const ruct ion of a s e r i e s of 
a i r f i e l d s . Afghanistan s t a r t e d baying Soviet b u i l t a i r c r a f t s 
'manned by Soviet b i l o t s and serviced by Soviet ground crews. 
Afghan personnel were sent to the USSR for t r a in ing as a i r crew. 
In May 1928, King Amanullah v i s i t e d Moscow a t the inv i t a t ion 
of the Soviet governnent. His v i s i t r e su l t ed in an agreement on 
increas ing of economic and cu l tu ra l t i e s between the Soviet Union 
and Afghanistan. The USSR agreed to send t l ^ Soviet s c i e n t i s t s 
to Afghanistan. 
on June 24, 1931, both the countr ies signed the t r e a ty 
of Neutra l i ty and Mutual Non-Agression in the accord with the 
1921 Treaty. Ar t i c l e 1 of the t r e a t y lays down tha t ' i n the event 
of war or m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s between one of the contract ing 
p a r t i e s and one o r severa l t h i r d coun t r i e s , the other contract ing 
party pledges t o observe n e u t r a l i t y with regard to the f i r s t ' . 
They a lso pledged not to ' t o l e r a t e any ac t on t h e i r respect ive 
42 
t e r r i t o r i e s which might be detrimental to each one of them. 
In the next two decades the influence of the Soviet Union 
diminished. In 1955 Daoud sent h is brother to Washington t o seek 
economic ass i s t ance including arms. But Aiaerica declined. So, 
Daoud went to the Soviet Union for arms ar:kd renewed the 1950 
4 1 . SMSJL 
4 2 . USSR Academy of Sciences, Afghanistan* pas t and Present 
1981, ipp, 203-204. 
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Trans i t Ayre«roent for another f i v e yeare. i n 1955 the Soviet 
leaders* Balganin ana Khrushchev v i s i t e d Afghanistan* They 
44 
provided support t o Afghanistan on pukhtun areas of pe^kistan. 
Daoud announced a further lO-ygar ex tens ion of the Soviet-Afghan 
45 
Treaty of Neutral i ty and Ncn-agression o£ 1931. 
In August 1956 an agreement v^ as s igned betiieen the two 
countr ies inc luding $ 26 m i l l i o n arros agreement. Afghanistan 
a l s o accept d an i n v i t a t i o n to Cssechoslovakia t o inspect the 
l a t e s t type of mi l i t ary equipments. The Sov ie t bloc contributed 
T-34 tanks , MIG in terceptors , bombers, he l i copters and small 
arms. The bloc included - Ca»cl»s lovakia , P41and, Hiaigajy, and 
46 
East Germany. The Sovie t union a l s o agreed to bui ld and expand 
a l r f i e l d i r^ar MasBar-i-Sharif, Shlndand, and Begram. Instructors 
47 
and spare parts fol lowed the arms d e l i v e r i e s . ' 
By 1963 the Turkish o f f i c e r s in Afghanistan were replaced 
by the Russian. A l l i t s a i r c r a f t s and adv i sers v«ere provided by 
the Soviet union and most o£ the aircrews of Afghanistan were 
trained i n the USSR. Afghan aimed forces i n a l l , were reorganised 
and modernised with the Soviet m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e and became 
4 3 . Kuldip Nayer, Report on Afghanistan. Kew Delhi , 1980, p . 119 
4 4 . KBllni Bahadwr, 2ttiJiit»« P« 660. 
4 5 . Kuldlp Kayar, o p . c i t . . p . 119 
4 6 . The Hindustan Tiroes, liew Delhi , December 27, 1983. 
4 7 . Kuldip Nayar, o i ^ . c i t . . p . 120, 
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an instrument of Monarchy* They a l so v/erc now i n pos i t ion t o 
48 
influence the government* 
In regard to t r anspor t ana comHuintcstion ' the USSR b u i l t 
or a s s i s t e d in bui ia ing more than IQ^ of the Afghan hard surface 
roads* The two major routes comtruc ted a re i the Salang pass 
road froni the r i v e r por t of Sher Khan (Qizil Qi»la) on the Amu 
Darya t o KSbul.' This had been for 10 years in operat ion and 
600 Soviet s p e c i a l i s t s were there i the Turghuncai-Herat-Kanaahar 
highway connecting pul-i-Khurori with Masson sho r t ly and Mazhar-i-
ShBrif V i t h new por t of Harretan and Shibarghan on Arou rarya . 
49 
About 500 Soviet s p e c i a l i s t s a s s i s t e d in i t s o^nstruct ion. 
There has also been co-operation in agr icu l ture* The 
i r r i g a t i o n system was constructed under the Soviet auspices* 
For ins tance , Sarde Datn was constructed on the J i lga r i v e r with 
50 
the co-operation and a s s i s t ance of the USSR, 
Aix>ut seventy i n d u s t r i a l pro jec ts i n Afghanistan have 
been <x>nstructed wxth Soviet econonic and technical assistaiKte. 
Ou April 14, 1977# t r e a t y on the l5evelo?»nent of Econonic co-
operat ion was concluded for 12 years* Ar t i c l e 2 s t a t e s : that 
co-opera t ion between the two countr ies wi l l be developed in 
' t h e gas oi l# petro-chsmical and chanioal indus t r i es* ag r i cu l tu re . 
4 8 . USSR Academy of Sciences, ^ c h a n i s ^ a n . Past and Pr^aent. 
Mc«cow, p . 20&. 
4 9* y?», HAa^iflrfti TJ^ ffiffff' «•*» Delhi, December 2 7, 1983* 
50* USSR Academy of Science, pp.c i t** p . 208. 
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I r r i g a t i o n and other spheres o£ the e^>noRiy in the publ ic heal th 
and veter inary s e r v i c e s ! geological prospecting far oil, gas and 
s o l i d minerals anci t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l develqpnenti design and 
const ruct ion o£ power i n s t a l l a t i o m developnent o£ t ranspor t and 
comntunicationi vocational t ra in ing of personneli environotental 
51 
p ro t ec t i on . 
m ireyards tra(to* Afghanistan's t rade with Russia conprised 
about 4C^ o£ i . s e n t i r e foreign t r ade in 1911«»1&. But a f t e r the 
19:7 Revolution in Russia i t s t a r t e d again in 1925. The free 
import of Afghanistan goods were allo«red. The USSR l i f t e d the 
import duty from some comnodities* Afghan merchants were given 
free entry an<3 were permitted to open permanent off ices in a 
nuraber of Soviet c i t i e s . In 1910 a t r e a t y of a t r ade and payments 
agre«nent v.as s igned. This was replaced h^f another t rade and 
payments agre«nent on March 20, 1974. And on June 18, 1976, a t rade 
agreeroent %%as signed for the 1976'-eo, "The agreement provided 
for the growth in t rade between Afghanistan and the UE^SR by 
52 
about 6S^ in f ive years ." 
In 1976 the Jo in t Afghan^&^viet Transport*Delivery Society 
(ASTE80) was organised f<^ the purpose of dealing with t ranspor ta t ion 
53 
of export and impArt and t r a n s i t cargo through Afghan t e r r i t o r y . 
The s c i e n t i f i c * educational and c u l t u r a l co«>qperation upto 
the l a t e 19&0s v?as or a casual charac te r . Since 1960 i t has been 
&l* £JBS§Slk* Hoscow* April 15, 1977 
52. USSR Academy of ScienoBS, o p . c i t . , p . 213. 
53 . I b i d . , p . 214«-15. 
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developing on the basis of a treaty on s c i e n t i f i c and cultural 
co*operation* It envisages the jo int programme—training of 
Afghan nation personnel with a higher and secondary technical 
education. Aco^rding to the Afghanistan Central s t a t i s t i c a l 
Department* between 19S7 and 1974 the Soviet union helped train 
more thirn 60*000 s k i l l e d Afghan vorkers and S*200 technicians at 
such projects . There has a l so been a ^ e a t deal of co-operation 
i n the f i e ld of arts and sports . The co<K>peration in the f i e l d 
of public health system has a l so been amking headway. 
The soviet imlon undertook constructing or iniproveinent 
of three of Afghanistan's four international airports including 
the major airport a t fOtbul. As part of i t s 1956 aid agreement, 
the USSR bui l t the a ir f a c i l i t i e s a t Bagram (40 miles north of 
Kabul.) which became the major base for Afghanistan's a ir force and 
55 
inducted f a c i l i t i e s of handling the largest military a ircraft . 
In addition* various other projects were undertaken with 
the Soviet help litaD Shindant air fcarce (1963) # the expansion of 
the f a c i l i t i e s aiMS training stat ions at Haaar-i-Sharif, and the 
56 
construction of a bridge across the Amu Darya at Heyratin. 
The most epoch making treaty v.es signed on 5 December 
1978 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan (the treaty of 
Friendship* Good-ltoighbourlinesa and co<*operation between the 
^ * Ibfd. 
55 . Ibid. 
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USSR St CHA) • I t was bftsed on the principle of *oonplet« 
equality, mutual reapect £or national sovereignty and territorial 
in tegr i ty and non>inter£erenc3e in each other's internal a££alrs. 
I t was conducted with a view to *reaffirming their coamltnents 
to their aiffis and principles of the Afghan-Soviet treaty of 1921 
and 1931 which la id the basis for friendly and good-neighbourly 
relat ions between the Afghan and Soviet peoples and which meet 
their basic national interests ." It contributed to safeguarding 
the security and independence of the two countries. According 
to Article 4 of the treaty ' the high contracting parties 
acting in the s p i r i t of the traditions of friendliness and good 
neighbourliness# as well as the UN Charter# shal l consult each 
other and take, by agreement, a-propriate measures to ensure the 
security , independence and terr i tor ia l integrity of the two 
countries, i n the interests o£ the high contracting part ies , they 
sha l l continue to develop co-operation in the mil itary f i e ld on 
the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them." 
On May 27, 1979, the two Sides exchanged the rat i f icat ion 
57 
instruments and the treaty went into force . 
Ihfl UaUefl ataliliai flBfl Agahanj^atani Afghanistan has ever been 
neglected by the US. Though Afghanistan tr ied to maintain the 
balance in her relat ions with both the great powers, the US did 
not pay any attention tx> Afghanistan because of i t s geogra^^ic 
57. gt», ftlAftR ffgWg<aer> 19Q0' Vbl. XXV, NO. 1, p. 14783 
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proximity to Pakistan. Given the Pukhtoonistan issue# the US 
t i l t e d towards peXistan^^her a l l y in containing the Soviet 
expaiuiionisin in Asia* I t was only in econ^ ic terras that the 
US ^ v e the aid and assistance but rather insuff icientji_ T\m \m 
aided Helmund V&lley project to be bui l t on the l ines of Tennessee 
Valley Authority, which had floundered in the sa l ty s o i l s of 
south-^western Afghanistan* The Americans had not made adequate 
preparations for u t i l i sa t ion of the impounded v/aters of the 
HelBiund. It also brought bad name to America because of inadequate 
58 
preparations and corr»4>t implementation of the p isn . 
In 1955 the United States rejected Afghaniscan's demand 
for assistance incl ining arms and her sviqpport for pakhtoonistan* 
The US also rejected the reqtiest for assistance to build another 
trans i t route through I an t o Chahbahar on the i^rsian Gulf. All 
th i s led Afghanistan nearer to the USSR for help, aid and 
59 
assistance* 
The Americans bui l t an international airport at Kandahar 
v i th an amount of $15 mil l ion for the purpose of refuelling the 
60 
piston et^jine a iroraft . But with the Seta, the need of such 
engine was no more* 
with time, America accepted the posit ion of a junior 
participant in the economic development of Afghanistan and even 
came to t i e qp some of i t s projects with those of the Soviet 
61 
Union and East European countries. 
58. Kuldip Nayar, op*c i t . , p. 118. 
61* IhiAx 
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The vmy the two siiqiyer-powers co-ordinated theix work 
v&B amaxlng. Hie Soviets bui l t roads in the north* the Anericans 
i n the South, and the two got together to join roads at given 
po ints . Moscow prepared maps of the northern one third of 
Afghanistan, Washington of the Southern two thirds . The Russians 
b u i l t the Kabul airport* the Anericans insta l led e lec tr ica l and 
coiRmxmioations equipment for i t . Indeed* the Russians and the 
j^nericans even established an international club, open to a l l 
62 
foreigners except Chinese in Afghanistan* 
The US-Afghan relations ^ s p i t e having their manifestation 
in economic and trade have jIxjwever^been not p o l i t i c a l l y prudent 
and mi l i tar i l y helpful for Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan on Cec«naber 27« 1979* was thus a logical imperative 
of this neglect by the US and the culmination of the Soviet aid 
and assistaiv:e in po l i t i ca l* military and economic matters. 
Thus Afghanistan VAS given low priori ty by the imited 
States of America in camperiBon to Pakistan. Pakistan began to 
g e t su|)ply of anas from the US imder the U6 policy of containing 
the Soviet Union after world war I I . Both India and Pakistan were 
approached for an a l l iance to strengthen the free world ayainst 
communist aggression. India declined to be a party of such 
a l l i ance while Pakistan accepted US arms and became a tnember of 
the Baghdad pact that linked Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan* 
while to ta l ly ignoring Afghanistan. 
62 . Kuldip Nayar, SOBxSji&x* P* 120 
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The ys ro l e was ce l i be r a t e ly l imi ted , p r i nc ipa l l y by 
wa«b±n9ton*a concern over an adverse r eac t ion by Pakistan whose 
leaders s t r o r ^ l y objected to Kabul's claims t o the North west 
Front ie r on the basis of a 'push tunis tan ' t h a t would regroup 
a l l Pathans on both s ides of the iHirand Line . Largely for t h i s 
reason* Dulles declined in 1954 to extend mi l i t a ry a id to Kabul, 
and the United S ta tes l imi ted i t s e l f to an econooiic a id program 
63 
d i rec ted e s s e n t i a l l y a t the southern half of Mghanis tan . vihile 
paicistan vas provided with modern vwsapons and a id from tYm IBA, 
Afghan requests to t he USA for m i l i t a r y s i ^ p l i e s to rerwvate i t s 
armed forces met with repeated r e f u s a l s , except un<3ter vunecoeptable 
64 
cond i t i o i* . Here too the Soviet union moved i n , to become 
suppl ier to t\m Afghan amed forces , which has already been 
discussed. This led Afghanistan to lean more and more to t l » 
Soviet union for m i l i t a r y and economic a i d . Also the Soviet 
union diplomat ical ly supported Afghanistan as regards i t s stand 
over pakhtoonistan i s s u e . After Saur Revolution 1978,Afghanistan 
fur ther came under the Influence of the Soviet union. This led 
President of Pakistan Qen» Ziaul Haq warn Washington t h a t the 
balance of power had se r ious ly t i l t e d Moscow's favor, but t h i s 
65 
warning had l i t t l e or no ef fec t on the USA. Spi t l^ Soviet 
6 3 . Aroaury de Riencourt , JtB< l^4, ^Bfl P f t ^ ^ t a i ?ffgSJ»9fi Allfitfff i 
Washington, D.C., winter 1962/83, p . 424. 
6 4 . Anthony Hyman, o p . c i t . , pp. 28-29. 
65 . Amaury de Riencourt, o p . c i t . , p . 424 
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m i l i t a r y In tervent ion in Afghanistan on December 27# 1979 was ths 
log ica l outcoiMK of the constant ly increasing Soviet-Afghan 
r e l a t i o n s end the continuous neglect o£ Afghanistan by the USA* 
communist movmnent in Afghanistan s t a r t e d ir. the 50s. But i t s 
s e e ^ can be seen sprouted around 1920* Hahtnud Tarzi* an 
enl ightened Muslim and a writer* who coRRnarided eDnsiderable 
readership front Turkey t o Central ASia# returned t o Kabul from 
exi le* His paper* Seraj*iil-Aikhbar {Torch of press) was a guide 
for a yroui? of young Afghans who ca l l ed themselves the mashruta 
<cons t i tu t iona l ia t s ) . Amanullah* who became Afghanistan's JUn^ 
(1919-29) and who laarried Ta rz l ' s daughter* Soraya, ^^ faa one of 
them* rtiey were l i k e western l i b e r a l s . They read only European 
p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e * but nei ther Russian nor Br i t i sh* . 
The f a l l of king AoMinullah resu l ted in p o l i t i c a l i n e r t i a . 
The monarchy susta ined by an obsolete c o a l i t i o n of t r i b a l chiefs* 
feudal nobi l i ty* and c le rgy . The economic conditions became worse. 
The f ive peircent of the landowners owned 4S9i of the cu l t ivab le 
land. Educationally* people were alniost backward. Even in 1977 
67 
the r a t e of i l l i t e r a c y \ma 9C% for men and 9®i for women. 
66, Kuldip Nayar, o p . c i t . . p . 98 
61* M.S. A9wani* The Saur Revolution and After* 
Uaternational s t u d i e s . New Delhi* October-December 1980* p . SS8 
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The establ ishment of the Bftnk-i-Millle Afghan 
(Afghanistan national Bank) ushered an era of commercial and 
economic a c t i v i t y * B^ the mid 1970 - the number of the modern 
industry employees vas only 27#OOQ people out of the t o t a l 
68 
working populat ion of about 4 m i l l i o n . 
In 194 7, some radica l educated youths formed 
wikh<-«-zalmayan or Ai^kened Youth. Taraki vas a member of t h i s 
groi^) and i n 1949 he assumed i t s l eadersh ip . He a l s o oaine out 
with a bi«weekly« Angar (Embers) i n both E»ri and Pushtu. 
F i f t y l e f t or i ented persons were a l s o e l e c t e d t o the 120 member 
parliament i n 1949. This was the f i r s t Afghan experience of 
69 
'Liberal parliamentarism, with r e l a t i v e l y free e l e c t i o n s ^ But 
t h i s experiment was s c u t t l e d before the 1952 e l e c t i o n . 
Several newspapers aum i n oppos i t ion to the Government. 
watan (Homeland) and l3ada->i-Khalq (voice of the p e o p l e ) , were 
the t%«o important newspapers both published i n Darl. They 
70 
Influenced the un ivers i ty s t u d e n t s . 
These developm nts were s c u t t l e d by conservat ives . In 
1952# the leaders were arres ted and the nev^spapers were c losed 
down. In 19&3 Daowa imposed himself as the Prime Minister . He 
had no use of parliament and with an iron h&nd he ruled 
71 
Afghanistan for 10 years . 
68. ipi^, 
70. ipi^, 
7 1 . Ib^d^ 
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rmoud resigned in 1963. Again the dCRnand for l iberal 
parliament was revived. So* another experjjnent in th i s regard 
was made in 1963. The Loya Jii^a passed a new constitution 
declaring Afghanistan to be a 'constitutional monarchy* Islam 
was to be the re l ig ion of Afghanistan. There was provision for 
a two house parliaments Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) with 
f u l l y e lected 216 members, and Mishrano Jirga (House of Nobles) 
72 
with 84 m«mbers, 60 e lected and 24 nominated. 
on January 1# 1965 a p o l i t i c a l party« people's Dmtocratic 
party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded by Koor Mohammad Taraki 
who became i t s General Secretary. I t s central committee also 
73 
included Babrak KarBMil and Amin* 
In 1965 and 1969 e lect ions were held. But the 
constitutional posit ion was held in abeyance. Hal£-hearted 
advance toward monarchy fa i l ed to sa t i s fy the rising po l i t i ca l 
74 
inspiration of the people. 
The Press Law was passed in 196t. This l iberal ised the 
publication of ne%nipapers. Taraki started 'Khalq* advocating 
not more than land reforms and public ownership of certain types 
of property. The co^ervet ive elwnents tiere frowned MD and in 
76 
May 1966 the paper wes banned. 
73. HMx' P* S59 
74. Ib id . . p. 558 
7^» Ib id . . p. 559 
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in 1966 BabcAk iCacmal broke away from tim party and 
fomed a new party* parchaio. The Khalq got s p l i t into twos 
parcham (Flag) led £>y Babrak Manual in March 1968; and 
Shula-e-Javed (eternal flaiae} by Dr Rahin Mahmudi (pro-Beijing). 
Another fraction of 'percham* oame* Sitain-e-Hilli (Afghan 
national appression) led by Tahir Badakshah (outright maoist) • 
The Khalq and parcham were pro-Moscow. However* a l l the papers 
76 
were banned in 1969* 
in July 1977 both the Khalq and parchftin became united 
due to the ef forts made by the Soviet union and Communist party of 
India (CPl) in Kew Delhi* TYmy formed Jaaiiyat-e-deBocratiqi-e-
77 
Khalq (PPrA)# to oppose Dsoud's tyranny who came by a bloodless 
coi^ of July 17, 1973 by ousting King zahir Shah replacing 
monarchy by republic, taoud was a lso overthrown on 27 April 1978 
by tftjor Mohammad Taraki. Toraki was also overthrown by Hafizullah 
Amin in SepttHnber 1979. And on 27 December 1979* Jtoin also f e l l 
prey to another G O ^ led by Babrak Kaxmal i n the wake of which the 
Soviet military intervention took place in Afghanistan. 
7 6 . 2i}Sti&M. 
77. Rajendra Sareen* Afghan i^ Sacks Top parcham Leaders, 
TtW yjiMfff ^ . hl^lif * New Delhi. December 4 . 1978 
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AFGHAt^ ISTAKi A FACTOR IK I^rlA-PAKXSTAlJ RELATIONS 
As already aiacuffsed, Afghftnistan has s t r a t e g i o a l l y bemn 
very iinportant for India • i t had alao forned a c u l t u r a l provinca 
of India . Abul Fd2»l described Kabul and Kandhar as twin gates 
, 1 
of Hindiisten* i n the ^ I t i s h period Afghanistan acted as a 
buffer between the Br&tish India and the Czar l s t Russia. The 
Br i t i sh Indian Government t r i e d to maintain f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s 
with the Afghan r u l e r s , **iile India provided inartets for Afghan 
consuner goods. The I n t e r e s t s oi both the countxles« t h u i , have 
been co(np2.«»entary« 
Ind i e ' s independence r e su l t ed in the dlvibsion of the 
Indian sub-continent i n to t%o s t a t e s - India and pai.iatan. The 
atrnosphere oi the r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies has been 
f u l l of lautuBl d i s t r u s t and suspicion* The p r inc ip le s of the 
geographic cont igui ty and wlsl^s of the people concerned were 
abandbned in favow of the pr inces to accede t o e i t h e r of the 
2 
two doBilnlons or t o reiialn independent. Soothe problem of Kashmir 
emerged between India and Pakistan •> a major se t -back to the 
^' S !^®**.^ ** Vincent A. Smith, 9x€9ir^. WtffffY 9tJ,nm, Oxford univers i ty p r e s s , London, 1923, pp. 674-78. 
2 . K. SuLrahraanyam, Indian Sectaritv Perspeet ive . ABC Pui l loa t lons , 
New Delhi, 1982, p . l$l. 
3S 
development of good neighlsoiarly relaitions betvrecn the tvio 
countries . 
After the birth o£ Pakistan* the pakhtoonistan—a 
corrollary of the Durand l ine has plagued the relatione toetifeen 
pekistan and Afghanistan. pakhtoonistan« an area of 19*000 sq. 
miles extending frooi Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the 
3 
South, i s composed of pathan and Baluchi t r ibes . Afghanistan 
j u s t i f i e s i t s claims on the 9roun<? that these areas have been 
component parts o£ Afghanist n s tate and ethnical ly closer to the 
people of Afghanistan. The Durand Line vvas not regarded by timm 
as sine qu&non. So,the demand for pakhtoonistan challei^ed the 
very sancti ty of the Durand Line* They also decoanded from 
Pakistan free access to the sea via Karachi and a guarantee of 
mutuSl neutrality in case of attack on the either psrty* 
According to Pakistan the Durand Line# despite i t s geog'» 
raphic and ethnic absurdity* constitutes an inter rationally 
recognised frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
Treaty of 1893, according to Pakistan's interpretation, \ata not 
imposed upon Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman but signed after a 
"cordial discussion." between Abdur Ralwnan and Sir Mortimer 
rurand and a l l the succeeding rulers of Afghanistan had comidered 
i t binding \spon Afghanistan* Pakistan being the successor state 
3* Kaiim Bahadur, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan. 
Dec«nber 1980, p, 
tional I tudies , J*li«U», New Delhi, October-
~ « 646. 
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has assumed obl iga t ions and r i g h t s under the various t r e a t i e s 
4 
concluded between B r i t i s h India and Afghanistan. But Afghanistan 
considers Pakistan not a successor but a new s t a t e carved out of 
B r i t i s h Inc ia . Moreover, in the eyes a£ Pakistan the pathans 
have never been a nation and i t i s not necessary t h a t the people 
speaking a oororoon language should be in one s t a t e . 
Consequently, the r e l a t i o n s between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan have been conf l i c t - r idden from the very inception. 
While opposing Pak is tan ' s membership of the UN in September 1947, 
Hosayn Aziz, the represen ta t ive of Afghanistan, s t a t e d in the 
UN General Assemblyi "we cannot recognise the North-west Frontier 
province as p a r t of Pakistan so long as the people of North-West 
Front ie r have not been given an opportunity, free from any kind 
of inf luence, to determine for themselves whether t l ^ y wish to 
be in^penden t or t o become p a r t of Pakis tan. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, refused to consider the i ssue , 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah assured the people of NWFP the equal i ty of 
s t a t u s and autoix>my within the framework of Pakistan S t a t e . 
Pakis tan, following the Br i t i sh , adopted the close Border 
Policy in the f ron t i e r a r e a s . I t drew array from South and North 
Waziristan and spared no e f fo r t to suppress a l l those who might 
^' General Assembly Off icj^al Records (GAOR) p ied, mtg. 92 
30 September 1947, p .313. 
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h e l p A£gban cause . The prominent leaders l i k e the Fakir of Ipi* 
Khan Abdul Ghaffer Kban« and Abdur Samad Khan Achkzai were dealt 
with an i ron \mn&» When Fakir isecaine more in trac tab le i n South 
6 
viaziristan« Pakistan used a ir force t o s i l e n c e them* 
In June 1949# Afghanistan repudiated the t r e a t i e s concluded 
wi th Br i ta in regarding the t r i b a l t e r r i t o r i e s and disolmed the 
Durand Line. Atteo^ts were made to bring aiiout a rapproachwnent 
under the pressure of out s ide s v e n t s . Hov.ever, the American 
Secretary of State» Mr John Foster Dulles b e ^ n constructing 
rail i t s ry a l l i a n c e s i n Asi»# and Pakistan joined CEKTO and REhTO 
whi le Afghanis.an and India decl ined t o j o i n the Ai«erican schemes 
and fol lowed the p o l i c y of non-alignment between the two b locs . 
In I9bb the Sov ie t leaders* Khurschev and Bnlganin, v i s i t e d 
Afghanistan and declared t h e i r country's support to Afgirianistan 
on the pakhtoonistan i s s u e . Zn the same year. Pakistan deciiied 
t o turn a l l four province i n t o one u n i t . Ihe scheme v^s velwmently 
c r i t i c i s e d by Afghanistan. But on October 13« 195S* Pakistan 
7 
implemented t h i s scheme. 
On March 6« 19&6, the SEATO iMteting he ld a t Karachi l e n t 
8 
i t s support t o Pakistan on pakhtoonistan i s sue and the Durand Line. 
6 . Kftlim Bahadur, SBaSi i* ' P» ^49 
7 . l ipi^cif 
3* The Dawn. i<arachi, Kay 8 , 19SS. 
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The diplomato^c r e l a t i ons bstwoen the tvo countr ies %i>ere 
ruptured in 1961. pakistAii blocked the Afghan t r a n s i t t rade 
9 
through Khyber pass and Karachi. 
For the f i r s t time* during the prixm Ministership o£ 
Z*A. Bhutto, e lec ted goverrments v.«re i n s t a l l e d in the four 
provinces o£ Pakis tan. He allowed the formatioR of popular 
governments in Baluchistan and the Korth-west Front ie r province, 
a l t )»agh p a r t i e s other than his ovn had %iK>n the larger nunber of 
s e a t s i n t t « e l e c t i o n held in 19*70 to the assemblies in those 
two provinces . Ataullah Khan Mengal of the National Awami 
par ty (ToAP) becart^ the Chief Minister of Baluchistan. Ohaus 
Bakflh Eizenjo of t h e same par ty became the Oovernor of the 
province. In the Korth west Front ier province Jafliiat-al-Ulrea-.i-
Is lam! (Hazarvi) and the hhP fcsrmed a c o a l i t i o n aovernment under 
Mufti M&lvnood. Boviever, they were dismissed j u s t two months 
before the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1973. The official . / roedxa r e l a t ed the 
dismissals of the provincia l Governiients with the ^iAP's s t a t ed 
i n t e n t i o n of carving out autonomous pathan and Baluchi areas 
wi th in Pakis tan. 
Bhutto 's Oovernnent had not reconci led i t s e l f to those 
two KAP (^verntients. I t feared tha t the KAP leadership would 
Join vtp with Afghanistan and fan Pakhtun and Baluchi nationalism 
and sectire the secession of those provinces . The dismissal of 
9 . Kiaiim Bahadur, o p . e i t . . p . 652. 
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the Ataull%h Hengal (]ov«riiQ«nt ixi B&Iuchlatan envountftd to an 
undeclarad v«r on tha BiluMShJUi. Hoe Governnent laui^hea on« of 
the bloodiest cumpaigns agalnat the Beluchie v;ith the help of 
army and the airforce* The cainpaign lasted t i l l the overthrow of 
Bhutto by General zia-ul-Haq in 1977* Thoueandi of Baluchis %Mire 
k i l l e d and laany #ore forced to take refuge in the mountains and 
10 
i n neighbouring Afghani*tan. In the North-west Frontier province, 
the KAP %ia8 banned in 197S on the charge of treason. And most of 
i t s top leaders, along with the Baluchi leaders of the NAP, were 
put on t r ia l before the specia l ly established Hyderabad tr ibumls . 
The CQ\Mp of July 1973 by Caaud Khan in Afghanistan was 
welcomed in the Baluchi areas* Daoud gave support to the demand 
for pakhtoonistan. Afghanistan a lso raised th is issue in the \M 
General Asstmibly. Zn such conditions, Bhutto took strong measures 
againit the pakhtoons and Baluchis* Afghanistan-Pakistan relations 
became tenie but conflagration was averted through the mediation 
11 
of the Shah of Iran* 
Bhutto paid a v i s i t to Afghanistan in June 1976 to discuss 
pakhtoonistan i s sue . But neither party gave u^ their stand* 
However, they agreed to solve their mutual problims on the basis 
o. M v . p r . « . p u . ^ ^ ^ . C U X c o ^ x . . „ o i ! 
10. Far Eastern Economic RevJ.ew. London, May 28, 1976 
! ! • Itm Hinflai Madras, December 2, 1975. 
12 . Tftg BiWB< Karachi. June 12, 1976 
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After the Saur Revolution. Afg i^an rebels started crossing 
over to Pakistan as r e f u s e s . The right wing elements in Pakistan 
13 
proviaed material vid moral support to thran* 
General Zia suaasnly v i s i t ed micml in Scqptetnber 1978 to 
resolve the i s sue . Ttm T«ra)ci-2ia talks failed* Afghanistan 
ins i s t ed to look the Baluchi and pakhtoon areas in the l ight of 
14 
their h is tor ic facts* 
lUie rebel groups o£ Afghanistan after the Savir involution 
1978 vera being given training in Pakistani terr i tory . These 
groups had been organised chief ly by the Hiscb* Islami and 
Jamait-i- lslami itK^narchist part ies . Both were ideological ly 
close to the Jaeniat-i^lslaroi of Pakistan* The headquarters of both 
15 
the parties were in peshwar, now a country for (X>ntraband arms* 
Some rel igious figures vnerged as leaders of paKiatan-based 
rebel mov<nnents. Sayyid Ahmad Gaylani^ Sibghatullah Majuddidi and 
ustad Rabbani and Qulbuddin Hikmatyar were some of the prominent 
figures* sayyid Ahmad Gaylani claiming descent from prophet's 
family^ organised Ittihad-e-lnquilabe Islamiwa-Milli-e Afghanistan 
or Islamic I«Bitional Revolutionary l^ion of Afghanistan. He had 
his personal grievances as he had l o s t his land and prc^perty in 
the Saur Revolution (1978) . Sibghatullah Majuddidi c«ae to haad 
13* Feroz Ahmed, Inc|ilab Afafainistan , Karachi, 1979 # p. 57 
1^« Tfti JCiyBi Karachi, November 21, 1978. 
IS* ,;!;fitif^fi»^l9?yl,„»yg^t5^ y y ^ W f * London, February 7, 1979 
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jabho*e«Kijat-«-MilIi or Nfttional Liberation front. Ustad 
Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar headed the fundamentalist 
o u t f i t s aaroiyyat-e"islamic Association anc Hizb-«-Islar.i or 
16 
islMnic party. 
Aftsr the takiK>vsr by Hafisullah i^in in 1979# some 
partisan po l i c i es and measures were adopted in Afghanistan. 
This alienated a large number of Afghan people* The number of 
Afghan refugees continued to swell in the Pakistan territory 
and these refugees turned into rebel forces, helped both morally 
and materially by the US« China, Pakistan and Arab countries. 
After the Soviat intervention on December 27, 1979, heralded a 
nev« era in these events. The number of the refugees went larger 
and larger and support for fkism by Pakistan and others became 
more open, c lear , and enormous* 
Jmi,^ titi, ,fcfat„ ,Pft?aitearyt.ffMR m ^ t Xnaia could rot extend her 
support to the pakhtoonistan issue in favour of the either country. 
Thera was a feeling in the government c i rc l e s that i f India 
8Imported the Afghan demand for self-determination in pakhtoonistan 
she herself! may have to yield to the application of the same 
principle i n Ktshmir. s imilarly , as the Afghan government \»as 
insistingf on the application of the principle of s e l f -
determination to the pakhtoon areas, she €X}uld not st^iport the 
16. M.S. Agwani, The Saur Revolution and After,tnt^^irif U g n i | 
atudief ^ J.K.U., New Delhi, October-December 1980, p . 5i4 
17. KBlim Bahadur, op,c^it JU. 
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18 
Indian stand over Kanhmir. 
India sympathised with the Pakhtoonistan TROvament mora 
openly whenever i t s relations with Pakistan worsened. But had 
Hew Delhi real ly helped che pathans« Ghaffar Khan would not have 
saidt "You l e f t us to jackalsf you promised to help us but you 
betrayed us." In New Delhi, in 1969# he a lso saidt "India vam 
never serious about Azad pushtoonistan but used the slogan only 
19 
as a s t i ck tx> beat Pakistan with.** 
However# there came a change in India's posit ion over 
pakhtoonistan after 1961. Mr Dinesh Sinyh, the then Deputy 
m n i s t e r of External Affairs* announced fu l l support for the 
20 
legitimate aspiration of the pakhtoon people. In the united 
Nations, the Indian delegate asked Pakistan to arrive at just 
and honourable solut ion o£ pakhtoonistan dispute. Such a move 
of Incia led a spokesman of the Afghan Foreign Ministry to sayi 
*'Si£K:e unfortunately In^ia d>es not consider the right of s e l f -
determination a i^l ioat ion to the people of Kashmir, i t considers 
that people o£ Pakhtoonistan should not be deprived of th i s right. 
The matter was further c lar i f i ed by the Indian Oovernment's 
21 
f u l l support to the cause of pakhtoonistan?* 
18. H.A.S. Jafr i , In^^Afqiran Rfiftttam,! New Delhi 1947-67, p. 27. 
19. Quoted in Kuldip Nayar, o p . ^ i t . . pp. 122-123. 
20. Tx>k Sabha i^ebates, isew Delhi, Vol. 48, i%>veRtber 18 to 
December 1, 1985 
21 . J ^ mfeVtl .tJBm* Kabul, October 9, 1965. 
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The Government o£ India, however, ac^pted in toto the 
l e g a l i t y ot the Curana Line (1893} to the nuch annoyance o£ 
22 
Afglianistan. 
India-pakistan relat ions h»ve alv^eys been worsening over 
KaehiTiir iasue* The irasitrutnent of accession* which .aa signed 
by Kashmir on October 2 6, 194 7, was not accepted by Pakistan, 
Both the countries resorted to war in 194 7 and Pakistan was 
l e f t iKslding a part of the s tate by the UN sponsored cease- f ire , 
India had promised to hold p leb isc i te in Kashmir, But 
prior to p leb i sc i te Pakistan was to vacate the occopied area* 
India waited t i l l 19£»3, But initead of vacating, Pakistan brought 
cold war into the sub-continent by getting the US arse aid and 
by joining the Baghdad pa^ct, l«ter known as C^NEO, The psycholo-
g ica l atmwiphere between the two countries continued to worsen. 
Kow, the question was not o£ the demilitarisation of Kaslwnir but 
one of mi l i tar i s ion tlMireof • The i^kistani leadership adopted 
tougher vi«w« Sardar Abdur Rahia, the President of the MusllHi 
League, stated on Hove»ber 26, 1956 "we are prepared to s ign 
defence pacts both offensivs and dsfensivs with any country «(tii<sh 
23 
i s prepared to help us against our one enesny, IndiaQn August 20, 
1965 t^ Min foreign minister c^ Pakistan, Mr Z.A* Bhutto asserted: 
"It is Soolish and hypothetical to say that Pakistan has cc^cnitted 
22, The H^B^uptan yipif^^ New Delhi, October 12, 1963. 
23, The pakfstan Tines, Lahore, Nowerober 27, 1956, 
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agQression in KiaBkrir* now c«n Pakistan commit aggression 
againtt her own people," Bhutto in 196X \mnt to KOSCOW and 
suggested that Pakistan v.as wishing to coote out o£ SEATO and 
££KI0 i£ the Soviet Union f«ouia help Pakistan get Kashmir. But 
the &>viet Union ^ c l i n e d to aecept such proposal* Again in 
1963« remarking on Xnaia's offer of m mr pact to Pakistan, 
Mr 2.A. Bhutto# the then Minister for Fuel power and Resources 
said* *'let India arrive a t an equal and honourable settlwaent 
with Pakistan over Kashmir# ym can then have not one but a 
26 
thousand no vmr pactJi.** 
On the issue of Kashmir« Afghanistan has lent i t s support 
to India. The perfoanent representative of Afghanistan at the 
United Nations stated in 1962t "in the case of Kashntir, Pakistan 
claieas that the people of Kashmir have the right of s e l f -
deternination# despite the declaration by the Kashmiris to be 
27 
part of inoia.^^ This shows that in the perception of Afghanistan* 
the problems of Kashmir and pakhtoonistan, though the pcodvct of 
the same time and circuamtances, were to be dealt with 
di f ferent ly . 
Thus* Afghanistan has been an important factor in India-
pa kis tan relations* The Pakhtoonistan issue has adversely 
affected not only relat ions between Pakistan and Afghanistan but 
2£. Kill dip Nayar* SBAS^^* P* 69 
26 . Ouoted by p.V. Napeimha Rao in Parlia^nent in response to 
Pakistan's offer of 'No war pact« in 198l» !nie A^iafi 
Recorder, New Delhi, December 24-31 * 1982,vol.XXVII. 
No. 52, p . 16378. 
27. Afghanistan Wy» (Kabul), Vbl.S* No. 55, March 1962, p. 9 
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al«o betMMin Xnaia ai3d E^Kistan on account of India** atand 
vi«Hi-via pakhtooniatan. Alao the Kashmir issua has been a 
sttanbling block in the c»n£iaence building iBeaaures between 
India and Pakistan. Sisiultaneously* i t has also created bitterness 
between Pakistan ana Afghanistan due to A£gh&r:istan*s stand v i s -a -
v i s Kashmir, In mediately after 194 7 # India was accused by 
Pakistan of sufsporting the i^risinQS in the tribal areas of the 
KWFP. jev?aharlal Nehru c lar i f i ed India's position with the 
28 
following statementt 
"May I say in this connection that becauM of the 
great tension bet%fesn Pakistan and Afghanistan over 
various osatters* we are continuously being charged 
with having sec «et intrigues with Afghanistan and 
bringinc^ pressure vspon her to adopt a policy in 
regard to fNHkistan which she might not otherwise have 
done? That, of course, I regret to say, i s one of 
the nuserotm thi i^s without foun^^tion which emanate 
from Pakistan.** 
Vihen Pakistan integrated the proposed pakhtoonistan areas 
into Pakistan in I'^tb* the diplooMitic relat ions between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan were ruptisredi* India oslmly saw the scene but 
again India was blamed* This was strongly repudiated by India. 
The Deputy prime Minister for External Affairs , Mr Ashok Chanda 
maintained! "India has not interfered in any way in the internsi 
a f fa irs of Afghanistan or in i t s relat ions and cs^ntroversies with 
Pakistan and any statement to the contrary i s wholly fa lse ." 
28. jawaharlal Nehru, speeches, Pubi lefit^na nivlaifta. New Delhi, 
lk>, 26, p. 289* 
29. Ralva Sabha, pebatea. vo l , II (1955), 19-24, December, 
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India did not de«n i t proper to inediattt iMttmcn Pakistan 
and Afghanistan over p o l i t i c a l iastias whic^ might haw craated 
an i r r i t a t i o n hetimen the r e l a t i o n s o£ the t«io coun t r i e s . 
The a t t i t u d e o£ Afghanistan to%«ard8 India^pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s has been of neu t ra l i ty* while s l i y h t l y i n c l l ing in 
favour of India , In 196£ over Kutch war* Afghanistan remained 
neu t ra l and i t s delegate to the United nat ions expressed 
unhappiness about the events and des i red not to approve any 
pol icy " ^ i c h i s not aimed* before a l l e l se* a t the maintenance 
30 
of peace and s e c u r i t y in a region to which she belon<|B." In view 
of siKdi percept ions^ Afghanistan welcomed the Tashkent Declaration 
and expressed the hope t h a t "favourable and j u s t so lu t ions wi l l 
be found to a l l disputes between India and Pakistan." 
Afghanistan's a t t i t u d e towards the l i b e r a t i o n of Goa vas 
coraslderably favourable t o Inc ia , The Afghan Prime Minister 
ca l l ed i t "Just ac t ions undertaken with a view to r e i i ^ t a t i n g the 
32 
irdierent r i g h t of freedoRi to the people of Goa.* In these times* 
Afghanistan 's demand for pakhtoonistan 's autonomy vms bein^i held 
high* Pakistan \m» c a l l ed "a grea t co lonia l base i n t^iis par t of 
the wDrl<r, cons tant ly using American Sv4>plifed planes and weapons 
^^« ^"^JM^Rt 2C session* 1362 plenary Meeting* October 14* 1965* 
pp. 4-'S. 
3 1 . yhf m^\a im^t ^^ul, October 11* 1966. 
3 2. Text of the Afghan prime Min i s t e r ' s message in J>|£Q^nistan 
^SMM.* Kabul* Vbl, &« MO. 54* February 1962, p . 2 
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suppressing th« p«opl« of Wikhtoonlstan. 
In X969 prtsiasnt of Pakistan Ayub Khan had offered Nehru 3^ 
a Joint Defence Scheme. Mehru rejected i t by asking -against w»io«7 
and Buggeated to l»ve a no war pact with Pakistan which Pakistan 
did not accept. This inevitably resulted in the mutual confidence 
building between India and Afghanistan. 
AS regards Pakistan's plan to enter into the OS sponsored 
a l l iances , the views of India and Afghanistan have been the same. 
When in 1954 Pakistan concluded military agreement with the 
united States of America, the pria» Minister of Afghanistan, Sardar 
Daoud described the m mil i tcry aid to Pakistan as a grave danger 
t o the security and peace of Afghanistan. Similarly,the prime 
Minister of India, pandit jawaharlal liehru stated in parliaroenti 
"obviottily i f roilitary aid comes to Pakistan fr«»n the USA, i t 
upsets a l l kinds of balances, the present exist ing equilibrium and 
a l l that.* 
Afghanistan remained aloof from the idea of a pan-Islamic 
confederation co i led in 1947. It dismissed the idea by saying 
3S 
that i t would never »»^port such a move. For Afghanistan such 
a move was neither necessary nor expedient over pakhtomoistaa, as 
33 . m% ISEK TliJtgj Dacewber 27. 1961 
3*» ,SQ»...amR«. Karachi, October 22, 1959. 
3 5. B.S.N. Murti, Mj^ MTl^ i iSmlm, PBJlgY.i ^^ Delhi, 1953, p. 93, 
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she was notable to have su|}port froro these countries at the oost 
of pekistan. AXso/lran and Pakistan were the parts o£ western 
a l l iance systero* 
At the time of 1971 Xndo-pak war over Bangladesh 
l iberat ion , AfQhanistan Kept i t s e l f s t r i c t l y neutral. I t 
re€»gniJied rangiadesh quite scHnetitne l a t e . For t h i s generosity* 
Bhutto v i s i t ed IQabul on January 11 # 1972 and expressed gratitude 
"for not increasing our probl€«ns when \m were facing our gravest 
36 
c r i s i s . " 
Afghanistan also weleoraed the Simla Agreetnent concludtatd 
between India and Pakistan in 1974. King ^ahir Shah spoke to the 
Indian President on July 10, l972t "I trust and sincerely hope 
we are now on the threshi«>ld of an era of peace and constructive 
37 
a c t i v i t y which wi l l bring benefits to a l l peoples in the area." 
the wnergenoe of oaoud 1973 saw a tough period in pak* 
Afghan re la t ions . He advocated strong bond of friendship with 
India and Bangladesh, iis reiterated the policy of non-alignment 
i n the international a f fa i r s . Ths pekhtoonistan issus was regarded 
38 
by hlai the "national issus of great impwrtanee." 
36. Illt..Zteii ,gg la l^ift.1 N«w Delhi, Janeary 12, 1972. 
3 7. T|lg„ 9m%mmBi N*W pelhi , July 11, 1972. 
38. The Pawt^ , Karachi, October 6, 1974. 
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After the Sftur Revolution in Afghanistan (1978), the 
relatione between Afghaniatan and pakittan became oK^ re tiioraenaa. 
The refonaa o£ Taraki Goveri&nent and the communist nature of 
h i s regime cotepelled many Afghans to leave the country ana to 
take refuge in Pakistan. AS the intens i ty of the reforms 
increased in Afghanistan* the number of the Afghan refugees 
swelled in large quanti t ies . The rebel movements started with 
the repressive measures •• adopted by Amin. The Soviet 
intervention and the ins ta l la t ion of Babrak Karmal in December 
1979 further aggravated the s i tuat ion . The rebel a c t i v i t i e s 
enorm usly increased. Their cause was both morally and 
materially stjfyported by the Islamic covuntries* the united States* 
China and Pakistan. 
India asked the Government of Afghanistan to solve the 
internal problems peacefully within i t s own sphere. Morafji 
Desai* while on the v i s i t to Moscow on June 11* 1979* emphasised 
that the Government of Afghanistan should try to acquire credi-
b i l i t y among the Afghan people instead of blaming Pakistan for 
39 
i t s troubles. India had also raised the question of the 
outside sui^port to Afghan rebels at the non'-aligned countries 
meet in Sri Lanka (1979) but in rather vague terms. Morarji 
CJesai si^^gested the Government of Afghanistan to be slow in 
39 . The Times of Indfa^ New Delhi* June 12* 1979 
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reforms, on January 12« 1980 z i s expressed the view that the 
Soviet imi«>ii might have acted at the request of the ;A£ghan 
Govermient* but ^the f l i g h t of 430*000 refuge«i into Pakistan 
40 
showed the reaction of the Afghan pec^le .^ 
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan cauied 
about 400«0(K3 Afghan refugees to cross over to Pakistan with 
nearly one-half of them reported to be armed* I t had direct 
bearing on Zndia^pakistan re lat ions . India's stand vis-a«vis 
development i s in Afghanistan brought a s e t back to the 
confidence building measures between India and Pakistan* The 
intervention turned Pakistan into a front l ine s tate in the us 
global strategy and thus brought the nK>re and more super power 
presence in the Indian sub«<aontinent. I t a l so led to massive 
rearming of Pakistan which has caused threat to India's security 
and thus introduced new arms race* both qual i tat ive and quantitative 
including nuclear one serving drains on the scarce resources 
of both countries -i< i^ch might have s\»ccesBf u l ly been \ised to the 
task of economic Asvelopnent and raising the standard of l iving 
of the people of both countries. Fisrther* the intervention also 
intensif ied mutual distrust and suspicion between India and 
Pakistan. To th is may also be added regional tensions and gl^aal 
repercussions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as i t 
^O, Iftg tUfliflM* Madras. January 13, 1980. 
SI 
brought %uch intenaif ication to the second cold %»ar of vhich 
focal point i s t ) ^ developing vrorld. Th« intervention led to 
the Increased US and Soviet mval presttnce in the Indian ocean 
which i s v i t a l for India •« trade and security » I t also led to 
the US ownpaign to establish an anti-Soviet s t ra tegic consensus 
which has affected ent i re international including regional 
environraent affecting India-Pakistan relat ions ultimately. 
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THE SOVIET IKTERVENTIOti IM AFGHANXSTAKt 
REACTIOyiS AKC REPERCUSSIOKS 
On Decefiib«r 21, X979« the Sovie t trooi>8 i n t e r v e m d in 
Afghanistan t o save the tm\i i ^ r ^ i s t regime froet being toppled. 
The entry o£ tXi» Sov ie t troops i s held t o he based on the request 
o f the CoverotneRt of Afghanistan to the Sov ie t Union for innnediate 
a s s i s t a n c e and support i n the s trugg le against external agt^ression 
as the i iRper ia l i s t Interference i n Afghanistan had assumed the 
scope and form that jeopardiseed the very e x i s t e n c e of the 
Republic* the Central Cotmnittee of the PDPA# and the Govermient 
I 
of the mh<. These developments which took place during 1978 
and 1979 invoked A r t i c l e 4 of the Sov ie t Afghan Treaty of 
F r i e n ^ h i p * Good-Neighbourbness and co-operat ion (1978) . The 
S o v i e t Union granted the request of the Government of Afghanistan 
under i t « Further* tl«5 request of the Afghan Government for 
mi l i tary a s s i s t a n c e v«s in accordance with the provis ions of 
A r t i c l e SI of the tK Charter which recognizes the inherent r ight 
2 
of s ta tes for individual or co l l ec t ive self -defence. 
Hovpever* the Soviet union's presentation of i t s 
jus t i f i cat ion was tardy and her arguments were a lso se l f -
1 . A. petrov, Pyavada, Moscow, December 31* 1979. 
2 . K*p^ SaKsena, Afghanistan Conf l i c t and tlie United Nations, 
3iiltfiraft^4gT?»l g^Vl^toa* ^ w Delhi , October-December 1980, p . 668 
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con t rad ic to ry . The key quest ions llke# who was responsible 
for sending an i n v i t a t i o n to foreign troops to move in to 
Afghanistan?* or on what date vmn t h i s i n v i t a t i o n extended?* 
were not responsed by the Soviet union and i t s a l l i e s * including 
t ^ Afghan Governroent in ca tegor ica l terms. The Foreign 
Minister of Afghanistan* Mohammad Tx»t s t a t ed t h a t ths Soviet 
armed forces were there in response to the request madi by the 
l a t e pres ident tioor Mohammed Taraki i n December 1978 and 
repeated during P r e s i ^ n t m f i s u l l a h Ainin's r u l e . Mtmn the 
oppression of the Amin regime reached i t s heights* the Afghan 
National Army rose in r e v o l t on Dec«Rnber 27* 1979 and overthrew 
h i s Fasc i s t regime and the new Government with Babrak Karmal* 
3 
who was present in Afghanistan* d i rec ted the whole operat ion. 
The c r e d i b i l i t y of such statements i s doubted. If 
Pres ident Junin had long been playing i n to the hands of American 
imperialism and ant i -people reac t ionary el^nents* as s t a t ed by 
4 
the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan* Mohammad Dost* why should 
he i n v i t e Soviet mi l i t a ry in te rvent ion to overthrow him and then 
5 
execute him summarily. 
Whatever the r e a l i t y behind the en t ry of Soviet troops 
i n AfghRnistan* i t s basic aim was to prop VEp and to save the new 
Marxist S o c i a l i s t regime from being to^^led and being replaced 
3 . The Hindustan T i ^ p * tiew Delhi* January 12* 1980. 
4 . K.p, S^ksena* asuSoLl** P» ^^^ 
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by an an t i -Sov ie t rmqitm. I t waa not i n the i n t e r e s t of the 
Soviet union a t a time when the reginte of Shah in Iran was 
replaced by tYm fundamentalist Khomeni regime (1979) • And 
Bhutto wae replaced by General Zia-ul-waq in i%ki»tan (1977) and 
he sought to l eg i t ima t i s e h is m i l i t a r y regime through the 
process of I s lamizat ion . To t h i s may a l so be added various 
fundamentalist movements occurr ing in many pa r t s o£ the Islamic 
world. Such a fundamentalist urge might have crea ted repercussions 
i n the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet imion. The people 
of these republics a re very conscious of t h e i r Islamic cu l tu re 
and i a e n t i t y . Also# the r a t e of population grovfth of these 
people i s much higher than tha t of the Vtfhite Russians who hold 
key posts in the Qoverranent. Consequently« white Russian fear 
themselves to be outnumbered by Central ASi&ns* The imfriendly 
regime in Afghanistan along with Pakistan and I ran might have 
c rea ted some in t e rna l turmoil in the USSR to the detriment of the 
image of the Soviet lAiion as the Sc^r.F^ovwr* This feel ing might 
a l s o hsve prompted the Soviet Union to intervene i n Afghanistan 
t o p ro t ec t i t t e e t e r i ng on the edge of co l l apse . 
Besides, geopolitio&l and geo - s t r a t eg i c j jnplications 
could also be t raced behind the Soviet in tervent ion in Afghanistan. 
A Soviet analys t A. petrov wrote* "Cracks appeared on the notorious 
s t r a t e g i c arch t h a t ARK!ricai» have been building for decades 
6 . Bhabani Sen Gupta, ^ e ^ghQ^, Syftdrom?, How t o Live with 
Soviet Pftwer, 1980, vlkas publishing House, Mew Delhi/ p . 1 
WF«r 
Close to the southern bo xdera o£ the Soviet union ana i n order 
t o mend the crlu:K« they have sought to Isring under t h e i r control 
7 
the Afghan people. 
The grea t s ecu r i ty concern for Moscow was posed by the 
Chinese a c t i v i t i e s on the Afghan borders* The danger to the 
Soviet Union v;ould have coTne on and a f te r the s i n i f i d a t i o n of 
s inkiang which has been going on s ince 1949* According to an 
au tho r i t y on Sinkiang* while i n 1949 the Han Chinese were only 
6% of the population* by 1973 they cons t i tu ted 3&% of the 
populat ion and numbered 3.l> mi l l ion out of a t o t a l population of 
8 
10 mi l l i on . This iBe« ns t ha t the H<i n Chinese reduced a l l 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s in the region t o a minority s t a t u s except vighurs 
who ntnbered 5*1 mi l l ion or bX percent in 1973. Moris Rosabi 
has explained t h a t emigration of Han Oiinese to Sinkiang i s 
9 
hoped to win minor i t i e s over through ass imila t ion* 
The Chinese a c t i v i t i e s affected t}i« long term Soviet 
c a l c u l a t i o n . For the Russians the overriding considerat ion 
was tha t e a r l i e r in 1979 China had already t r i e d to s e t \xp a 
7, On events i n Afghanistan, Pjr«vada# jHflscQw., December 31 , 19794 
8 . Eonal H. HcMillen, C|t,|,pg,ffg ffiPI!'.ffl\iR;^S,.Pytifr fl^ FQU^ 4 P 
Sinkiang, 1949«*>77, p* 8 . 
9 . Morris Rossabi, chirf)% &m irnns ini^ fff Um, li^fg ,to %M 
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Mualim Republic o£ Pamir on the AfghAnistan territory of 
Badakhaan ana the viakhan cc»rridor. This republic would have 
adjoined Sinkiang and Pakistan held territory of Kashmir. This 
atteropt was fo i led due to the vigilance of the Afghans ana the 
Russians* but the graver implication of the fa i l ed bid were not 
10 
forgotten. 
According t o Sir Olaf Caroe *Soviet Intervention in 
Afghanistan was to a large degree pr«Knpted by a sense in Moscow 
that Chinese action In Sinkiai^ and Tibet were moves to encircle 
11 
RvMsia,** The soviet Intervention took place at a time when ttm 
Soviet union perceived herself being encircled by NATO in 
Europe in a decision taken on December 4,1979 to deploy new 
neclear miss i les in Euzx>pe. Further, the deployment of R.D.F* 
(Rapid Deployment Force) with a throit against the Southern borders 
of USSR along the Persian Gulf region stimwilated the Soviet 
union to intervene in the region. 
The United States of Aieerica v^ as osnfronted with tlw 
Hostage problem in Iran. The New Cold War had started. I t s 
focal ]E^int# in the words of Carter#was "the area running from 
the middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia." The 
10. Dev Murarkai Afghanistan, ^ r a t a a i c Diaei^t. i^ ew Delhi, 
Vol. XII, ito. 1, January 1982, p. 21. 
11. Sir Olaf Caroe, The Russian View of Afghanistan, 
^*^*rfVfi^ f niaest . Kew Delhi, Vbl* x i i . No. 1# January 1982, 
p . 33. 
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storm centTft of t h i n new c o l d war ia West and South west A«la. 
Though Europe f igures at the top of the l i s t of the secur i ty 
concerns of Jboth super ^ powers and Eastern and western Europe 
are undergoing s i g n i f i c a n t changes in percept ions and postures 
ye t the 8uper'po%Mir game in Europe i s subjec t to c e r t a i n ground 
12 
r u l e s . "In the new Cold war« China, Japan an<d even the Vvfestern 
Eruopean a l l i e s are very lukewann, leaving i t t o be pursued 
13 
e n t i r e l y by the t%*o Super povrers" 
on September 26, 1979, Saunders/ Harold H.« Ass i s tant 
Secretary for North Eastern and South Asian At f a i r s , s t a t e d 
before the Sub-Committee on Asian and p a c i f i c Af fa irs of the 
Committee on Foreign Af fa irs that "direct interference in 
Afghanistan by any country, including the Sov ie t Union* would 
threaten the i n t e g r i t y of that nation and the peace i n the area 
14 
and would be a matter of deep concsern to the United S ta te s ." 
The Soviet in tervent ion i n Afghanistan l e d t o the 
proclamation of Carter doctr ine . Hie core e^ the Carter doctrine 
was a ^0 word dec larat ioni "Any attempt by any outs ide force to 
ga in control of the Persian aulf region w i l l be regarded as an 
1 2 . K. Subrmhmanyam, o p . c i t . , p . i i 
1 3 . K. SiibrahroanyaiB, Thf Second Cold war. A.B.C. Publications< 
New Delhi , 1982, p . 11 . 
14 . Ttlff T.kBl9i9,M XB t^ft* New Delhi , September 27, 1979. 
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a s s a u l t on the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the United Sta tes of America, 
and i t wi l l be repe l led by use of any means necessary* including 
m i l i t a r y force.•* In his roeasage to the Conyress, president 
Carter s p e l t out f ive spec i f i c par t s of the ^ c t r i n e t (1) the 
Rapid Deployment Force t h a t \ ^ s being quickly assembled (2) 
enhanced naval presence in the Indian ocean and acqu i s i t i on of 
base f a c i l i t i e s in the Gulf and nor th-eas t African l i t t o r a l ; 
(3) a coiTimitment to the defence of Pakistan and t rans fe r of 
s i gn i f i can t quant i f ies of arms and db l ia r s to t h a t countryi (4) 
s t rong mi l i t a ry and p o l i t i c a l t i e s with other countr ies in the 
region; and (S) a co l l e c t i ve s ecu r i t y framework for the region 
under US auspices . Carter offered t h i s doctr ine with the label 
15 
"h Framework of Regional Cooperation* and thus clairoed for the 
Ur.ited S ta tes the r i gh t t o intervene in Arabian->Persian Gulf * South 
West Asian region to defend world c a p i t a l i s t i n t e r e s t s . And thus 
presence of the suqper^powezs began to increase in the Indian Ocean. 
In February 1980* the New York Times reported t h a t the 
Sovie ts , without reducing the large force s ta t ioned in E s t e r n 
Europe* had t r i p p l e d the s i z e of t h e i r forces in the F r East . 
They were developing naval and otli«r c a p a b i l i t i e s t ha t should 
permit thi^s t o operate simultaneoualy i n the several par t s of thm 
world. While Tisnes ana lys is maintained the US had decided to 
move a ful ly equipped army div is ion of 15000 men to the P-fv-sian 
1^* Xht, Hl'BtilMtfaHa yiBWii New Delhi, March 6* 1980. 
S9 
Gulff %d.th the Rapid Deployment Force in f uai s ^ p e . To Keep a 
permanent naval presence in the Indian ocean* the s iae of the 
Aiiteric»n f l e e t was a lso proposed in increase. 
After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the US 
presiaent« C rter expressed his opinion chat "njy opinion of the 
Russians has changed most drast ical ly in the i sa t week than in 
the previous 2^ years before that." He cal led the intervention an 
invasion - a deliberate ef fort by a powerful atheis t governnent to 
subjasate an inaepcn<3tent Islamic people." He vmrned the Soviet 
17 
union of serious consequences for the Soviet-US re lat ions . 
On Decemlaer 30, 1979 president's adviser on National 
Security Affairs Mr zbignicw Breainski ca l led the intervention 
"a qualitative new step involving direct invasion of a country 
outside the Warsaw pact through the use of Soviet armed forces. 
I t was an attempt to impose the Soviet wi l l on an independent 
18 
country." He also wished to have consultations with Western 
a l l i e s . Pakistan* China* Japan e t c . 
The United States sought to provide Pakistan with arms and 
economic aid under the commitment i t ha<! made to Pakistan in 19&9 
that if any aggression v»s committed against i t* the US would take 
!«• Nevt York Tiir.^p. i^ ew York* February 2, 1980 and June 1. 1980, 
17. rtlff. m MmMB, y tot * ^^^^ Delhi* March 6* 1980 
18. ytw HlBfiilfciB Ulrni* New Delhi,December 31* 1979 
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'appropriate a c t i o n including the use o£ force wi thin the framework 
of i t s const i tv i t ional procedure.* I t a l s o sought to help the 
cause of Afghan rebe l s by a l l mearai and throuyh Pakistan, Egypt, 
ClULna e t c . The objec t was t o contain the Sov ie t Union as far 
as p o s s i b l e . 
CHlliA ANr THE SOVIET ItorgRVEKTIOM Ih MCHMilSTMi 
China's r e l a t i o n s v i t h Afghanistan and i t s response 
towarai the Sovie t in tervent ion i n Afghanistan had now undergone 
change. In 1963 Chim concluded a border agreement with 
19 
Afghanistan Ly fonnal ly deliroitina 48 roile long border and 
t i l l 1974 i t ijad agreed to provide economic a i d of the value of 
20 
about S 72 m i l l i o n . In 1975 Nairo. the brother of Daoud, v i s i t e d 
China aud on January 1, 198S, an agre«nent was reached between 
China and Afghardstan. According t o t h i s agreeroent, China 
provided for a long term i n t e r e s t f ree Chinese loans o£ $55 
21 
m i l l i o n t o Afghanistan. 
China's proxltnity to the Afghanistan border and near i t s 
borcter the nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s a t Lop Nor i n SikiaiKi« an<3 the 
r e l a t i o n of China with Pakistan i n typ ica l forro have considerable 
e f f e c t on Afghanistan and Asian balance of power and v ice versa . 
1 9 . Gargi Dutt, China and the Develo^Meents i n Afghanistan, 
l a t e r national s tud ie^ . Hew Delhi , October-December 1980,p.597 
20* Murtafi zubeida, Afghanistan and the Asian power Balance, 
Pakistan Cgapunf^lr. Tokyo, Apri l -June, 1975, pp. 233-299. 
2 1 . Gargi Dutt, Qp«cit.» pp. 598. 
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After the f a l l of Daoud (1978), China turned i t a a t t e n t i o n 
tovaras atruygle i n Afgiianistan's rebel rooveroent and i t s 
p o t e n t i a l i t y . The Sinkiar^ report a l s o lambasted l4oscow for 
a l l e g i n g €»inplic i ty and a i d in the rebel movement by Iran, 
Pakis tan , China, and other c o u n t r i e s . In separate a r t i c l e s , 
Pravada and I sves ta had s a i d tha t Karakorum Highway was being 
uaed f o r transport ir^ arms and anmiunition and propaganda material 
fro(R China for subversive a c t i v i t y in Afghanistan and that 
Chinese ins t ruc tors %fere t ra in ing Afghan g u e r i l l a s . SinKiang 
alarmed that a l l t h a t \^«s a srooke-acreen to abscvre Sov ie t 
22 
i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Afghardstan. 
Renmin Ribao denounced tne Soviet-Afghan t rea ty of 
December 5, 1978 as extremely e v i l i n t e n t i o n s , Moscow had*openly 
clamoured that i t would intervene . . . attempting t o careate a 
p r e t e x t for the Soviet Union t o d i r e c t l y interfere i n Afghanistan's 
internal a r f a i r s , ttareaten Pakistan and Iran t o aggravate the 
turmoil , and d e s t a b l i s e the s i t u a t i o n around the Persian Gulf, 
and d e s t a b l i s e the s i t u a t i o n around the Pers ian Gulf so that 
the Soviet union can take the opportunity t o f i s h in troubled 
23 
waters. ' 
The Sov ie t in tervent ion came to Chiria both as a challenge 
a s viell as an opportunity . The chal lenge was the perception of 
2 2 . I b i d . . p . 601 
23» JMklY JRgaayli Beijung, 16 April 1979, p . c3 
^2 
i t s s ecu r i t y neeas and t t e opportunity for cecMinting the Sino-
pak-Ua cowbination. An AFP (Agence France Press) report from 
Beijing clainted t h a t China haa boosted i t s forces along i t s 75 
kilometres long border with Afghanistan in the l^mir regiori as 
t hey saw the events in Kabul as a i^w dangerous inanifeatation o£ 
24 
the Soviet policy of t rying to enc i r c l e China. 
Hie Chinese percept ions of the developments in Afghanistan 
were put s a ^ i » a t i o a l l y "within l ess ti^ian s i x t en ths the Kremlin's 
good f r iend Taraki was Killed by the Kremlin's good friend Air.in, 
and An;in was executed by Kaonal, another good f r iend of Kremlin. 
This c l e a r l y shows t h a t Afghanistan i s completely under Soviet 
con t ro l and even the s e l e c t i o n of goverraoent personnel # the i r l i f e 
and death* Iwncur and disgrace* a r e a l l Voided by Kremlin. 
Afghanistan had becc»ne only a gate through which the Soviet Union 
2S 
could enter the Persian Oulf." 
Qiina did not wish a t a l l t o have t a lks of compromise 
with Moscow on t h i s i s s u e . A , Renmin Ribao observer observed 
" i t i s impermissible to t o l e r a t e and connive a t the aggressors 
whin tlisy t r y to s t a l l for time* but forward pre-condi t ions or 
leave p a r t of t h e i r t roops behind j u s t to achieve t h e i r 
aggress ive aims*" 
24. A.P.p. d ispatch, quoted in SM, BiUY, fifWIflrf Beijing* 
December 31* 1979* p . Fl 
2 5* BBjlJjtaa RftflJiP PBffitflfe^ g g tCYl^ i Mandarian S ta t ion 
OoBSBeiitary* tmeemh&r 29* 1919* 
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Chii^ put forward thz«e principle* for genuine solution 
of the A.fQhan ptohlwan 
(1) Kithcre%i«l of the Soviet troops stould not be subject 
to any pre<»CK)ndition. It should also be beyond thm 
pale of package deal. 
(2) Afghan people should themselves s e t t l e their internal 
a f fa i r s . 
(3) All the countries in the world and their people should 
firmly support the struggle of the Afghan people against 
26 
the Soviet occupational troops• 
China did not permit any pGlit.ical solution— give and tate 
and coroprcxBise. I t sought the solution only in the ccmplete 
Soviet withdrawal of troops* 
The itost concern o£ the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was to Pakistan. But i t was late in reaction about by 48 hours, i t 
shoMi more concern about the swelling number of the Afghan refugees. 
on January 12, 1980, General Zia-ul-mq said that "the Soviet union 
might be right in her claim of having intervened in Afghanistan on 
tfm request of the Kabul government but "the f l ight of 43#ODO refugees 
27 
into Pakistan showed the reaction of the Afghan people." 
26. ^imn^ mm, ActR<ry> Bsijing, No. S79, March 20, 1980. 
27. Tftff •Ing f^t.a MsmM^j ^•v Delhi, Jani»ry 13, 1930. 
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Cteneral ZiA thought i t p o l i t i c a l l y expendient to support 
the cause o£ the Afghan raiaels through the help tram the US, 
Chii», ana others * causing much concern for i ta another 
neighbour« India. 
Immediately after the Soviet intervention* the Government 
of Pakistan rushed with a statement issued on Decemher 29« 1979« 
regarding the s i tuat ion in Afghanistan! 
"Pakistan }»m a consistent history of defending the 
inalienable right of the people of every country# big or small« 
to order their internal affairs in accordance with their own 
wishes free from dictation or im^erference by any external poifsr." 
"The Coverncnent of Pakistan* therefore* vie%irs th i s 
developnent with the gravest concern. I t s concsern i s a l l the 
more profound since the country which has been subjected to 
mil i tcry interventicm i s an islamic country* which i s i t s immediate 
neighbour and i s a m&»ber of the Islasiic cx}n£erence as well as of 
28 
the Non-Aligned Itovennent." 
Gen. 2ia made refugee problem a convenient cl iche for 
serving his purposes. He opened camps in Pakistan for the 
Afghan refugees and allowed the Jemaat-i-lslsmia* financed by 
contributions from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia* to preach among them 
28. AS.laB R^nf^y^ New Delhi* Vbl. XXVI* No. 5* January 29* 
February 4* 1980, p . 16291. 
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and through th«iB in Afghanistan, With the 
Soviets in Afghftni8tan« Pakistan f e l t insecure frcmi Afghanistan's 
s i d e . Moreover« Pakistan also continually f ee l s threatened from 
the Indian sidte. Her relat ions with India have rsot been cordial 
s ince 1947 over the Kashmir i ssue . Further* i t s internal 
p o l i t i c a l ins tab i l i ty caused by the F«RD (Movisnent for Restoration 
of Democracy) by a coal i t ion of various parties and insurgent 
rooveroents by Ealuchis and Sindhis, and i t s economic vulneralrftlity 
added n&^ dimensions to i t s stand on Afghanistan* 
66 
The Xii€ia~p&kistan re lat ioni biv« be«n acrimonious fron 
the very beginning sinca 1947—fovar wara in three decadea. The 
cauaea of t h i s aerixaony ntay not be aaoertained merely in terma 
of the military threat poaed by one to the other. The baaic 
differences in approach and method eenerging from the partit i t ion* 
i n the p o l i t i c a l s e t up, ideologies , economic systems, and the 
foreign po l i c i e s are some of the main factors of antagonism betiwen 
the two countries* 
Iridia's inage in inter-oational af fa irs came to ex i s t 
v ir tua l ly before 1947. The foundations of her international 
status were fiirmly la id in 1917 as quasi-independent ent i ty in 
foreign re la t ions . In the inter-war period, India achieved a 
measure of autonomy in international a f f a i r s , i t s interests %iere 
influential in the council of major s tates and i t s £un<^mental 
objective of security ««es rot neglected, i t s status and prestige 
increased as Indian representatives abroad became known for 
1 
their statesmattiihip. This created a uniqiie s i tuat ion which 
provided India a pla<M of primacy in world p o l i t i c s . The 
Heimsath, Charles H, and Surjit Man Singh, ,1 P4PlgfflaU<? 
History of Modern Indi^. New Delhi, p. 3 
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p a r t i t i o n did not change the in te rna t iona l s t a t e s of India . 
India continued to possess a l l t r e a t y r i g h t s , obl igat ions and 
p r e s t i ge in lwr i ted frxwn the B r i t i s h India , Her continued 
mcsnibership in the UH was not qxaestioned. 
paidLstan, on the other hand, ^aerged on August 14, 1947 
through the b i furca t ion of the Indian sub-cont inent . lAllii<e 
I n d i a , she had no image in in te rna t iona l a f f a i r s as the 
foundations of her s t a tu s were only l a i a a f t e r independence. 
2 
She was admitted as new s t a t e in the United Nations. She 
could a l so not develop a coherent foreign policy because she had 
t o consol idate the r e s u l t s of Independence by unifying i t s 
d iverse peoples . 
The concept of Pakistan v.<as invented by a few Muslim 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s in 1933 who claimed t t ia t there were two d i s t i nc t 
nat ions in Ind ia . This idea was then adopted by the Muslia 
League a t i t s h i s t o r i c nieeting in X,ahore in 1940 as implying an 
independent sovereign hc^neland for those Indian Muslims who 
3 
would choose to opt out of a Hindi doninated India* while the 
T%fo Nation theory of the Muslim League was never accepted by t.he 
4 
Hindu-dominated congress pa r ty , whose leaders were a l l for the 
c r ea t ion of a united and s t r i c t l y secular India with f u l l 
2 . iM Document in K. Sarwar Hasan and Zubeida Hasan/ 
Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan* T ^ K a s ^ i r 
Uy&SJjySLB* P» 3935. 
3 . Amaury de Riencourt, India and Pakis tan, Foreign Affa i r s . 
Winter, 1982-82, Washington, D.C., p . 416. 
4• ^b^d. 
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p r o t s c t l o n for a l l re l ig ioun minor i t ies and iiapoverished 
DUt-cAstes. 
When pa r t ion was agreed to# Indian leaders demanded 
t h a t t l ^ r e should be two dominiorai based on t h e geographicel 
con t igu i ty fac tors and wishes oi tlw people coiu;!erned* If 
t h i s formula had been accepted by Jinnah and his colleagues, 
the Kaslxnir problem would have been solved on the basis of the 
a s c e r t a i n t d wishes of the people of the S ta te of Jammu and 
Kashmir* But the MuSliro League leaders concurred with the 
B r i t i s h view tha t when paramoimtcy lapsed, the princes of the 
s t a t e s would become free to accede to e i t he r of the two dominions 
or to remain indepenc^nt* 
I n d i a ' s p o l i t i c a l evolut ion may be viewed as an 
enlargement or extension of t he ir iherited framework with major 
transformation ra the r than any abrupt change from i t* As 
regards i t s adminis t ra t ive s t r uc tu r e for conducting diplomacy 
i n sooe of i t s def in i t ions of nat ional i n t e r e s t and formulations 
of p o l i c i e s on in^portan^ subjects and i t s s t y l e of diplonacy, 
tlMs Hehru government followed the pre(»<^nts of the previous 
6 
Indian Government* AS regardi Foreign r e l a t i ons of India , 
t he re vas complete absence of mi l i t a ry mindedness. Nehru and 
5 . K. Subrahroanyam« imajaft SegUgJLtY PSgffpegt.AV8* »ew Delhi, 
p* 156. 
6 , Heimsath, Charles H. and Su r j i t Man Sinuh* op . c i t . ^ p . 3 
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o the r leaders regarded pre-1947 Indian rnilit< ry involvement as 
iropooed by the imperial i n t e r e s t s of England. The Congress 
reso lu t ions on the foreign pol icy matters in the 19208 and 1030s 
not only c r i t i c i s e d BritlAh Government to support Inoian 
i n t e r e s t s i n the l^ eacjiM; of Nations and t o press moVe s t rongly for 
the r igh t s o£ Indian overseas* and condemned the use o£ Indian 
t roops in China and west A3 la* but a l so iclentificc Ind i a ' s 
p o l i t i c a l s t ruggle viith the world's movements aga ins t imperialism 
7 
and a l l foinns o- o i^ re s s ion . 
Post 194? I n c i a ' s pol icy of n n-alignroent was not framed 
with the physical s ecu r i ty of the country chief lyiwuind. I t 
aimed mainly a t th ree pointss fu l l nat ional independexK»; a 
c a l i b r e of great importance in world a f f a i r s ; and a mediator 
providing a kind of buffer between the conf l ic t ing power groups. 
The pol icy of non-alignment was very act ive* judging each issue 
on the bas i s of i t s merit* AS such* i t v^ as the main source of 
I n d i a ' s power i n in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s and a l so v i s - a -
v i s USA and USSR, But t h i s pol icy was powerless against such 
s t a t e s as Pakistan and Chine. I n d i a ' s power in the global 
system curing the 1950»s res ted on the acknowle<^eroent of Inc i a ' s 
non-aligned ro le ^ other s t a t e s because India chose rot to s t r e s s 
n?l l i tary and economic c a p a b i l i t i e s but r a the r r e l y on the 
diplomacy to support itS objectives—except occasional ly i n 
r e l a t i o n to Pakistan vhere d i r e c t m i l i t a r y and economic po l i c i e s 
"?• I b i d . , p . S>6 
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were adopted. Such r e l i a n c e reaul ted from a conscious dec i s ion 
t o a l l o c a t e maximupn resources , internal as w e l l as external# to 
the ec^nonic developnmnt and s o c i a l progress of the country and 
to avoid as far as prac t i cab le d isplays of tangib le coercive 
8 
power. 
Pakistan formulated i t s p o l i c y v i s - a « v i s India i n the 
wake o£ a psychologicail background o£ Two-Nation theory and 
g e o p o l i t i c a l i m e c u r i t y . So,Pakistan, fr^n the s t a r t a t trac ted 
greater western sympathy than India due to the greater ease in 
personal contact with Pakistani leacto^s than with Indians . 
Early i n the f i f t i e s Pakistani l e a s t s brought the cold war into 
the sub-continent by joining CEf^ iTO and SEATO. Pakistan began to 
rece ive arms from the United States re su l t ing in to operation 
Gibraltar d e l i b e r a t e l y planned and executed by Pakistani leaders 
and in 1965 Rann of Kutch war. From 1959 onwards Pakistan 
s t a r t e d c u l t i v a t i n g China. When i n 1965# menbers of the Pakistan 
National Assanbly from East Bengal questioned about the secur i ty 
of East Bengal, the reply was that i t v;as being looked a f t er by 
9 
China. Before 1971 %<aV between India and Pakistan over 
Bangladesh, the Iftiited S t a t e s , ChiiA and Pakistan at t«»pted to 
e s t a b l i s h a Washington «> pindi -> Peking a x i s . Aa Kiss inger's 
s e c r e t t r i p to Peking became p u b l i c , and i t became evident that 
8 . I b i d . , p . 65 
9 . K. Subrahmanyam, iaa»jSil., p . 158. 
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t\m Unitea States ana China v^ere l i n i n g \ip behind Gen. Y&hya iO^n* 
In<3ia concluded the Xndo-Soviet t r e a t y of Peace and Friendship 
(1971) . The t r e a t y res tra ined China and the lAiited States froin 
10 
a c t i v e l y intervening in the war over the l i b e r a t i o n o£ Bangladesh. 
AS regarcs India 's domestic scene* India has been an open 
compet i t ive po l i t i o a l system - a s o r t of par t i c ipa tory democracy. 
There have been various p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s contending for power 
Vvithin an e l e c t o r a l proces s . The government i s vievwd as 
l e g i t i m a t e . There e x i s t s xidte^spread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i c y 
a t a l l l e v e l s . There i s a l s o a £air balarce between various 
governmental a u t h o r i t i e s . The ro l e of m i l i t a r y i s confined mainly 
to tYm defence needs. Also^ considerable freedoms and r ights are 
widely observed* The minor i t i e s hc.ve been provided spec ia l 
r i g h t s to safeguard t h e i r culture# education and identity«- <fertain 
r e s t r i c t i o n s have been imposed on freedoms in the publ i c i n t e r e s t . 
Mean%Aiile» Pakistan has developed along conservative 
l ines# but witJiout the bene f i t of the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and 
c o n t i n u i t y . She has passed through a a e r i e s of p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s . 
Under Mohammed Al i Jinnah Pakistan moved towards the p l u r a l i s t 
democracy. After h i s death« t h i s t r a d i t i o n came to an end. And 
with a few except ions s i n c e then m i l i t a r y force and 
author i tar ian theocracy have been the main instruments of 
1C>- I b i d , . p . 160 
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governing i n P a k i s t a n . Ttm p o l i t i c i a n s , who formed governrnent 
a t the tlm« of in^tependence irom t h e B r i t i s h r u l e i n 194 7, 
belonged to -he Mii^llm League %^ich had l e d t h e movement for 
P a k i s t a n . Af te r the eiMsrgence of P a k i s t a n , t h i s p a r t y got 
invo lved i n many a f i s s l iparous s q u a b b l e s . 
The B h u t t o ' s regime expe r i enced t h e 1 9 7 3 c o n 8 t i t u t i o n . 
But h i s e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y of March 1977 wes too svreeping t h a t 
t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s d e c l a r e d a na t ion-wide a g i t a t i o n . The 
a g i t a t i o n brought General Z i au l Haq t o power th rough a m i l i t a r y 
t a k e o v e r . He I n i t i a l l y promised t o e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n Pak i s t an 
t o democrat ic r u l e . For t h i s purpose , gene ra l e l e c t i o n s t o the 
P a k i s t a n Nat iona l ASs©t»bly were he ld i n February 1985 on a 
11 
non -pa r ty b a s i s . I n March, 1985 Gen. 2 i a -u l -Haq c r a s t i c a l l y 
changed the 1 9 7 3 - c o n s t i t u t i o n and gave himself u i^recendented 
12 
d i c t a t o r i a l powers . He became p r e s i ^ n t for ano the r f i v e y a r s 
13 
on t h e b a s i s of referendum he ld i n December 1984, He nominated 
Mr Mol^romad Khan Junejo a s h i s prime M i n i s t e r . The m a r t i a l law 
14 
a l s o came t o end on 1 s t J nmry 1986, wi thou t changing the 
p o s i t i o n of P r e s i d e n t Z i a -u l -Haq . 
! ! • TJiPWi, 9f IXif^^* New D e l h i , February 26 , 1985 
1 2 . i ^ i ^ # March 24, 1985 
13« I b i d . . March 25, 1985 
14* i f a i ^ ' ' J anuary 2 , 1986 
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General Zia'a ultimatA just i f loat ion £or military rule 
i n i t i a l l y came to reat on hUi pledge to lalawiee the Pakistan 
soc ie ty . Zt i s doubtful ana untenable i f ZiM*a Zslamization 
strategy could bestow i t any legitimacy. But he has been 
successful in manipulating the geopol i t ica l posit ion of Pakistan 
s ince the f e l l of the Shah of Iran and the Saur Revolution 
in Afghanistan* These events enormoiMly increased the interest 
of the United States in the s t a b i l i t y of Zia's regime• A 
roilitarised Pakistan i s necessary to the s trategic consensua 
policy of the US in South-west Asia. 
In the realm of economic development* India has adopted 
the strategy of balanced growth and comprehensive planning. 
Through f ive year plans* Inc'ia hai^ens the ninth largest 
industrial po% r^ in the v/orld. Three major problems have been 
solvedi there are plenty of savings for investment} the Green 
Revolutioni and a reasonable amount of foreign exchange* S\ye 
manufactures v ir tua l ly a l l of i t s consumer goodb* therefore 
imports as l i t t l e as poss ible . In oase of a global economic 
depressioOf India i s largely insultate^l from the buffeting of 
external forces . With a l l that* i t produces i t s own computers* 
has launched spacw rockets* and possesses nuclear know-how 
15 
and power. 
15. Ameury ce Riencourt, pp,.94.t^. pp. 418-419. 
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Pakistan* on the o ther hand* i s predominantly 
a g r i c u l t u r a l . Her i n c u s t r i a l development was pushed undter'^he 
auspices of s t a t e bureaucracy* Soon a f t e r Independence* the 
Qoverrment o f f i c i a l s adopted rapid i n c u s t r i a l i s a t i o n as t he i r 
credo because they considered the Indus t r i a l s t r e r ^ t h of 
neighbouring India a t h r e a t to Pakis tan ' s s u r v i v a l . The 
measures were adopted to encourage free en te rpr i se* including 
import controls* tax exemptions* r e s t r i c t i o n on labour unions* 
foreign exchange bonuses and d i r ec t involvement of the s t a t e in 
s e t t i n g up indus t r i e s th ro i^h Pakistan Indus t r i a l Development 
Corporation (PIDC) and t r ans fe r r ing the same to the p r iva te 
16 
8ec t<^ • 
During t h e Ayub era (19S9<»69} Pakistan entered a new 
phase of eojnomic ^velopment* American a id and investment 
flowed in Pakistan through m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , American 
advisers* economic and technical experts and planners played a 
leading r o l e in the count ry ' s development s t r a t e g i e s and p lans . 
The ent repreneur ia l r o l e of the Sta te ^^ as fur ther enham:ed. 
Bhutto 's period saw the nat ior jai izat ion programmes. Gen. 2 i a - u l -
Haq*s regime saw the eiKarmous Jtaierican aid and ass i s tance 
(mi l i tary and e€x>nomic} in the vake of the changing circumstances 
i n I ran end Afghanistan, Thi r ty seven years l a t e r , the re i s no 
16, HttBsan h. Gerdezi.* Pakistani Emergence of Bureaucratic 
Milicary Oligarchy* paty-io^. Kew Delhi* April 1* 1985. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t change* Although aome modest i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n has 
taken p l ace^ i t continues to depend on foreign a id and a s s i s t ance . 
kh i l e India remains the dominant i n d u s t r i a l power in the region* 
One o£ the causes of Pak is tan ' s low economic development i s the 
more emohasis on defence expenditure, iter defence expenditure 
17 
(per capi ta) i s about twenty one times more than t h a t of India* 
The atmosphere between India and Pakistan i s emotionally 
highly charged. The c lose cu l tu ra l* l i n g u i s t i c and r a c i a l 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Indians and PakistanSu^could not l^ad to harmonise 
na t ional d i f ferences . The Pakis tani leadexnship developed a sense 
of s ecu r i t y and i d e n t i t y . I t s sense of iAiecur i ty a l so grew 
from the dis tance betv^en i t s Eastern and Vv'estern par t s separated 
by India and £rom i t s i r i i b i l i t y to gain Kashnnir. So« Pakistan 
sought to defend her exis tence aga ins t India* And in doing so 
Pakistan projected India as an aggressive Hindu s t a t e* The case 
of Kashmir-a MufBlim majori ty «reai.«>wa8 c i t e d as an example 
wherein India had refused t o re l inqu ish her control over t h a t 
s t a t e * A Karachi daily* 'The Dawn' advocatedt "if the main 
concern ol Chr is t ian Viest i s the containment of Chinese communism* 
the main concern of Muslim Pakistan i s the containment of 
m i l i t a r i s t and m i l i t a n t Hinduism. 
17* Atmury de Rieixx>urt* o p . c i t * . p . 422 
18* T|y a%ifn. Karachi* April 26, 1963, 
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Pak i s t an ' s foreign po l icy , with such payclK>lo4iic«l 
background, was pursued to s«ek external support to recaress ths 
geopo l i t i ca l inequa l i ty v i s - a - v i s India and to achieve a favourable 
19 
settl«B»ent on Kaslnnir. Three important elements of Pakis tan 's 
foreign pol icy Wave been* to ensure nat ional secur i ty* to crea te 
ana achieve 8,>liaerity with is lamic world* and t o acce le ra te the 
econotoic development through fr iendship i^ith other coun t r i e s . 
For a few years a f t e r 1947* Pakis tan ' s po l i c i e s on the world 
20 
problems were s imi la r to those of Ind ia . But Pakistan did not 
l i k e I n d i a ' s increasing ro l e and inf luence. Secondly* B r i t a i n ' s 
indifference to Pakistan in the disputes with India disappointed 
pak is t n. Thirdly* the re v^ -as a l so lack of Arab i n t e r e s t i n the 
proposed Islamic f ron t . All these fac tors led Pakistan to the 
Great powers for a i d . Simultaneously* the us was extending the 
po l i cy of mi l i t a ry aligranent in to Asia. The us-pakiatan deferne 
agreement end the membership of Pakistan in regional a l l i ances 
improved Pakis tan ' s mi l i t a ry c a p a b i l i t y . But her r e l a t i o n s with 
21 
India got more i n t e n s i f i e d . 
The <3teep sea ted d i s t r u s t of both the countr ies agains t each 
other has served as stumbling block t o improve t h e i r r e l a t i ons with 
each o the r . Burt: from time t o time* the Two Governments sought 
19. Heimsath Charls* H. and Su r j i t Man Singh* o p . c i t . ^ p . 122 
20. B.C. Rastogi* Alignment and Non-alignment in Pakis tan ' s Foreign 
poi^y* Ia^ytfrt^a.fffii3i 8.ttiair§ff>JN^*N.Deihi* v o i . m , 
October 9* 1962* p . 16S. 
2 1 . Heimsath Charles H and S u r j i t Han Singh* ^ p . e i t . . p . 122 
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so lu t ions t o t h e i r sit i i i lar a i££icul t i«8 in the waks of 1947* 
The issiies on which agreement took place e re t refugees o£ 
the minority communities # t h e i r s e t t l ^ n e n t and compensationi 
c iv i s ion of p r e - p a r t i t i o n a s s e t s ; ane a l l o c a t i o n of the waters 
22 
of the Indus r iver basin* The ¥&almkr issue* the symbol of 
p o l i t i c a l r i f t betvieen the tvo s t a t e s has been unresolved t i l l 
today. After the so-ca l led 1966 syndrome in India and the 
1971 syndrome in Pakistan* a ne%^  chapter s t a r t e d in India-pakistan 
r e l a t i o n s with the Siaila Agreement signed in Ju ly 1972. i t 
emphasised the resolves of the two countr ies to s e t t l e a l l 
d i f ferences by peaceful means. I t a l so l a i d s t r e s s on the 
countr ies* oawnitmenta t o peaceful co-existence* respec t for 
each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y arwl sovereignty and non-
in te r fe rence in each o t h e r ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . lt\e agreement 
fur ther went on to de t a i l the various spheres in which 
23 
co-opera t ion between the two countr ies should be enco\iraged. 
Subsequent to the Simla Agreement a nunber of agre«nents 
were signed and s teps taken to develop t h i s mutual co-operation 
24 
i n various f i e i a s . The agre«Hnents a r e : 
1. Bangladesh* India , Irakis t an agre<»Bent signed in 
New r » l h l on April 4 , 1974 on the r e p a t r i a t i o n of 
nr isoners and c i v i l detenus. , !>«* ' 
/^s /3 7 y 
22. Ib | .d . . p . 123 
23 . K.D. Sharma* A Deca^ o£ ln<%3-pak RelatiiOltisi; 
gtifi^ ffiSllrff P t o g t ' N«w Delhi. April 1985. pp . 393-394< 
24 • ^bit^^ 
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2, Th© Agreement on the releauie and r e p a t r i a t i o n of 
persons detained i n e i t he r country p r io r to the 197X 
conf l i c t signed on 9 April 1974. 
3,k An agreement on postal services signed on 14 Septoaher 1974^ 
4 . Agre^nent on r e so r t ing telecommunication l inks between 
the two countr ies signed on 14 September 1974, 
5. A visa agreement for es tab l i sh ing t r ave l f a c i l i t i e s 
between the two countr ies signed on 14 Septwnber 1974. 
6. A pilgrimage protocol signed on 14 Septcmiber 1974* 
7. An agreement for stopping h o s t i l e propaganda over 
t e l e v i s i o n and radio signed on 14 September 1974. 
8. A protocol on resumption of t rade between Int?ia and 
Pakistan signed on 30 November 1974. 
9 . A t r ade agreement between India ana Pakistan signed on 
23 January 1975 which led to the opening of p r iva te 
sec to r t rade between the two coun t r i e s . 
10. A shipping protocol signed on lb January 1975. 
11 . Agreement to r e s to re Civi l Aviation l inks between the 
two countr ies which was a r r ived a t i n discussion in 
Islamabad between 12-14 Hay 1976. 
12. Agreement to r e s t o r e diplorastic r e l a t i ons between the 
two countr ies which %#a8 reached in discussions in 
Islamabad between 12-14 May 1976. 
13. A Rail agreement between the two countr ies which was 
signed on 23 June 1976. 
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In 197?« the martial law was inipoaed to^ Gen. Zia-ui.Haq 
in Pakistan. The nev regime eiai.ned a "special new demarche in 
extending a hand of friendship to India.** I t has also endeavoured 
to accelerate the process of normalisation of re la t iom with 
In<3ia. However« in 1978 the Pakistan Government declined to 
renew the trade agreement which was signed in January 1975 for 
2b 
three years. 
Takii^ into account their respective courses of developmeiA 
i n the past 38 years# i t i s understandable that Pakistan %fould 
fear the might of India not just i t s undoubted military 
superiority due to sheer nunbers# but a lso the potential for 
economic ai^ cultural absorption if i t comes too close to i t s 
giant neighbour. Right now* trade and economic relat ions 
between Uiem are negligible* even though In<5ia could supply 
v ir tual ly a l l ttxe consumer requirements of Pakistani but th is 
precisely what the leaders of Pakistan do not want. Over the 
longer term they fear that a c lose economic and cultural 
relationship %<ould gradually lead to a <tefaeto absorption of 
Pakistan or a t l ea s t reduction to the status of a s a t e l l i t e and 
26 
in e f f ec t , partly null i fy the a>stly part i t ion of 1947, 
25. ^^id. 
26. Aaiaury de Riencourt* gp,,ffji,^ ,* p. 418. 
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IMEIA.PAKISTMV RELATXOlJS ^ mmOVEEEm OR mTERIORATIOii AFTER 
The Soviet In tervent ion i n Afghanistan on December 21, 
1979 Cftu«ec! a cV^in of r eac t l one . I t led to the formulation of 
t he Carter Doctrine* the cons t i t u t ion of the Rapid Deployment 
Force* grea t ly increased US and Soviet presence in the Indian 
Ocean* anc the US campaign to e s t a b l i s h an an t i -Sov ie t s t r a t e g i c 
c nsensus. 
The Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan brought 
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n to the second cold v/ar which commcmced with the 
breakdown of US Sovi< t t a l k s on Lhe Indian ocean issue and the 
conventional arms t ransfer i s s u e . Ttte f a l l of the Shah was for 
the second cold v^r what the Chinese communist revolut ion was to 
the f i r s t . One could draw a s imi la r analogy between Afghanistan 
1 
i n 1979 and Czechoslovakia i n 1948. 
The developing world forms the arena of the second oold 
war. The Soviet help t o Angola and MOiiarobique was seen by the 
US as an attranpt to dcjroimte the Southern s e a s . The Soviet 
support to the Ethopian regime* the coup i n South Yemen (1978) 
and the Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan (1979) have been se^n 
1 . P.B. SinhB, Pak i s tan ' s Role and I t s Implicat ions, The 
second Cald war, ed i t ed by K, Subr«ihmanyam, t^v Delhi, p . 66 
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by the US as & prelude t o oloeiny i n OIK. Saudi Arabia and 
2 
con t ro l l ing the Bab-el-Kandeb waterway. Secondly, the enveloped 
nations are tnore dependent now on the raw mater ia l s and markets 
o£ the developing countr ies ti^ian ever before* Also t i n orcter to 
avoid secular s tagnat ion r i c h countr ies need an ever increasing 
r a t e o£ development v^ich nust be accompanied by an o u t l e t for 
3 
t h e use or t h e i r growing cap i t a l s tock, v^hile poor countr ies 
need an acce le ra t ing r a t e of development to increase the i r exror t 
4 
po t en t i a l for avoiding d e f i c i t i n baianc» of payment. Thi rd ly , 
some of the developing countr ies occupy v i t a l s t r a t e g i c locat ions 
or cons t i t u t e appropriate s i t e s for e l ec t ron ic survei l lance 
5 
s t a t i o n s . Fourthly, the second cold war tends to divide the 
ron-aiigned in to t t o se leaning towar<Ss the US and some other 
6 
leaning towards the Soviet Union. F i t t h l y , the second c»ld 
war continyes to iD^>ose s t r e s s anc s t r a i n s on the developing 
coun t r i e s . Arms t r ans fe r s and ecDnomic a id a re the potent means 
to manipulate them. Also, the deveK^ing worlc continues to be 
sub jec t t o increasing in te rven t ion , p ressures , and arms r ace . 
Las t ly ana important ly , the Indian ocean has become a focus o£ the 
new cold v«r confrontaticm. External involvement here has 
IMJ^» p. 20 
M.L. Jhingan, y|W gfiOnaffla-CT 9^ g<gYfiilgttlff^ B^ MM ?l%mkmi 
Delhi, p . 1. 
K. Subrahroanyaro, (ed) , Tllf ^99M ffftl^g,'f^ftF* ABC, i^w Delhi, 
1982, p . 21 . 
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grown crea t ing more regional I n t t a b i l i t i e a and invi t ing further 
7 
involvement iy ex t r a - r tg iona l powers. The US Central Command and 
a c q u i s i t i o n o£ f a c i l i t i e s In various Indian ocean l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
ind ica te the type of involvement of the super*powers in the 
Indian ocean* 
Pakis tan . in the wake of the second cold var and espec ia l ly 
following the Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan* emerged as a 
f r on t - l i ne s t a t e in the US global s t r a t e g y . In a repor t prepared 
by Francis Fukuyamafor the Rand Corporation e n t i t l e d the secur i ty 
of Pakistan in SeptemlDer 1980* Pakistan was given a v i t a l ro le 
in the overa l l us s t r a t egy for the Persian Gulf. The Pukuyama 
report s t a t e s th ree advantages from t h i s r o l e . Firs t« the United 
S ta tes i s cur ren t ly building a Rapid Deployment Force (REF) to 
p r o t e c t western access to oil) - Pakistan could serve as an 
extremely important entrepot for an RTF moving in to the Persian 
3 
Gulf frtxn the e a s t , i . e . from Diego Garcia or the Ph i l ipp ines . 
Fur ther , the loss of access to Chah Bahar (Iran) naval port could 
9 
be compensated by F^rachi and Gvvadar por ts i n Pakis tan . The seconds 
i t would f a c i l i t a t e d i r ec t Mserican a id t o Afghan rebels thus 
7 . p .K.S. Mamboodrif In tervent ion in the Indian ocean« 
The Second Cold »iar. ed. by K. Subrehmanyaro, New t e l h l , p . bl, 
8 . Cited in P.B. Sinhe, SBjtSiix* p . 67 
9* Ibid. 
03 
kecDlng Soviet r«8ouirc«s and attcuction engaged i n Mghanistan and 
*^ 10 
aviay from areas ot g rea t e r i n t e r e s t t o the US, l i k e Europe. Last ly, the 
Pakis tani Army and i t s contingents already s ta t ioned in several Gulf 
11 
s t a t e s could serve as a proxy force f ighting i n the Persian Gulf. 
In the sub-oontinental context , abouS 430,000 Afghan refugees 
12 
povtf-ed in to Pakistan follovfing the Soviet in te rven t ion in Afghanistan. 
t\» l imi ted economic resources of Pakistan could not allow Pakistan 
Government to su s t a in the economic burden for a long time without 
foreign economic a s s i s t a n c e . Also,the Soviet armed forces on the 
Afghanistan-r^kistan border with the r e spons ib i l i t y of defending the 
13 
Afghan border impelled g u e r i l l a a t t acks from the Pakistan s i d e . 
The Soviet in te rvent ion i n Afghanistan developed ce r t a i r 
i n b u i l t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in Pakis tan. The uS and her a l l i e s 
came out to provioe a l l necessary a id t o Pakistan. The Carter 
regime s t a r t e d wooin*si Pakis tan, and offered the $ 40o mi l l ion US 
m i l i t a r y and economic a i c . But palcistan needed more to avoid 
s t agna t ion . And the a id c^Gomitments from European nations t o her 
were e i t h e r modest or none a t a l l . Pakistani o f f i c i a l s were 
disappointed by a seeming decline of i n t e r e s t on the pa r t of donor-
n a t i o n s . Saudi Arabia ya^m negot iat ing with Pakistan t o provide 
14 
v^ t o $ 750 mi l l ion to help i n m i l i t a r y bui ld 19. But Pakistan was 
i i » I>3id^ 
12. T ^ T ^ s 9f IrA-^' N«w Delhi, l»rch 7, 1984. 
13 . M.P. Sr ives tava, gQYin iBtirVftmffP to Al^tiaBi?tiP* Delhi* p . 45 
14. washipaton POf^, Washington, March 8, 1980. 
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asking for about $1*5 b i l l i o n year in economic a i d from a 
1£ 
var i e ty of sou 'ces Including the US* As a r e s u l t Pakistan 
re jec ted the US oi fer o£ $400 m i l l i o n as 'peanuts' a i d . To 
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq the 'acceptance of the us o f fer would have 
16 
detracted from* rather than enhanced* our securi ty^ Pakistan 
s p e c i a l l y d i s s o c i a t e d i t s e l f from any US i n i t i a t i v e to introduce 
r e l e v a n t l e g i s l a t i o n on the a i d package i n Congress. I t i s . 
Agha shahi s a i d , a matter of h i s tory that a provis ion i n the 
1959 agrewnent for a s s i s t a n c e to Pakistan remained in-operat ive i n 
17 
the 1971 c o n f l i c t betiMien Pakistan and India*. General zla«ul-Haq 
waited for the US a d n i n l s t r a t i o n to r a i s e i t s bid which the 
Reagan adkninistration did and General 2ia accepted the US $3.2 
b i l l i o n m i l i t a r y and economic package. In t h i s respect General 
z ia sus ta ined a dialogue with the Sov ie t Union, even while 
p lay ing the r o l e of a conduit for arms to Afghan insurgents and 
project ing an image of a confronta t ion i s t and f r o n t l i n e s t a t e 
v i s -a<^i s the Sov ie t Union to the US a d n i n l s t r a t i o n . Congress, 
18 
and the media. 
The Soviet in tervent ion in Afghanistan a l s o brought China 
c l o s e r t o Pakistan. On March 6, 1980, the then fore ign minister 
of Pakistan, Mr Agha Shahi, expressed "Pakistan must primarily 
15 . a ? Ifto^M* Hadras, February 30 , 1980. 
16. Cited in aiabani Sen Gupta, o p . c ^ t . , p . 150 
18. P.B. Sinha, a m s i j t * ' P» 68 . 
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r e l y on i t s own s trength . . . as well e s the tl2ne«>tested 
19 
fr i endsh ip o China." The Chinsae couia extend a id to insurgents 
operating in the north-eastern provirices of Afghaniste n using 
the mountain peases cut t ing through the narrow neck of land 
connecting Afghanistan with Sinkiang :^  and then could a l s o funnel 
a i d to rebel groiQjs operating from Pakistani t e r r i t o r y a s well as 
i n Afghan provinces c le^e to the Pakistani border. The Chir^se 
fore ign m i n i s t e r , r^ r Huang Hua, was the f i r s t fore ign dignitary 
t o v i s i t islatnabed a f t e r the Soviet in tervent ion! his ta lks with 
Gen. Zia-ul-Baq and Agha Shahi covered not only Chinese a id to 
Pakistan and the Afghan rebels but in yreater depth the global 
20 
s t r a t e g i c response to the S o v i e t c h a l l e n g e . Hu&ng a l s o v i s i t e d 
an insurgent camp located on Pakistani t e r r i t o r y , and assured the 
21 
Afgharji t h a t t h e i r cause enjoyed in ternat iona l backing. Huang 
a l s o denurred i n cominitting d e f i n i t e C^iinese contr ibut ion to the 
22 
arming of Pakistan* 
The Sir^-Pakistani united front aga ins t the Soviets i n 
Afghanistan had some p o l i t i c a l advantages with l e a s t deterring 
impact on the S o v i e t s . After the Sov ie t in tervent ion in 
Afghanistan, General zia-ul-Haq t o l d Xinhua that "Pakistan i s 
19• Pakistan Tiroes, Lahore, March 7, 1980. 
20. Bhabani Sen Gupta, o p . c i t . , p . 168 
21* iJ2iJk' P- 169 
22. IPHs 
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threatened* Iran i e e i K i r c l e d . I t i s an outt lanking movement 
23 
ayalrait China as v^ell*' 2.ia in a t e l e v i s i o n interview on March I* 
1980 a l s o s a i d thut China had given Pakistan a good deal of 
m i l i t ry hardware - nd would continue to ^ so . * . . China was 
24 
a s s i s t i n g Pakistan v.ith the supply of Mig-19# tanks anc, i^unboats. 
China had rush d c e r t a i n q u a n t i t i e s of arms through the Kara K r^am 
hightmy immediately a f t e r the Sov ie t in tervent ion in Afghanistan. 
The US-pak-Chinese s t r a t e g i c a x i s has c e r t a i n reporcussions 
v i s - a - v i s I n c i a . The h i s t o r y shovs that American arms a id has been 
used against I n d i a . Francis Fukuyama, i n his report on the 
Security of Pakistan, l a i d <town, •*The central point ma<^ by the 
o f f i c e r s in-charge of planning a t the Jo int Staff Headquarters and 
by numerous other Pakis tanis was tha t regardless of what happened 
on the Western border* Pakistan's Rtajor pre-occupation WQS and 
25 
would remain indiaV Several other western observers including a 
US congress iorai team which v i s i t e d Pakistan i n October 1981 have 
a l s o come to conclude that India i s and w i l l continue to be the 
pr inc ipa l concern of Pakistani armed forces notwithstanding the 
26 
developments i n Atghantstan, Pakistan planned the ra is ing of f i v e 
new divis ioris over the ne>t two ^ a r s to double the deployment along 
2 3 . Cited i n Bhabani Sen Gupta, aa»iSiJ»" P* 170. 
24. The Times of Ipd^a,, New Delhi , March 2 , 1980. 
2 5. Cited in p.B. Sinha, Q D . C ^ ^ , . p . 70 
26. Ibid. 
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t h e Afghan bordsr wi thou t reduciiite i t s pr«»ent s t r c n y t h on the 
27 
Ind i an f r o t t . Ino ian defence e x p e r t s a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t g iven 
A f g h a n i s t a n ' s ruyged mountaneous t e r r a i n wi th narrow r o a ^ 
runn ing th rouyh h igh roountains# the s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons l i k e 
an armoured personriel c a r r i e r w i l l be exposing i t s e l f t o g r e a t 
r i s k of d i r e c t r»avy i n c a p i c i t a t i n g f i r e which wouia not only take 
a heavy t o l l of i t s human cargo b u t vfould a l s o b lock t h e narrow 
roadways which c r i s s c r o s s the tough t e r r a i n s . Eyperts be l i eve 
t h a t an i d e a l o p e r a t i n g s u r f a c e for armoured pe rsonne l c a r r i e r s 
l i k e t h e Howi taers , i s a v e s t expanse of even ground—something 
28 
l i k a tl^e I n d o - p a k i s t a n i b o r d e r . 
The S o v i e t i n t e n ^ n t i o n i n Afghanis tan brought new contours 
i n t h e us-pak c o l l u s i o n which have d i r e c t b e a r i n g on In<2ia's 
s e c u r i t y , r r Henry Kiss inger conceived t h e S o v i e t a t t a c k on 
P a k i s t a n imposs ib le and saw t h e r e a l t h r e a t i n t h e Indo-Sovie t 
c o - o p e r a t i o n . To hira "Inflia may s e e k , wi th s p l i t t i n g Ba luch is tan 
and the NWFp and occupy (Pak i s t an held) Kashmir* Both India and 
29 
t h e Sovie t Union would then be sur rounced by weak c l i e n t s t a t e s . " 
Following t h e Sov i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghanis tan/ Indb . -pak 
r e l a t i o n s hav« been a f f e c t e d a s f o l l ows ; 
(1) I n d i a ' s s t a n d v i s - a - v i s developments i n Afghanis tan adve r se ly 
a f f e c t e d the p r o c e s s of conf idence b u i l d i n g bet%»een Ind ia and 
2 7. TIW, nim^i Madras, February 3 , 1980 
2 8 . Asian Recorder . New Delhi* October 29 - November 4 , 1985, 
Vbl. XXXI. NO. 32 , p . 18 i84 . 
29. I M H^IMPtfPttB y # f g , i Kew D e l h i , January 2 3 , 1980, 
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Pakis tan. I n i t i a l l y Gen. Ziaul Haq expressed the urge of c o -
operat ion betv^een Xn^la and Pakistan t o vn r^k out a jus t s o l u t i o n 
ot the Afghan problem. He a l s o prclosed to s t a t i o n a peace 
keepiny force cons i s t ing of contigencs frcmi Zn<aia« Pakistan and 
30 
Iran t o oversee the bordir o£ Afghanistan. But Mrs. Indira Qandhi's 
re fusa l to openly condemn the Soviet in tervent ion i n Afghanistan 
provoked wuch d i s t r u s t of India . She defended the Soviet 
jv*8t i f icat ion of t h e i r Afghan in tervent ion but t h i s did not mean 
su|>pc»:t for the Soviet in t ervent ion . Secondly/ the rearming of 
Pakistan by the US and China, and the extens ion of great power 
confrontat ion to South Asia were more destabl iahing for the whole 
area, and for each of XLB roewbers than what had happened in the 
Hindukush. Third, the rnain thrust of India's diplomacy was to 
31 
defuse the c r i s i s and dam the confzrontation. While Pakistan 
suggested that "instead of protes t ing about Pakistan's anns 
a c q u i s i t i o n s , Inola should more use fu l ly turn to supporting Pakistan 
32 
i n i t s endeavour to s e e that Sov ie t forces leave Afghanistan.^ India 
as such should be p leased that Pakistan was taking on the sov ie t 
g i a n t , thereby making a s o l i d contr ibut ion to the secur i ty and 
33 
s t a b i l i t y of the reg ion . Thus there vas no meeting ground between 
3 0 . ItiB P^K.4it^n tMsm* Ignore, February 7, 1980 
31* Jj f^f ,S>.I Intf^.i N«v I5elhi, January 3 1 , 1980. 
3 2 . K.^. Sharma, A. Decade of In<fc>«-pak Re la t ions , S tra teg i c piaas t . 
New Delhi , April 198S, p . 4C0 
» 3 . Bhabani Sen Gxipta, SSUSkiiA' P» 117 
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34-Pakistan's and Ir^aia's regiotal s trateg ic thinking* And Indian 
view to CDnfront Soviet presenctt in Afghanistan with a watching 
military build up in Pakistan only intensi f ied the prevailing 
tensions in the region. General 5&iA-ul~Haq offended Indian 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s by e^q^ressii^ the view that the people of Kashmir 
are yearning for the restoration of their rights along with 
the people of Palestine* before the First Islamic Meet in Islamabad 
in January 19^* He a l so remarked before the f i r s t Islamic Meet« 
that **it i s for the Muslim countries to get together to defend 
the sovereignty of a Muslim coimtry* not only of Afghanistan, but 
36 
also Of the entire Islamic world*' Such statements only outraged 
the normalisation between the two countries. 
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan thus did 
not bring India and Pakistan together in search of common security 
and s tabi l i ty* India having a substantial $ 1.6 b i l l i o n new arms 
deal with the Soviet Union in 1981 was not able to offer Pakistan 
a regional security and s t a b i l i t y strategy* Nor paidLstan showed 
the s l i gh te s t incl ination to move away from i t s special 
relationship with China« the united States , and the Islamic world* 
In short "the Soviet military intervention in AfsN^niatan has 
not released f luids of f r i en^hip in South Asia, i f anything, 
i t has sharpened the tradit ional s trategic divisions of the 
34. IbSJttiflflll' Madras, February 5, 1980. 
3E>« lRdi>fi Ea^resff. New Delhi, January 28, 1980. 
36* Pakistan Times, T«hore, January 28, 1980, 
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3J 
r e g i o n or a t l a s t re inforced them. Further,the outbreak of 
Hlnau-I4u»llm r i o t s i n severa l towns of Incia in 1980 was u t i l i x e a 
by Gen. Zia to speak for the welfare of 80 m i l l i o n Indian 
Muslims. The Government of India lodged a diplofoatic p r o t e s t . 
The Hindu obeervedi "once again thm ln<3o-pakistan syndrome was 
producing mul t ip le sytsptoros o i a much deeper malaise that 
threatening to put the c lock back to the p r e - p a r t i t i o n days. 
After the Sovie t Intervent ion i n Afghanistan* pres ident z iaul 
Haq made some reiMisuring i b i s e s about the need for bet ter 
understanding between the two neighbouring countries i n the 
s ub->continent* But he i s back a t the o ld game of lndia«43aiting 
and has s t a r t e d to t a l k darkly of Indian i l l w i l l towards 
Pakistan. Thm martial law regime i s progagating the kind of 
animosity t h e t Could p lace the two countr ies on a c o l l i s i o n 
38 
course again." 
(2) The a c q u i s i t i o n of u l t r a - s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms by Pakistan 
i n the v^ ake of the Sovie t in tervent ion i n Afghanistan has 
adverse ly a f f e c t e d the r e l a t i o n s betumen India and Pakistan. The 
Indian focus has been on the danger US arms a id to Pakistan 
39 
would pose to the 8ub->continent. In February 1980 the Foreign 
3 7, mn%A aygffg P«U4iaf Calcut ta , July 15, 1980 
3 8 . ytit tt^Btittf Madras, August 3 i , 1980. 
3 9 . imXm B?^Pf^ ?.g.i ^ w Delhi , January 30, 1980. 
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Secretary of Ind ia , Mr Ram S tlie made i t qlear t h a t "India wa« not 
aga ins t Pakistan ge t t ing m i l i t a r y help frcHB the United States 
40 
but t h i s should not oontr ibute to tensions i n the suixsont inent ." 
i n June 1981 the Foreign Minister of Inoia Shri p .v . 
Narsimha Rao v i s i t e d Pakistan and discussed with his counterpart 
Mr Agha Shahi various matters including the subjec t of arms 
acqu i s i t ion by India and Pakis tan . Immediately,i t was announced 
t h a t an offer had been made for Pakistan to receive IB $3,2 b i l l i o n 
worth arms and economic a s s i s t ance from t l » USA. I t was a l so 
announced tha t Pakistan would be permit ted to buy F- l6 a i r c r a f t 
from the united S t a t e s . Expressing defence needs of Pakistan* 
Agha Shahi, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan s a id , "our 
m i l i t a r y p u r c ^ s e programme i s r e l a t e d exclus ively t o the dtefen<» 
needs of the cx>untry which have acquired an urgency i n view of the 
de t e r io ra t ion i n our s e c u r i t y environment r e s u l t i n g in pa r t i cu l a r 
41 
from the recent development i n Afghanistan* 
The Goverranent of India took ser ious note of t h i s development 
and €6xpressed i-ts Concern a t the int roduct ion of extremely 
s o p i s t i c a t e d azrmaments in to the reg ion . On June 16, 1981 i t was 
made c leer t h a t " the Government of India acknowledges tha t every 
country has a r i g h t to acquire weapons for se l f -defence . I t has 
*0, IMfi,, 9l In^l^' N«w Delhi, February 7, 1980 
pp. 16148-9 
4 1 . J)^ MStl^mmm* J« ly ap-August S, 1980, vo l . XXVII, 
No. 31 , -S 
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not cominentea i n any way vhiXe Pakistan ha« been s t e a d i l y increasing 
ana moaeraniainy i t s mi l i t ary s trength over the past decade. The 
agreement annoimced yesterday is^ however ,qual i ta t ive ly and 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t . I t could introducse liwnediately a new 
l e v e l of weapons s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n t o the reg ion which would a f f e c t 
43 
the e x i s t i n g balance?^ 
Late Prlroe Minister* Mrs Indira Gandhi, on July 10, 1981 
t o l d a Kews Conference i n New Delhi t h c t c c q u i s i t i o n of arms roust 
o n l y be according t o needs and l eg i t imacy . But the sub-continent 
i s being v i l l y - n i l l y pushed in to an arms race increasing f inanc ia l 
bur«ten on our people a t a time when our l i m i t e d resources shotAd 
have been e n t i r e l y used for the needs of our people and to make 
43 
up for l o s t time in technolog ica l and s c i e n t i f i c progress . The 
US Secretary for Defence Mr Casper Weinberger s t a t e d i n Islamabad 
on 2 October 1983 "the US i s trying t o provide Pakistan advacK:ed 
weaponry but we do not have anything much more advaxx:ed than the 
44 
A leading Pakistani m i l i t a r y thinker L t . Qen, (retd. ) 
A.I* Akram, whiSbe r e j e c t i n g Indian l o g i c on October 3 , 1983. 
propounded a theory that Pakistan's defence c a p a b i l i t i e s must 
CO respond to the s i z e of the threat i t faced and not t o the 
4 2 . JtM Jtoffii 9.^  M<^A&j J^ 'ew Delh i , June 17, 1981. 
4 3 . im^B ptjara§g* Ke*^  Delhi , July 11 , 1981. 
4 4 . Cited i n Stgj^^fflifi., Ulm§%» New Delhi , April 198!^, p . 398, 
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s i z e of i t s t e r r i t o r y or populat ion. According to him *tl^ main 
m i l i t a r y t h r e a t to India , if i t is there# comes froro Pakistan. 
Ther« was tx> ser ious t h r e a t t o India from China because there 
can not be a great war in the Himalyas and peninsular India was 
out of the invasion courses . But we a re under a bigger th rea t 
45 
both fran Indis and the Soviet Union.** 
Consequently*a continued supply of sophis t ica ted US weapons 
t o Pakistan and i t s matching by India escala ted the arms race 
between India and Pakistan, when Pakistan completes the present 
equipment acqu i s i t i on programr^ by 1986-87, i t w i l l l»ve many 
more modern f igh ter bombers, such as Uie F-16, many more squadrons 
of M-*0 tanks , more Cobra he l i cop t e r s , TOW a n t i - t a n k mis s i l e s , 
46 
and so on. pa i s t a n has a l so been offered US $103 mil l ion worth 
of arms bi* ^^ *^  '^  i (1985) in addi t ion to the $3.2 b i l l i o n 
m i l i t a r y and economic a id package (1981) . The new arms package 
i s designated to bo l s te r Pakis tan ' s ground offensive capab i l i ty 
47 
using armoured personnel c a r r i e r and lib mm Howitzers. Pakistan 
a l so signed a cont rac t with the IKA t o purchase Advanced Medium 
Range Air t o Air Missi les (1984) a package deal of 500 Siae 
Winders and other defence equipments costirjg §60 mi l l ion (1985) 
4 5 . The Asian Recorder;;cKov«nber-Deceinber 2, 1981, Vol. XXIX, 
No, 48 , p . 17488. 
46 . U.S. Bajpai, |n^|f,'ffi Sg r^.tfT^W* India In te rna t iona l Centre, 
imm Delhi , p . 74. 
4 7 . Th^ AsAan Recorder, October 29,, November 4 , 1985, vol . xyxi , 
NO. 32, p . 18534. 
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and HAWKEYE planes, «oaled>^wn version of AWACS (198S) . 
Moreover, Washington's plans to s ta t ion p«rishing-2 
nuclear tnissiles In Pakistan, two naval bases being bui l t at 
K/MARA ana Givilil on the Arabian coast , building of new 
a i r f i e l d s and extensive depots to store military hardware 
arriving from US and publishing a nev s trateg ic map of South 
Asia by the C£^ iTOCOM in which Pttiastan i s inarked an as area f i t 
49 
for stationing the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) - are some 
developments further escalating the anas race between the t*PO 
countries, jack Jt^iderson's disclosure that President Zia has 
proftiised to "allow US planes to use Pak-airfields should the 
Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan adds 
a new dimension to i t . These a ir f i e lds are also l ike ly to be 
used by US AWACS, SHR-71 and RC-13& e t c . for inte l l igence 
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gathering over India. 
4 8 . S.R.S. Fsmncis, Premier, I .A.S. Main fiapn^^^ Madras, 
1985, p. 6.40*41. 
49 . V.D. a»3pra, us-Pak Collusion - New Contours, patriots 
Hew Delhi, February 11, 1985. 
50. strateoif; Analysis, IDSA, New Delhi, April 1984, Vol. i x , 
tio. 1, p. 12 .3 . 
hi* V.D* Chopra, SHUMS^' 
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Impelled by the compulsions a r i s ing from such developments 
vhich th rea ten Indian seciarity* the Government of India iinnediately 
« f t e r the v i s i t of Indian Foreign Secretary Mr Ram Sh^the t o 
Pakis tan in February 1980 announced t l » purchase of $1.6 b i l l i o n 
52 
worth of arms from the USSR over a period of IB years , since then 
I n d i a ' s arms purchase from the USSR includes 
(i) i^«w T-TS tanks* HMP Armoured Fighting Vthicles 
(AFV's) 2.SU-Z-3 radar cont ro l led a n t i - a i r c r a f t 
weapons, low leve l s u r f a c e - t o - a i r miss i les (SAM) 
for the army, 
( i i ) various versions of MIG-23, some MIG-25, MIG-27 
and MIG-29 a i r c r a f t , IL-76 and AN-32 t ranspor t 
a i r c r a f t , MX-2S a t t ack he l icop te rs and miss i l e s 
for the a l r f o r c e . 
( i l l ) icashin c l a s s destroyers and IL-38 maritime 
surve i l l ance a i r c r a f t for the navy. 
Asms purchased from the Western countr ies beglnniny with 
8s. 4700 crore 1973 jaguar deal from U.K. Includet 
(1) 90 Mirage 2000 a i r c r a f t s frcxo Frana» 
(11) ultra-modern MILAN an t i - t ank m i s s i l e s , d i f fe ren t 
versons of Matra a i r - t o - a i r miss i les and p rec i s ion-
guided weapons includiCKi the A~S-3c laser guided 
bombs. 
52. ijew York Times, Nev York, June 1, 1980. 
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( i l l ) The aupply of Harrier v e r t i c a l short take-of f 
and landing a i r - c r a f t # Sea-king he l i copters and 
Sea-Eagle mis s i l e s« advanced s u r v e i l l a n c e systetn 
for the navy and Cynibelline f i e l d a r t i l l e r y radar 
for the array, 
(iv) A contract for the outr ight purchase of two and 
l i c e n s e d manufacture of titfo m o e type 2C9 submarines 
from i ^ s t Germany* 
Besieges# other smaller contracts include heavy machine 
guns, s p e c i a l i s e d ammunition, bridging equipment, e l e c t r o n i c s 
systwns and s p e c i a l i s e d a lp ine equipment such as snow-mobiles 
for troops involved i n Operation Heghdoot, the army's code-name 
L3 
for the s i l e n t wer on the g l a c i a l wastes along Siachen. 
On the whole India i s qui te capable of safeguarding her 
land f r o n t i e r s with Pakistan i n purely m i l i t a r y terms. Following 
t a b l e s showing the m i l i t a r y balance and the comparative f ight ing 
s t rength of both countr ies can be seen in t h i s respects 
5 3 . IMJ&JSaMM.* New Delhi , November 15, 1985, pp. 86-87. 
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Such an arms race betvieen India and Pakistan ^however. 
has beconie seriously detrimental to the national development of 
both the countries . **?«>» the purely geopolit ical point of view, 
the problem of security would be iiffineasurably simplified £or both 
India and Pakistan if the armed forces of the two s tates were not 
locked up in mutual confrontation within the sub-continent, but 
regarded as cooqplementary to each other for the defence of the 
conmon geographical unit." 
£ 4 . J . Banaopadhyaye, yhe fjt|cj,ffl[ gf |n f t f *g rgWlr9ffi ?9U9Yt 
New Delhi, Second Edition, pp. 48--48. 
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(3) Pakistan i s reported to hftve reached the Uranium enrichment 
c a p a b i l i t y . HMS fa ther oi the Pakis tani bccab« t r A.O. Khan has 
pub l ic ly admitted t h a t Pakis tani s c i e n t i s t s have developed the 
UraniuB! enrichsment capab i l i ty and can, i f ordered, produce nuclear 
weapons. And Mr Sajjad Hyder, a r e t i r e d a tnbassa^r , has deta i led 
h i s views on the weaknesses o£ the Pakis tani nuclear progranxne 
and the s teps t ha t should be taken to overcome these weaknesses 
55 
and thus s t rengthen the count ry ' s c r e d i b i l i t y as a nuclear power* 
jack Anderson, the well*in£orn)ed Aiaerican freelance 
j o u r n a l i s t , has disclosed t h a t the bc^b beinQ nanufactured by 
Pakistan consis ts of a sphere of enriched uranium about s ix inches 
i n diameter suspended within a s t e e l sphere twice as l a rge . All 
t h i s equii^ment i s surrounded by over 200 pound of conventional 
shaped charges, enclosed in curved metal p l a t e s to form a 21 inch 
56 
sphere , i i^ile sooie defence expe r t s , including pentagon spec ia l i s t s , 
th ink t h a t Pakistan has already adhieved the capab i l i ty to put 
out such quan t i t i e s of enriched uranium which can produce s ix 
bombs annual ly . According t o t h i s est imate Pakistan wi l l be able 
t o accumulate 30 nuclear bombs by 1990. Ttmrm a re others who have 
predicted t h a t Pakistan wi l l explode i t s f i r s t nuclear bomb in 
1986, a f t e r i t has received the remaining 28 P»l6 f i gh t e r s , a l l 
o ther American weaponi under the b i l a t e r a l deal for 3,200 mil l ion 
5 5 . I?|^ I,a»§ff 9l iB^^.t New Delhi, August 14, 1984. 
56. p^Mff^JRllffMi Lahore, May 12, 1985. 
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d o l l a r s . Wrlous reports a l s o su^jgest tha t Pakistan would 
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t e s t i t s atomic bomb i n Sinki^ng. 
Ttm nuclear fac tor i s one of the most i r r i t a n t factors 
i n India-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s . I t has increased mutual d i s t r u s t 
and susp ic ion between them. In India 's perceptions the Pakistani 
bomb cannot have any relevance to the Sov ie t presence in Afghanistan 
o r t o carina or any other neighbourina c o u n t r i e s . While Pakistan 
erLjneottsly s e e s threat from India . There are ^ v « v e r ^ c e r t a i n 
p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c impl icat ions of the Pakistani bomb v i s - a -
v i s India . Some o^ : the American s t r e t e g i s t e have t r i e d to explain 
the r a t i o n a l e underlying the Pakistani nuclear s t r a t e g y , 
prof . Stei^nen Cot^n pointed outi "Pakistan belongs t o that c l a s s 
of s t a t e s whose very surviva l i s uncertain, i^hose legitia^acy i s 
doubted and whose s e c u r i t y r e l a t e d resources are inac^quate. Yet 
these s t a t e s w i l l not go away nor can they be ignored. Pakistan 
(Like Taiwan, South Korea, I s rae l and South .Afr ica) has the 
capac i ty t o f i g h t , to go nuclear, to inf luence the global 
s t r a t e g i c balance ( i f only by co l laps ing) and, l a s t l y , in a 
s t r a t e g i c geographical l o c a t i o n surrounded by the three l a r g e s t 
s t a t e s i n the world and adjacent to the mouth of the Persian Gulf." 
Pakistan i s fol lowing the success fu l examples of I srae l and South 
Africa in f o l l o w i i ^ a p o l i c y of deterrence th ouyh nuclear 
&'• The p a t r i o t . New Delhi , February 11, 1985. 
5 8 , §Ui^ff9at9 filfl^ff^* New Delhi , December 1985, p . 1577 
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areblQUity. 
The proposals presented t o In<3ia b^j? the pre»i<^nt of 
Pakistan both i n b i l a t e r a l commuiiications t o the Indian Prime 
Minister and a t in te rna t iona l l e v e l , lack c r e d i b i l i t y . These 
proposals includes 
(a) To declare South j p i a a nuK:lear - weapon free zone} 
(b) to sign the KPT t r e a t y simultaneously; 
(c) to s ign a b i l a t e r a l nuclear non-prol i fe ra t ion t r e a t y ; 
(d) to agree to art in te rna t iona l inspect ion team to v i s i t 
ana liiSpect each and every nuclear f a c i l i t y in each 
of the tvfo count r ies ; and 
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(e) to renounce the use of nuclear vreapons . 
Talk of nuclear free zones i s only a propaganda ploy meant 
t o deceive the v^orld. There i s only one such zorw in the world -
the i i s t in American nuclear weapon zone, ^ t even tha t t r e e ty has 
not come in to f u l l force 13 years a f t e r i t was signed; Chile and 
Brazil have not l»-ought the t r e a t y in to f u l l foriM. Both Argentina 
and Brazil have reserva t ions on t t e r i g h t t o carry out peaceful 
nuclear eyp lo i s ions . Fur ther , Latin American free zone i s not 
fu l ly respected by the nuclear weapon po^^rs . Recently the book 
59 . K. Subrahwanyam, why pak wants the Bomb, ff%i:nf94<i PlqW^i 
New Delhi, October 1981, p . 1206. 
60 . A.Q. Khan, Indian Nuclear pol icy and Pakistan Plan, 
SU»l«fll& PJraMLi New Delhi, December 1985, p . 1570. 
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Kuclear Ba t t l e f i e lds by William Arkins d isc loses the t the USA 
has contirtyency plans to introduce in c e r t a i n circumstances 3 2 
nuclear anti-auloaarine weapons into Puerto Rico which i s 
8 Imposed to be covered by che LATIK American nuclear weapon free 
zone. Secondly, warships of nuclear weapon countr ies s a i l in 
the sea areas covered by the Latin Aroeticen nuclear weapon-free 
61 
zone* 
So rar as the NPT t r e a t y i s concerned, the very character 
of the t r ea ty i s d iscr iminatory . I t bans even nuclear exploisions 
for peaceful economic purposes by nuclear powers, l^iis t r e a t y i s 
c l e a r l y a r»o- impera l i s t i c manoeuvre on the p a r t of the super-
powers to perpetuate the gross ly in iqui tous and immoral power-
62 
p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the in ternat io ia i l system. The re l en t l e s s 
nuclear a-ms build«U|> by the nuclear weapons s t a t e s , or what 
i s known as the v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n , i s not a matter of 
concern to the NPT regime. I t s so le concern i s the spread of 
nuclear weapons to more countr ies - the horizontal p ro l i f e r a t i on . 
Therefore J i t i s not possible for India , in terms of her p>olitical 
t r a d i t i o n and economic compulsions, to s ign t h i s t r e a t y as 
proposed by Pakis tan. The use of nuclear technology for economic 
development i s the only way to solve I n d i a ' s economic problem. 
6 1 . K. Subrahmanyain, Pakistan and the Nuclear i s s u e , 
S t r a t eg ic Analysis . New Delhi, September l9Bt, pp. 551-552. 
62 . J . Bandyopadhyaya, sm^Siiiu,* ^^ -
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P a k i s t a n ' s o f f e r of mutual i m p e c t i o n of nuc lea r f a c i l i t i e s 
i s a l s o s u b j e c t t o s o many q u a l i f i c a t i o n a * So long as PaidLstan 
has e n r i c h e d uraniuRi bontbs i n the basements i t \oul<£ be c i f f i c u l t 
t o r e a l l y v e r i f y how many nuc lea r weeporos t h e r e a r e r e a l l y , i t i s 
conce ivab le timt otXi& a mutual i n s p e c t i o n agreenrient i s signed* a 
break ou t could occur wi th P a k i s t a n having s e v e r a l en r i ched 
uranium vieapons h idden away. Secondly» t h e f a c i l i t i e s t o be 
i n s p e c t e d by t h e two s i d e s a r e very asyronietr ical . While i n t h e 
c a s e of P a k i s t a n i t w i l l cover on ly the r e p r o c e s s i n g c e l l and the 
c e n t r i f u g e f a c i l i t y , i n the case of I nd i a i t w i l l Includte the 
f a s t b reeder r e a c t o r , t h e Madras r e a c t o r , t h e rhruva r e a c t o r • 
Trorobc y and o the r r e p r o c e s s i n g p l a n t s and a l s o c e n t r i f u g e 
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f a c i l i t i e s . 
As r ega rds ar; i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n team t o v i s i t 
nuc lea r f a c i l i t i e s , so f a r ro o p e r a t i o n a l i r i i p e c t i o n procedures 
have been developed for f a c i l i t i e s l i k e f a s t lareeBer r e a c t o r s o r 
uranium c e n t r i f u g e enr ichment . These a c t i v i t i e s have h i t h e r t o 
been undertaken only hy t h e nuc lea r weapon powers and t hey have 
exempted awAx i n s t a l l a t i o n froia the i n s p e c t i o n procedures of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency. The two c e n t r i f u g e uraniun 
enr ichment p l a n t s , URENCO and ElBOriF, f u n c t i o n l a r g e l y on a self-
safeguftrdiriQ b a s i s s i i « e they run as mu l t i ne t i o r i a l ven tu re s and 
t h e pe r sonne l of one n a t i o n a r e expec ted to keep watch on those 
from o t h e r n a t i o n s . 
6 3 • I b i ^ . 
6^* OMJL* P * ^^l 
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R«garring the proposals to Sign a b i l a t e r a l nuclear 
non-pro l i fe ra t ion t r e a t y and to renounce the use of nuclear 
weapons. I t rray 'be held the t h rea t s a re r» t posed by weapons 
a lone . Threetes a r i s e out of weapons enveloped in adversar ia l 
p o l i t i c a l re ia t ior iS . The Br i t i sh and French nuclear veapons do 
not pose t l i reats to other West European countr ies or each o ther . 
Similarly5the US nuclear weapons a re not seen as posing th rea t s 
to Cam da or Mexico but do pose a t h r e a t t o Cuba. Sojin order 
t o have arms control agreements* the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t ionsh ip 
should be acdressed along with signing the t r e a t i e s * 
I n d i a ' s above mentioned response as regards the proposals 
offered by Pakistan i s held negative by the Pakis tani leaders 
including A.Q, Khan. To hire "the Indians a re not only drcatuxng 
of competing with China in nuclear weaponry but a lso of subjecting 
Pakistan to perpetual nuclear black-mail.* He has a lso quoted 
Jack Anderson's exposure t h a t "Inclar appears to he masteriny 
the Ttiore soph is t i ca ted technique of building a hydrogen bomb. 
The hydrogen bomt i s being b u i l t a t Bhabha Research Centre near 
Bombay. About three ctozen s c i e n t i s t s are t rying to ref ine a 
process ca l l ed i n e r t i a l confinement fusion. India since 1933 has 
been stock p i l in^ separated plutonium tha t i s ideal for weapons. 
At ful l capac i ty , the p lan t can process lOO tons of spent fuel 
a yeer , s epa re t l r ^ out as much as lEO kg. of weapons grade 
6 5. ,?tirft^,q|g„,BJ^;^fi,§^, New Delhi, December 1985, p . 1570 
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plutoniuR). Six to e ight ki los a re eixjuf^h for nuclear bomb." 
Such statements had detrimental e f fec t on the reduction of 
nuclear confrontation in Indo-'pak r e l a t i o n s . 
The Indo-pak nuclear confrontat ion haa been refiucea to 
moam ex tent as a r e s u l t of a mutual an<^rstanaing between both 
the countr ies on December 17* 198&, agreeing not t o a t t ack each 
o t h e r ' s nuclear f a c i l t t i e a . The understanding i» a s tep towardM 
confidence-bull<Sing • There was no agreeoient over the nature 
of respec t ive nuclear prograomies. The linderstanding would serve 
t o remove the a l l e g a t i o n in pakistar- t h a t India plans to a t tack 
on the nuclear f a c i l i t y a t Kahuta. Incla offered to give an 
uncertakirxs tha t i t would not do any such th ing , v/hile General 
Zla asse r ted t h a t Pakis tan ' s nuclear prograrwne was e n t i r e l y 
peaceful . Al»o,Pakistan might review i-ts acqu i s i t ion of sophis-
67 
t i c a t e d arms once there uaa %n troproveroent in b i l a t e r a l rel^itioivB, 
<4) lm§S% 911 „g,t5^ lMP>J-5S ,CHYfil.WMg,nt?. '«^e Soviet In tervent ion 
has imposed i r broad quan t i t a t ive terms the f i nanc i a l , economic, 
soc i a l and p o l i t i c a l coats on Pakis tan. Taking the s i x t h five 
year plan of Pakistan (1983*88) as a reference* the d i rec t fixed 
cos ts to Pakistan exchequer of maintaining three mil l ion. Afgtian 
refugees are at US $300 mi l l ion annually exclusive Of 
i n t e r n a t l - n a l donsitions. LOSS of Import duty for exeijptiny a l l 
66* I b i d . 
67, i;|^, ,.Ttoff„ M. M^±t N«^ Delhi. December 18, 1985 
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r e l i e f vehicles and gooai comes to a tou t US $50 mi l l ion (1984) 
a n n * i H y . Social serv ices ana infras t r a c t ora l aevelopwent have 
a i a o been aaversely a f fec ted . Scarce resources such aa cement 
have t o be diver ted for refugee r e l i e f and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n from 
68 
development p r o j e c t s . Further , labour displacement by refugees, 
the ecological costs from defores ta t ion and overgrazing resul t ing 
i n t o s o i l erosion^ f lash-f loodin^ and eventual ly affect ihg 
a g r i c u l t u r a l land and weather cyc le , a lso form the impact of the 
Soviet presence in Afghanist n on the econanic development of 
Pakistan* To these rttay be added the demographic changes with the 
refugees outnvwibering the local inhabi tants in a number of areas 
mainly conf inded to the NWFp and Baluchistan. Their importation 
i n to the Punjab had inev i tab ly led to a reac t ion finding expression 
i n p o l i t i c a l dessent . Also* the soc i a l falaricM of Pakistan i s 
being eroded far more e f fec t ive ly by the rap id r i s e of heroin 
addic t ion in Pakistan which has reached some three hundred 
69 
thousand people. The revolut ion in I ran drove the I ranian heroin 
chemists to Pakistan and the Afghan c r i s i s led to a vas t increase 
70 
i n opiuRi production* Moreover^the f i s c a l cost of the Afghan 
refugees comes to be 8 b i l l i o n a year (1984) . ThuSf^^ Afghan 
problem has brought an adverse a f fec t on the economy of Pakistan 
by making i t dependent on foreign a id to maintain the Afghan 
68« Ifci^« March 3 , 1984. 
69 . Trig y^ fflfff Qi imi^t mrch Q, 1984. 
70. M.G* Gapta, „I|yl>»,P ,l^ fft49ff? ?9U9Xt ^e^a. F i r s t edition^ 
1985, p . 154. 
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r e f u g e e s . Sajj«d Kyder« th« iormmr diplomat ot Pakistan, sa id 
In 1984 t h a t "the 40 b i l l i o n t h a t w i l l have t o spend on the 
retugees wool6 sut i i ice tor Qb p@r cent oi the c o s t ot the 
projec ted Kalabegh ram on vhose energy generat ion our econooiy 
w i l l depend in large p&rt» I t woul^ be enough to pay for two 
1,000 Bieyawatt noclear po%ier p lants 4 t Cheshuna. I t woaie eneble 
us to procuce completely Indlgenotai nuclear c a p a b i l i t y along 
wi th a cred ib le roedluro Yange d e l i v e r / system v^hlch I s v i t a l In 
71 
the context o£ our s e c u r i t y v l s - a - v i S ln<SlaV 
Ap«art from t\m c o s t of (naintslnlng Afghan refugees,FsKistan 
embarked on a continual increase of the defence expenditure* For 
Loth the c o s t s Incurred out of maintain-ng the Afghan refugees and 
Increasii*^ defence expenditure# Pakistan has been c^ettinQ cer ta in 
external f inanc ia l he lp and a s s i s t a n c e . But Pakistan's ^i ience 
budget does tK>t lnclu<^ the a s s i s t a n c e rece ived frow ot»wr 
c o u n t r i e s , while references are tnade In Pakistan to ths 
f inanc ia l asslstaiuce frotn f r i end ly Arab countr ies for purchsse of 
mi l i t ary hardware* d e t a i l s about repayments arf In t ere s t ra tes 
of such a s s i s t a n c e , i f any. have never been published* It has 
been d i s c l o s e d In the l^ Congress that Saudi Arabia has been 
f inancing the m i l i t a r y purchase by psKistan from the USA and 
72 
other c o u n t r i e s . 
71* Sajjad Hyder# Afghan I s s u e , Canage to Soc l e t and Econc^ny, 
J>if 7hm§ 9fi l»^i f« Kew Delhi , March 8, 1984. 
72 . R.R. subrainanian Defence Burden on Pakistan, S trateg ic 
Analvpis^ mv ZSelhl, recember 198£ ,^ p . S^2, 
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The deirenoe bui ld up o£ Pakistan e n t a i l i n g an escala t ing 
arms rac» loetween Znaia and Pakistan i n the wake of the Soviet 
in te rven t ion in Afghanistan has been ac t ing as continuous drain 
on the resources which isiyht be employed for ameliorating the 
condi t ions of poor tnasses. Late prime Minister of Ind ia , 
Mrs. Gandhi, saw tLis f inanc ia l burden •'on our people a t a time 
when a r e l imi ted resources should hc^ve been e n t i r e l y used for the 
needs of our people and t o make WJ for l a s t time in technological 
73 
and s c i e n t i f i c progress ." 
Tlr^ e f fo r t b:^  India to match i^akistan's acqu i s i t ion i s 
f u l l of impl ica t ions . The ex ten t of money involved i n the new 
acquisit iorjs i s mind>-bo99ling. lio one w i l l ever know the exact 
amounts involved i n purchases from the USSR, but knowledgeable 
sources put the ve l i» of the cont rac ts signed a f t e r 1981 a t a 
s tagger ing ^, 18,000 c ro re , enough to i n s t a l l more than 15000 m 
power capaci ty , which was the t o t a l acdhieved i n the Sixth Five 
Year p lan . While taoney for the purchase of a m s from the western 
market i n d u c e is. 1100 crore earmarked for 1978 Jaguar deal , 
8s. 3500 crore for 90 Mirage 2000 a i r c r a f t - equivalent i n value to 
the t o t a l m -^ ney spent so far in the country i n s e t t i n g \3p cement 
p l a n t s , over 1000 crore wcarth of the ultra-oKidern MIUvI^  an t i - t ank 
mis s i l e s and other weapons equivalent to launching ten communication 
s a t e l l i t e s , Ss. 3,000 crore for the supply of Harrier Vert ical /Short 
73 . The Times of i^ndla. New Delhi, Ju ly 11 , 1981. 
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t a k e - o f f and l and ing a i r c r a f t # Sea-King h e l i c o p t e r s an<S Sea-Eagle 
m l a s i l e a / and a c o n t r a c t o£ s t i l l unknovn f i n a n c i a l ntagnituae for 
t h e o u t r i g h t purchase of two and l i c e n s e d manufacture of two more 
Type 29 sutamarin. s from West Germany. B e s i i ^ s , hundred of c ro re s 
rupees have been committed for sundry o the r sma l l e r c o n t r a c t s . 
The government has a l s o agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t o making a 
number of o t h e r m u l t i - b i l l i o n rupee commitments. The more s i g n i -
f i c a n t among t h e s e a r e 155 mm a r t i l l e r y gun purchase fo r approxima-
t e l y Rs. 1600 c r o r e s , a Rs. 4000 c r o r e computer system and 
approx i r t a t e ly te. 200 c r o r e for t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of Escorter-3J . 
75 
r a d a r - c o n t r o l l e d , s e l t - p r o p e l l e d a n t i - a i r c r a f t guns . 
purchases a p a r t * an enormous amount of money has a l s o 
been spen t i n domest ic p r o d u c t i o n , a g a i n geared towards 
mOderniseation. £Kit t h e most of t he i n t ^ v a t i v e and u l t r a - e x p e n s i v e 
indigenous e f f o r t i s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the f i e l d of compu te r i s a t i on 
and au tomat ion s i n c e , w i th t h e i n c r e a s i n g m o b i l i t y of fo r ce s i n 
combat t oday , the ca tch- | i l i ras« i n 'CSI ' - s t a n d i n g f o r Command, 
Con t ro l and Communication and I n t e l l i g e n c e . I n d i a ' s answer t o 
t h i s problem i s t h e ^^ . 500 c r o r e p l an AREK (Army Radio E iwinee r i i ^ 
76 
l^etwork) . 
7*« Indfa T o ^ v , New De lh i , November 15, 1985, p . 86 
7 5 . Ibi«^. P 8-7 
7 6 . i i t i i^* ' p - 3"^ 
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This unprecendentod ana almost fr ightening spending 
spree i s pr imari ly responsible for taking the country 's c3ef«noe 
budget t o si, 7688 crore t h i s year 198L-86 roor« than twice as 
much as i t \^n in 1980/81 (Rs. 3(^6.77 crore) . If the current r a t e 
o£ growth o£ ^ f e n c e spending i s maintained* and with the 
an t i c ipa t ed new acquis i t ions* the defence b u ^ e t may cross the 
PS, 20000 crore mark in the next f ive years . According to a 
conf ident ia l Defence Ministry est imate the t o t a l defence spending 
in the seventn plan period could cross 8s, 750CX) c ro re . This i s 
more than the seventh plan out lay for any sec to r , «nd# incident ly , 
77 
near ly twice as much as the a l l o c a t i o n for power. 
(^ > Hffi ^yil^.4dffilS« § r^tl^ ilT.B9 MifgWltt T^^^ ^v t t been, before 
the Soviet in tervent ion in Afghanistan, occasional endeavou s for 
a construct ive dialogue between ':-\Te two countr ies on b i l a t e r a l 
problems l ike the Simla Agreement 1972 and other subsequent 
agreements which have already been discussed, i n the wake of the 
Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan "Ir.dia b u i l t a tenuous iaridae 
78 
to Pakistan." Late Mrs. G ndhi chose the foreign sec re ta ry . 
Ram Sathe, to undertake a probing mission to Pakis tan, The 
discuss ion on b i l a t e r a l issues was narked by a r e s t o r a t i o n of 
both coi-4 i^ries' comroitraent to the Simla Agreement which, both 
77. I b i d . 
78. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.cf^. . p . 116 
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sa ld f p rovided a s u i t a b l e fraaievork t o e s t a b l i s h a c o - o p e r a t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . General z i a a l s o expressed t h a t Ind ia and Pak i s t an 
79 
both shou ld a c t t o g e t h e r t o defuse the Afghan c r i s i s . 
On Apr i l 10* 1980 the second mis s ion of India headed by 
s rda r Swaran Singh went t o P a k i s t a n . On t h e eve of h i s depar tu re 
from E » l h i , t h e I n d i a n p r e s s saw a " f a r g r e a t e r degree of c loseness 
i n the I n c i a n and P a k i s t a n i approaches to t h e s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d 
by Sov i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n In Afghanis tan , s a r d a r Swaran Singh 
emphasised t h e need t o break away with p a s t , t o narrow ^ w n the 
d i f f e r e n c e s and t o promote peeoB and s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . The 
P a k i s t a n fo r e ign m i n i s t e r , Mr Agha shahi* r e i t e r a t e d good 
n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s ana t e n s i o n - f r e e r e l a t i o n s . General z.ia renewed 
h i s proposa l for mutual 3:orce r educ t ion* conceding fo r the f i r s t 
t ime , t h a t Ind ia ' s defence cortmitroent VAS fa r l a r g e r t h a n 
P a k i s t a n ' s but a rguing t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s commitment had a l s o i nc reased 
with S o v i e t fo rces s t a t i o n e d i n Afghan i s tan . The t a l k s ended 
wi th good-^friendly g e s t u r e s t o con t inue t r a d e . t r a v e l , tour i sm, 
81 
c u l t u r a l exch&nc,e and s p o r t s . 
I n J u l y 1980 t h e t hen Pore ign Min i s t e r of P a k i s t a n , 
Mr Agha Shah i , v i s i t e d I n c i a arK3 asked for s e r i o u s m o d i f i c a t i o n 
7» . ln^j»B iP^Praffii New D e l h i , February 6 , 1980. 
8 0 . iiaifi,., Apr i l 10, 1980. 
8 1 . The Asian Recorder . August 12-18, 1980. Vol. XXVI, No. 3 , 
p . lb!sb9S. 
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of lnc51«'8 s t r a t e g i c thinkinfl t*ith regard t o Pakistan as a 
pre -condi t ion for bet ter p o l i t i c a l and ecoiKHRic r e l a t i o n s . He 
dananded a Just and amicable sett lentent of jatmnu and Kashmir, 
and mutual force reduction by the f i e l d cowraanders meet of both 
the countr ies which was not accepted by the Gbverwnent of India. 
He a l s o r e i t e r a t e d the need to turn South Asia into a nuclear 
82 
f r e e 8sone# which was a l s o not acceded t o by India . 
i n June 1981, tlie then Foreign Minister of India, Mr Narsiinha 
Rao v i s i t e d Pakistan. Both the countr ies ruled out the use of 
force or the threat of use of force bet%feen tlwro. Reiterat ing 
t h e i r comn itroent to the Sisila Agreement, both s i d e s c a l l e d the 
Ste la Agreement c o n s t i t u t i n g a firm foundation for preserving 
peace and in^rovi i^ r e l a t i o n s bet«^en the two c o u n t r i e s . Bot)i 
covoitries expressed the i r i n t e n t i o n t o expand mutual co-operation 
83 
i n d i f f erent f i e l d s . Iroinediately the anrouncoment of US $ 3 . 2 . 
b i l l i o n m i l i t a r i and economic a i d to Pakistcn and the permission 
to purchase f -16 by Pakistan from the us shat tered the 
conf idence-bui lding move between India and Pakistan. 
On November 11 , 1981 Pakistan put forward « proposal for 
a draft of guarantees of non->aggression between India and Pakistan. 
The proposal suggested Pakistan's readiness t o enter i n t o iosaediate 
8 2 . Tft? Yfegji g | ti3^k> ««w Delhi , July 17, 1980. 
8 3 . Ite , iij>,n<^ ,^Sr^ fR y^ffiff' K«w Delhi , June U , 1981 
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c o n s u l t a t i o n s v^ith Incila f o r t h e purpose of exchanging mutual 
gua ran t ee s o£ noD<-aggres8ion ana i3on~uBe of f orc« In the s p i r i t of 
84 
t h e Simla Agreement. On November 2&, 1901 t h e Government of India 
roade her r e sponse t o P a k i s t a n ' s o f fe r of 'No war p a c t ' . The 
r e snonse was made on the b a s i s of I n d i a ' s o f f e r of no war p a c t 
t o P a k i s t a n made a s e a r l y a s i n 1949. The Fore ign Min i s t e r of 
I r ^ i a , p . v . KarsiiriBw Rao <teclarea i n p a r l i a m e n t t h a t I n d i a ' s 
s t a n d i s t h e seme a s i t s o r i g i n a l o t f e r "wi th no e x c e p t i o n s , 
rx> c o n d i t i o n s and no v a r i a t i o n s . Our a t t i t u d e w i l l t hus be 
p o s i t i v e on t h e b a s i s t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s o f f e r c o n s t i t u t e s an 
accep tance fca: the f i r s t t ime of I n d i a ' s o f f e r of a no-'Vjar pac t 
which has s t o o d i n t a c t Biocm 1949 and a s f u r t h e r a m p l i f i c a t i o n of 
85 
t h e Simla Agreement." 
H i s t o r i c a l BaCkarQund of t h e No>war Pac^i 
The f i r s t p roposa l ot No war p a c t vas made by the 
former prime Min i s t e r of I n d i a , J awahar l a l liehru on December 
2 2 , 1949 wi th h i s c o u n t e r p a r t l iate Lieq^ t A l i Khan, t h e then 
prime Min i s t e r of P a k i s t a n . The p roposa l s t a t e d t h a t " t h e 
Goverranent of I n d i a and t h e Govermient of P a k i s t a n , be i r^ des i rous 
of promoting f r i e n d s h i p and good-wi l l between t h e i r peoples who 
have many common t i e s hereby d e c l a r e t h a t they condemn r e s o r t t o 
war for tlie s e t t l e i r e n t of any e x i s t i n g of f u t u r e d i s p u t e 
3 4 . The j^aian Recorder. r*cember 24^31, 1981, Vbl.XXVII, No. 52, 
p . 16377»8. 
8 5 . The Times of I n d i a . New D e l h i , November 26, 1981 
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86 
betvfeen them.** But t h i s proposal could iK>t take i t * ground. 
Similar ly i n 19S9 Pre»ident Ayub proposed for a Jo in t 
Defence Scheme by India and Pakis tan . Nehru re jected i t by 
askingt "Against whowT* This led Mr Manzur Qadir, Pakis tan ' s 
Foreign Minister t o say on October 21, 19b9 t h a t "apar t from 
the i n i t i a l negative reac t ion front India« there had been no 
87 
p o s i t i v e reaction.** Instead, Iviehru put the same proposal 
as of 1949 which was not accepted by Pakis tan. The offer was 
repeated by Mr, Lai Bahacur Shas t r i i n 1965, and by Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi i n 1968 and by Mr Morarji Desai i n 1979. Al l these 
proposals were not accepted by Pakis tan. 
i( 
According t o Pakis tani view no war pact was s i n que non 
for fur ther good r e l a t i o r i s . Any further and rash s tep %K>uld be 
premature. The i n t e r e s t s o£ both the countr ies wi l l be served 
be s t by the ear ly conclusion of the proposed t^on-Agression pact . 
The p re requ i s i t e ground for the promotion of mutual fr iendship 
and CD-operation can be e f fec t ive ly prepared through t h i s 
88 
approach." 
86• Tht tttltfMfftin lABmii New Delhi, recember 23, 1949. 
8*7* The Dawn. Karachi, October 22, 19S9« 
88 . T ^ mi%n mmfl^JS^t August 6-12, 1982, Vol. ;XVIII, 
HO. 32, p . 16738. 
114 
The former prime Minister of Ind ia , l a t e Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi t o l d the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr i^ha shahi 
t o have a fr iendship t r e a t / v i t h Pakistan. She expressed the 
hope thet progress would be made over some period of time taking 
Into account of nat ional i n t e r e s t , peace and secwority in any 
89 
agreennent* 
But the major hurdles i n reaching some understanding even 
a t t h i s preliminary s tage . . . . developed concerning the respect ive 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e ot non-alignment and b i l a t e r a l i « j . 
In India ' s reckoning, commitment to the pr inc ip l e o£ non-
alignment ru l e s out al lowing fore ign m i l i t a r y bases and being 
part of another country's s t r a t e g i c consensus. Ihe pr inc ip le 
o f b i l a t era l i sm a l s o makes the t%K> countr ies concerned to s e t t l e 
t h e i r disputes without involv ing a t h i r d party or any outs ide 
9 0 
agercy. 
on the i s s u e of Afghanistan, Mrs. G ndhi r e i t era ted I n c i a ' s 
oppos i t ion t o any kind of fore ign m i l i t a r y presence i n Afgriardstan 
but conveyed the Soviet i n t e n t i o n to take "the stand that they 
would q u i t once outs ide help to the rebe l s were stopped." She 
a l s o explained the Sov ie t j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r entry i n t o 
Afghanistan owing to the "growing m i l i t a r y presence of other 
8 9 . J ^ d . . 
90. ihe Times of India, Kew Delhi, January 31, 1982, 
HE 
powers in the Indian ocean and the i n s t a l l a t i o n s of nuclear 
weapons in t h a t region* They wished to guard agains t such 
91 
presence reaching t h e i r own neighbour^ 
But to Mrs. Gandtii no-war pact was not enough for making 
the r e l a t ions between the two countr ies sound. "Apart from No-war 
pact proposals there a re a nunber of b i l a t e r a l problems l i ke v isa , 
trade* anc cu l tu ra l exchanges . . . a conducive atmosphere wil l be 
crea ted for solving mutual problems." Secondly, the offer of 
No-war pact gave the impression tha t "India i s going t o wac,e war 
and i t i s Pakistan which has come fo r th with a roacjjriificent offer ." 
Both the proposals vmre inherent ly good and i f accepted 
would cons t i t u t e a pos i t ive factor in the normalissation process . 
But both the countr ies saw 'caut ions in giving t h e proposals 
f l e sh ana blood. To Ind ia , the motives and intstiitions underlying 
the offer of Pakistan vrere of fake kind lackii^j genuineness. While 
t o Pakistan I n d i a ' s o t f e r of Treaty of peace and Friendship seemed 
**as a loaded miss i l e intended to by-pass the mi l i t a ry adr^inistration 
and h i t Pakis tan i publ ic opinion d i r e c t l y . In the view of Pakistan 
such a t r e a t y was pre-mature. 
On Kovernber i# 1982, prime Minister of Inc ia , Mrs. Oandhi 
and the pres ident of Pakistan, General S&ia-ul-Haq agreed t o the 
establishment or an India-Pakis tan Jo in t Ccmimission. They issued 
9 1 . T?W y ^ f , 9l toatj New Delhi , January 3 1 , 1982. 
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Instructaona for the rapid conclus ion of RK>aalities and 
92 
fortnai i t iea i n t h i s regard. 
On December 24» 1982 Mr Rasgotra and Mr Ni^x Malik, the 
fore ign s e c r e t a r i e s of India and Pakistan ire8pectively# held 
t h e i r t a l k s a t liew Delhi and i d e n t i f i e d the areas of convergence 
and divergence on the draft proposals for a t rea ty of peace, 
f r i endsh ip and co-operat ion and non^ggres s ion pact* Ttuey a l s o 
agreed t o s e t \sp a j o i n t Zndo-pak Commission t o strengthen 
good-neighlsourly r e l a t i o n s • The Foreign Ministec$of the two 
93 
countr ies %iere proposed t o be i t s co-chairmen. 
on March 10# 1983 the agreement for the s e t t i n g up of the 
j o i n t commission was s igned . The commission was t o promote 
co»operation between India and Pakistan i n a wide range of areas 
and f i e l d s of human endeavour. I t was envisaged to provicte an 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework for strengthening b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s to 
exp la in s y s t e m a t i c a l l y the p o t e n t i a l for b e n e f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n 
a number of agreed f i e l d s , i t IAS proposed to meet once a year 
t o prcxnote r e l a t i o n s in economic, trade* indus tr ia l ^education, 
health* consular , tourism, t r a v e l , iriformation snd s c i e n t i i i c and 
technologi a l f i e l d s , p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t ary quest ion i were l e f t 
94 
out of the purview of the j o i n t conn i s s ion . 
9 2 . JJaJ4|.# November 20,->ricvvnibe/ 26, 1982, \tol • XXVIII, No. 48 . 
p . 16908.9 . 
9 3 . Tt^ Ecpnomic Ti^aaes. Bombay, March 11 , 1983. 
9 4 . ijya&s.' March 11 , 1933. 
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on Jxxne 1-4, 1933 the f i r s t meet i i^ of the Indo-pak 
Jo int Commission wes held i n Pakistan and i t decided to s e t i^ 
4 sub-contmissions on (a) eoon»ERic^health* s c i e n t i f i c * and 
technolog ica l areas i (b) tradei (c) information* education* 
s o c i a l s c i ences* cu l ture and s p o r t s ; and (d) travel* tourism and 
95 
consular matters* Ttm suggest ions viere made for the exchange of 
academicians* s c i e n t i s t s * j o u r n a l i s t s and other Biedia«»men* 
sports team and f i lm p e r s o n a l i t i e s between the two countr i e s . 
Also, specsefic proposals were put forward for increas ing cooperation 
i n agr icul ture* health* communications* s c i e n c e and technology* 
tradte* education* information and e a s i e r t r a v e l f a c i l i t i e s for 
96 
the people . 
The second ccxnmission met on January 17* 1984 openir^ for 
some new avenues t o be t ter trade and economic r e l a t i o n s even 
t tough they f a i l e d t o Ixeak the f i v e year o ld deadlock over a new 
t r a ^ agreement, itowever* they agreed on how to go about increasing 
b i l a t e r a l trade without an i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework and a l s o on 
severa l co>c^perative raeasurea i n the spheres of planning* 
agr icu l ture* rai lways* health* industry* s c i ence and technology* 
and telecommunications* The trade sub-ct^nmission apparently 
s k i r t e d the i s sue of bas ic approacl^s t o i d e n t i f y 19 items for 
bulk trading betv^en the two countries* t e n of them report to 
9 5. Ttie H;il|g\gtaaJ,4i!IB,fl> ^ ^ Delhi* June 5* 1983. 
9 6 . s t r a t e g i c Dicjeat, New Delhi* April 198E, p . 396. 
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India and other nlna £or «xport t o Pakistan, Notwithstanding 
the major iinpasac i n trate« the Government of India respondad 
p o s i t i v e l y t o supply onions on the request of the GoverriRient of 
Pakistan, s i m i l a r l y , i n e a r l y 1984» India purchased 35»00O 
tonnes of urea trom Pakistan a t a c o s t of W $5*2S mil l ion* and 
i n October 1984# India s igned .an agreement wi th Pakistan for 
98 
purchase of 50,000 tonnes o£ urea valued a t over US $101 m i l l i o n . 
The th ird meeting of the suh-comroissions took place i n 
July inl985« l o t h countr ies s igned an agnreonient for cooperation 
i n agricultitt-al research and agreed t o promote t r a v e l and tourism 
but f a i l e d to r e c o n c i l e the d i f ferences i n c r u c i a l trade s e c t o r . 
They hoviever agreed for f i r ther d i scuss ions in ordfer to bring 
about a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n bas ic pos i t ion* But the two s i d e s 
i d e n t i f i e d the p o l i c e organisat ions for coo-ordination, exchange 
of information and Joint s t e p s to curb the growing menace of 
narco t i c smuggling. I t was a l s o agreed t o commission the 
Coaxial cable by the end of August. As a resul t major c i t i e s in 
India ana Pakistan have d i r e c t telephone l i n k from August 1985. 
There could be no agreement on exchange o f newspapers and 
p e r i o d i c a l s . The i s s u e of terrorism X-^BB not d i scussed in dd^ail 
during the t a l k s but the Pakistani spokesman s a i d h i s couontry 
9 7. XIW SfigflBIB f^i Ttefirf Pxnbay, July 13, 1984. 
9 8 . Strateaig , U a s a t ^ New Ds lh i , April 1985, p . 396. 
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was prepared to talK in this regard with India and would iielcone 
any suggestion* 
On janoary 9, 1986 in islanabad the lA^on Finance Minister 
of India, Mr V.P. Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Mr Mabua«>ul-
Haq discussed the problems concrerned with trade agreement. The 
discussion covered public and private sector trade, infrastructure 
and joint ventures. Both India and Pakistan agreed for a long 
term trade ayre«Bent to be signed during the prline Minister of 
India, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's v i s i t to Islamabad this year (1986) . 
Pakistan a l so agreed in prizx:iple to extend the roost favoured 
nation's treatment (MEM) t o exi>ort from India. Besides, throwing 
open 42 items to the private sector to import direct ly frcwi 
India, the Pakistani government would s e t up a cotmaittee to 
identify within a month some 2CX} to 300 additional items that 
would be traded by the private sector. Both s ides also agreed 
101 
on further dialogue in this connection. 
Thus>all the deliberations of a l l the joint commissions 
along with the four sub->axnmis8ior^ a t each meeting hava sought 
to achieve an< atmosphere of friendship, constructive cooperation 
and mutual aecommo<%ation« Tl:^  deliberations have been productive 
099, Xlm JfigBBlty TlMfff Bombay, July 5. 1985. 
100. T»^ H4H^^ Wtfl? YlBfffi N«« Delhi* January 10, 1986. 
101* Tte Ttofff g l In^i^t New Delhi* January 12, 1986. 
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and s a t i s f a c t o r y and a s t ep towards the eatabHshroent (^ a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o£ cord ia l i ty^ co*operation# mutual t r u s t and 
understanding between the peoples of India and Pakistan. 
HoiAiever^  t h i s process o£ confidence building i s being outraged 
by t^xi f ac tors t one; involv^nent of Pakistan in the Punjab 
c r i s i s and two; the c o n f l i c t on Siacl^n Glac ier , 
Tl^ Pt^ iab C r i s i s and peil^.sly||t^i The involvement of Pakistan with 
the e x t r e n i s t and seces s ion i s t el<»nents i n the Indian s t a t e o£ 
Punjab makes one factor common between India and Afghanistan -
the ro l e of Pakistan and i t s a l l y the united S ta tes t o des tabl ise 
these two coun t r i e s . Jag j i t Singh Chauten claimed t h a t " i f war 
s i t u a t i o n ctevelope;,the western countr ies w i l l have to support 
our movement. America wi l l a l so come in a big way and China too 
may i n t e r f e r e . In such a confl ic t* Sikhs a re going t o gain. 
p o l i t i c a l l y we can ge t si;|>pffirt from the Western world* ant i> 
102 
coRHtiunist forces and frcMon northern Indian states.** There i s 
a l so evidence to show t h a t some extremists have taken ref lage in 
Pakistan* rece iv ing t r a i n i n g in gue r i l l a warfare* though opiniorai 
d i f fe r on t h e i r s t r e n g t h . Before and aur i r^ the army ac t ion in 
tVffi Golden Temple a t Anri tsar i n June 1984 there were repor t s 
about ttm movement o£ extremists across the border in to Pakistan 
and of c e r t a i n Pakis tani agencies* a c t i v i t i e s opera t ional ly 
support ive of t e r r o r i s t elcNnents engaged in a c t s of violence in 
'^^' gfttrioi^. Hew t5elhi* January 2 1 , 198S.. 
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the In(31an Pioijab. The record o£ Pakistan media in deliberataly 
distorting and misrepresenting events in India in the wakt of 
army operations in Punjsb* the extensive coverage given to the 
statements of secess ionis t on Pakistani Television in tinn months 
Q£ June and July 1984* the supplements brought out in the 
Pakistani newspapers carrying interviews with known extremists 
and secess ionis t s and repetit ions o£ a r t i c l e s about so>csalled 
104 
KhaliBtan have further added to the setback in Zndo-Pak relat ions . 
The %ihole sequence of events in Pwajab has an identical 
pattern with Afghanistan in the l a s t f ive t o s i x years* According 
to a Washington daily "Afghanistan dissenters are undergoing 
gueri l la training at a base 12 miles north of Peshawar and this 
former mil i tary base i s s t i l l under the gusrd of Pakistan 
s o l d i e r s . And almost sinultaneously# Indian intel l igence 
agencies started receiving reports that terror is t training camps 
had been s e t \ap on the Indo-pak border s t Narcwal* pasrur and 
I)askB (Sialkot d i s tr ic t ) E n^anabad and Muridke (Sheikhupura 
d is tr ic t ) besides AttocK Fort and Murzee Hil l ranges near oecuK>isd 
105 
Kasbroir. 
103* Ibi^. 
104. gfcr^ teqjLg lii,<ms\i "ev ceii^i* April, i s s s , p. 399. 
105. patriot , aasSJi&M,* 
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Signif icantly looth a t Indo-pak and pak-Afghan border 
training camps, one of the aspects of the motivational training 
re lates to the need to i n f i l t r a t e the re l ig ious , po l i t i ca l and 
soc ia l organisations for reasons of cover, and to ultimately 
capture these bodies by applying p assures frost within. I t was 
af ter th is development that acts of sabotage and k i l l ings of 
individuals began on a large scale b^h in India and Afghanistan. 
Thus^notxitlistending the differences in the soc ia l systems of 
Xi^ d.a and Afghanistan one conclusion i s inevitable—that both 
these countries have become a special target of attack by the 
US. The weapon i s vietnamisatlon of Afghanistan make Afghans 
f ight Afghans in Afghanistan^ and make Indians fight Indians in 
106 
India. 
However^the President of Pakistan, Ziaul Haq while v i s i t ing 
New Delhi on 3*4 Nov^nber 1984 gave a healing touch to the indo-pak 
relat ions nAmn he said that nothing would be allowed to come in 
107 
the way of better understanding between out two countries. The 
indo-pek relations a lso went c r i t i c a l when the hijacking of Indian 
aircraft by Sikh terror is t s to Pakistan took place in September 1931 
and in July 1984* itie hijackers were l ionised, were given Vip 
lounge f a c i l i t i e s a t Lahore airport, and intervie%fed by Pakistan 
Television* But with the t r i a l of Sikh hijackers on January 10,1986 
106, iliiUji. 
107. aiM Tjteijg^ ina^li* New Delhi, Kovwaber 5, 1984. 
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three at^raed death 3ent«ne« and mmrnn givan l i f e inpriaonment* 
the Indo-pak reletiona are l i t o l y to gain normalcy. 
(&)Tbe Siachan glacier i s located in the Karakorains v-tiich 
contain 8c»ne of the higl^st peeka in the world and i s one of the 
vorld'a moat glaciated 8uh-i>olar regiona. Anong t i ^ large 
g lac iers here ia SiAohen which ia 74 km. in length and varies in 
109 
width from 2 to B }«B. Thia area misaed decaaroation during the 
Simla Agreement 1972 between India and Pakistan. In early June 
1985 shoot-outa continued unabated between Indian Army Jawana 
and pakiatani forces at the olacier* The dispute aroae in April 
1984 when Pakiatani trcwps reached the spot and claimed the 
area aa their own* fhey resorted to firing# %diiich the Indian 
jawans repulsed* In February 19% pakiatani troopa made a 
detenmir^d bia to capture the area* but Indian Jawana made a pre 
emptive attack and captured Sia^La and Dele Endla pasa at 1700 £t-
110 
the key to Siachen* 
India became concerned about Siachen only in 1978* wlum 
defence authorit ies were given a mountaxnera' map* publiahed in 
the US showing a demarcation l ine from eaat of Shyok to Karakorum 
pass and excluding the area between Indira Col to Daulat Beg and 
108. The Tiff^ of Ipydia^ tiew Delhi* January 21* 1986 
109. Thm F r o n t l i ^ . Bombay* April 20* May 3* 198B* p* 76* 
1^0* The Apifn Ri»CQrdar* August 6*13*198&* ^ 1 * XXXI* Ho* 32* 
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Great mrBkorma peak from Indian t e r r i t o r y * The area/ accordiiKj 
t o L t . Gea. M»L. Chibber, a - i n - C h i e f , Northern Camnand/ had ibeen 
111 
under Indian c o n t r o l , while Pakistan** Foreign Minister* 
Mr Sahibzada Yakub Khan disputed m a i a ' s claim t o the Siachen 
g lac i e r area and sa id t h a t Pakistan would take xxp the n a t t e r 
again with the Indian GovernRient. He claiiaed t h a t Siachen g lac ie r 
112 
area formed a p a r t of northern areas of Pakistan. 
According to defence experts i n (tew DBlhi* Pakistan i s 
co«<»-dinating i t s m i l i t a ry a c t i v i t y with China in a bid t o 
e s t a b l i s h suzera in ty over the s t r a t e g i c Siachen g lac i e r in the 
Ladakti region* There i s evidence of Pakistan and C3iina j o i n t l y 
undertaking some reconnaissance missions over t l ^ Siachen g lac ie r 
and Nubra valley* According t o experts to achieve i t s geo-
s t r a t e g i c a in s Pakistan i s now t ry ing to dominate the Indian 
Nubra va l l ey and the routes going down to Leh. She also wants to 
capture Inc5ira Col, which i s a wedge between i t s i l l e g a l l y occupied 
pa r t s of Kashmir and 4500 km* of t e r r i t o r y i t had i l l e g a l l y ceded 
t o China, with the capture of Indira Col . Pakistan would es tab l i sh 
1X3 
a conanon border with China. India occupies GaDanmnding posi t ions 
i n the region with the cont ro l of Sia La and Salatoro passes and 
114 
can speak fron a pos i t ion of s t r eng th . 
111. Tte yirffl^ Sa, ffil, In^^' New Delhi , June, 5,1985 
112. Xte. .iROAiftR, fiaffi.ffili« New Delhi. June 2, 1985 
113. lUt, T t o t i al, , t oW* New Delhi, January 3,1986 
1H« ;tbid. . January 10, 1986 
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India« from th« very lamgitmlpg, waiited to resolve this 
i ssue b i l a t er s l l y with Pakistan and aimed a t cease-f ire before any 
talks on the dtspute* To have cease-f ire there have been at 
l e a s t three flag meetings of COTsnanders on both sid^s to prevent 
further escalation <x fightings* On January 12, 1986 talks 
between the Indian and Pakistani delegations took place in 
Islamabad to resolve the thorny Siachen glacier i ssue . The 
talks were held in a frank and a>rdial at^oosphere and there %iras 
a greater appreciation of each other's perceptions« without 
being arrived at an agreement* The delegates agreed* however« 
115 
to meet again in New Delhi in March-end or April 1986. 
Today# ironical ly enough* the Siachen issue provided 
ar^tl^r type of wedge - the one of peace. The agreement on a 
cease-f ire and a possible desRarcation of th is area could be an 
important f i r s t step as a "confidence building measttre** to begin 
general talks on the ruD'war pact or force reduction that are 
talked about so otten. With this* peace would return to the 
area which i s today the only point on the Indian land frontier 
116 
where act ive h o s t i l i t i e s prevail . 
115« Ilmllm9r9^ auaii„i ^ew oe lh i . January 13* 1986, 
116. Marxsj Joshi , The Siachen Glacier Incident* strategic 
XtoMJfe' J«ne 1S>85* p. 671. 
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The foreign secretaries of India and 
Pakistan net i n ISXanalsad on January 18« 1986 to improve their 
re la t ions . The most important among the topics for their 
deliberations related to the offer o£ a no-war pact by Pakistan 
and a Treaty of peace # Frienaihip and a>>qperation urged by 
117 
India* Tfm t%io s ides also discussed the draft on the earl ier 
agreement on not attacking each other's nuclear f a c i l i t i e s . 
with regard to the nuclear f a c i l i t i e s agreement* the 
substantiiw part of the draft had been agreed to and only for 
118 
presffible roEnaintd to be exaaiiced by the t«o s i d e s . But the t\K> 
s ides f a i l e d to resolve their differences over preparing a 
s ingle comprehensive draft* with Pakistan sticking to i t s 
reservations on the question of mil itary bases and acceptanoi of 
the principle of bilateralness in settlement of disputes. As 
regarai bilateralism Pakistan has been ins i s t ing that bi lateral 
disputes could be raised in international forums despite the 
Simla agreement. But the Indian stand has been that ef forts m<«tt 
be made f i r s t to resolve bi lateral issue l ike Kashmir through 
negotiation and an approach made to a third party by mutual 
119 
consent. tifhile on the question of foreign bases* Pakistan 
appears to be keen to keep i t s options open especia l ly in view of 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan i s prepared to assure 
India that there would not be any terr i tor ia l threat from i t s 
I If . 7 ^ Times of India. Kew Delhi, January 17* 1986 
22* < i3.8. JSMJI.* January 22* 1986. 1^9. JSMX* January 20* 1986. 
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s i d e in r e tu rn £or a slrollar assurance trom India , but does not 
want to be t i e d down in a d i f f i c u l t i n t e rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n on 
the Afghan borders . To t h i s may a lso be added Pakis tan ' s 
engagement i n negot ia t ions to r a new $ 6.6 b i l l i o n American a id 
package including l a t e s t soph is t i ca ted weapons. However,India 
and Pakistan h»ve decided t o r e p a t r i a t e by March 31 , 1986 each 
o t h e r ' s c i v i l i a n deta iners who have completed t h e i r nrison 
120 
te rms . 
While tx}th s ides during t a l k s r e i t e r a t e d the resolve 
and abiding oamtnitment o£ the two governments to envelop 
tension^free and good-neighbourly r e l a t i o n s and conmitment to 
the Simla agreement. However^they f a i l e d t o make subs tan t i a l 
progress and some of the t i c k l i s h i s s u e s , l i k e questions of 
b i l a t e r a l i sm and foreign bases for wiiich Pakistan put forward a 
revised draf t giving new farmulations^,have been l e f t to a meeting 
o£ the Joint ccmimission to be held in March 1986 under the two 
Foreign Ministers of both the coun t r i e s . 
120. Ttif Yiaflfi ftf imSiB* »ew Delhi, January 11 , 1986 
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CHAPTER-VI 
In the context of India ^Pakistan r e l a t i o n s the continuance 
of Afghanistan problem adds a great deal t o t e n s i o n s . Pakistan. 
using i t as a cover* continues to yet more and more arms £rcKn the 
USA and Chita, strengthens her defence p o t e n t i a l and adopts 
h o s t i l e postures tovwrds India . The r e s o l u t i o n c^ the Afghan 
problem vould reduce t t e t ens ion and could contribute t o the 
confidence building measures between the two c o u n t r i e s . But given 
the ccntradictory nature of the assessment of Afgnan developments 
by the various countries concerned* the i r conception of the 
Afghan problem and the marr>er i n which i t should be resolved 
have d i f f e r e d . To Pakistan* the United States* China* Iran and 
other like-minded countr ies the Soviet m i l i t a r y in tervent ion and 
i t s f a l l o u t c o n s t i t u t e the Afghan problem; as a corol lary* the 
bas ic problem vK>uld be so lved with the c e s s a t i o n of that 
1 
in tervent ion . Viei*ed from Kabul and Moscow the Sov ie t ac t ion 
was not cause but the e f f e c t of the AfgtAn problem; the problem 
was and continues to be the armed fore ign in tervent ion , while the 
P.B. Sinha, the Afghan problem, IPSA Journal. October-
December, 1983, New Delhi* p . 120T 
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India Governrotnt took a reyiorAl view of the Afghan problwn 
r a the r than a s p a t i a l yloiaal view which prevai led in the 
United States* China and Pakis tan. In the i n t e r e c t of regional 
s t a b i l i t y and balance of power what was needed was to contain 
t h e A£g):«n c r i s i s bat not t o aggravate i t and enlarge i t s 
context and scope. I t would be necessary to obtain the 
withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet forces from Afghanistcsn 
within a spec i f i c time frame. But t h i s would not be possible if 
the insurgency was in t e rna t iona l i s ed and if Pakistan were 
converted in to a base for Sino-US mi l i t a ry ope a t ions against 
2 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Indian (]k>vernnent expressed 
more concern with the US planning to add s u b s t a n t i a l l y to 
Pakis tan ' s mi l i t a ry capab i l i t y , added fur ther by i t s nuclear 
development prograanme than Afghan problem. I t v<as a l so made 
c ' ea r t ha t if the US <^cided to ignore Ind ia ' s sentiments, i t 
would be doing so a t the r i s k of increasing ami Delhi ' s 
dependence on the S o v i t Union for <^fence req aircmsents to meet 
3 
the s i t u a t i o n . Thusjhaving reaffirmed the Indo-Soviet s t r a t e g i c 
linkage* Mrs. Gandhi made i t c l ea r tha t she had i » t supported 
or approved tDS Soviet in tervent ion/ she s t r e s sed Iwr opposition 
t o a l l foreign in tervent ions and the presence of foreign troops 
2* Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Necessity of Choic», Seminar. 
New Delhi* Mo. 246« February 1980. 
3- Indian Exoress. ^ w Delhi, January 23, 1980. 
130 
i n t h i r d world countxies , Mrs. Gandhi's goveriment, oponad 
chann«ls of deploinatic dialogues with several countr ies within 
and outside the region to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of an 
i n i t i a t i v e t h a t would Induce the Soviets to p u l l out tt^e bulk 
of t he i r troops frow Afghanistan within a r e l a t i v e l y shor t 
4 
tiiae* 
Pakistan expressed i t s gravest concern a t the Soviet 
intervent ion* e l l the more because the victim t^?as in Islamic 
nation* i t ca l l ed for the iroinediate unconditional and t o t a l 
withdra%ml of Soviet troops* AnM^ng other measures t o be 
adopted l a t e r to solve the Afghan problem Pakistan Includedt 
(1) Afghanistan's s t a tu s as an Xslarolc and non-maligned 
s t a tus should be res to red! 
(11) a conductive a1»nosphere should be created so tha t 
Afghan refugees could r e tu rn to t h e i r homeland with 
safety* honour and d igni ty i 
( i i i ) the people of Afghanistan should have the government 
of t h e i r own c l^ loe without outs ide In te r fe rence . 
Pakistan demani^d the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
as a csondition precedent to any e f fo r t t o resolve 
the Afghan problem. I t did rot recJognisc the Karmal 
government and would have nathing t o So so long as 
•MMMWMpwwMMnaiaM 
4 . Bhabani Sen Gupta. T^^, M.^ lffiE ?,TO^ ffP,fT'ff« P^- 10-18, 
5 . The Hlndmstan Tlmea. Hew Delhi« December 30, 1979. 
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6 
the Soviet troqps remained i n Afghanistan. 
On the o ther hand« the c»vernnent of Afghanistan 
diman^d complete and r e l i a b l e cessa t ion of armed aid 
or any other in te rvent ion in i t a a»»est ic a f f a i r s an^ 
c rea t ion o£ condit ions t h a t vrould ensure t ha t such 
in te r ference would not recur i n the fu tu re . The 
Soviet troops vvould r«nain in t h e i r country as long as 
Afghanistan vais subject to continuiny armed aggression 
from the t e r r i t o r i e s of the neighbourim^ coun t r i e s : 
once an agreement \im» reached and there was cessat ion 
Bnd guaranteed non-recurrence of armed intervention# 
Afghanistai tiould determine through en accord with 
the Soviet Union the t ime-table for the withdravial of 
Soviet troops from i t s t e r r i t o r y . The quest ion of 
Soviet m i l i t a r y presence was Afghanistan's own in te rna l 
7 
a f f a i r in which no other country had a r i g h t of say. 
1 . Indian i n i t i a t i y p s i India adopted the diplomacy of defusing 
the c r i s i s . 'She became a member of an in t e rna t iona l constitv»ncy 
which aid not wish t o throw av.ay ttm gains oi detente* which 
6 . P.B. Sinha, o p . c i t . . p . 120 
7. ptfctid. 
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opposed extreme reactions to the soviet action* and which 
preserved to l i l t the cold war ana defuse the svqper-power 
8 
confror^aticm* The Hindu rep)orted that Goverrment Intended to 
mobilise opinion against the growing dangers o£ great-power 
involv^nent in the region* '^ Xt is thinKir^ of an Indian in i t ia t ive 
to laring the neighiaouBring countries and the interested powers 
together to de£ufe the deepening c r i s i s end foster better 
understanding amongst them. The proposed diploraatic vaov9 will 
take some time to take shape but preliminary consultations with 
the concerned countries wi l l be in i t ia ted soon.^ ^ 
On January 25« 1980, the Hindu reported that the Government 
o£ India was considering whether i t should confine i t s current 
exchanges to bi lateral talks with other countries in the region 
or take the In i t ia t ive inconvening a conference of the foreign 
(tiinisters of the countries to discuss what could be done t o 
avert the danger of big-power r iva lr ies in the region. One of 
the Suggestions was that India should invite pakistan« lran# 
Afghanistan. Nepal« Bangladesh, Sri Lenka and even Burna to 
10 
such a conference i f these countries were wil l ing to take part. 
However, such a move could not be materialised. 
8. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op .c i t .^ p. 115* 
9* IUfi, mm^t Madras, January 2 l , 1980. 
10. i^jSLu. January 26, 1980. 
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The XAt Secretary-General, Mr Kurt v^alcheim's talkS wxth 
Mrs. Gandhi on jani^ry 23, 1980 sa t i s f i ed him that India was 
trying privately to persuade Moscow at l e s s t to thin out i t s 
mil i tary presence in Afghanistaun* He later informed Mrs. Gandhi 
11 
that Gen. 2ia would be delighted to open a dialogue with India. 
Mrs. Gandhi chose the foreign secretary, R&Ok sathe# to c,o to 
Pakistan £or the purpose* h 100 minute ta lks with his Pakistani 
counterpart fa i l ed to arrive a t a cownon strategy to resolve the 
Afghan probl^n. The perceptions of both the countries of the 
c r i s i s remained widely apart, but there was desire on their part 
to have strategic co-operation. Gen, ZJLa expressed that India 
should assert i t s posit ion and influence with the Soviet Union 
t o get the l^uisian troops withdrawn fram Afghanistan. He also 
favoured the raising oi a i^ace keeping mission consisting of 
India, Pakistan and Iran to f a c i l i t a t e withdrawal of &?viet 
troops from Afghanistan and to give the people of Afghanistan an 
12 
opportunity to decide the ir future. But the Afghan issue utLrn not 
a regional issue but a global one, so i t was the responsibi l i ty of 
the world cosRnunity to come to i t s rescue. 
After Ram Sathe *m v i s i t to Pakistan ranking o f f i c ia l s of 
the Indian foreign o t i i c e %;ere sent to Colombo, K t^hntandu and 
Dhaka. These diplomatic soundings did not hold out much hope of 
11 • iT»<aian Express, New Delhi, JaniPry 24, 1980 
12 . Bhabani Sen Gupta* p o . c i t . . p . ITI 
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any j o i n t i n i t i a t i v e for exer t ing co l l ec t ive pressures on the 
s up£r-povv<er8 to d e s i s t troin fur ther involvement i n the in t e rna l 
13 
a f f a i r s of ti^ ie region. Hone of these countr ies sa«f the two 
deve lo^en tS ; viz»th& Soviet ac t ion in Afghanistan and aming o£ 
Pakistan by the United States* thereby deepening super-power 
r i v a l r i e s in the region* as India d id . The Indian contention 
t h a t these two inseparable components ot the sane c r i s i s cannot 
be tackled compartmentally but he ve to be ^ a l t with 
14 
concorotnitantly as pa r t s of one and the same problem did not make 
much impression \xpon them* 
On the v i s i t of Soviet Foreign Minis ter , Mr Gromyko in 
Itew Delhi on February 12, 1980, Mrs Gandhi pressed for ons o r 
more o£ the followingi 
(1) An immediate token withdra%i«l of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan; 
(2) a publ ic pledge tha t the bulk oi the troops would 
be wi^drawn within a spec i f i c period of timei 
(3) a statement Affirming Soviet adherence to non-
in tervent ion in in te rna l a f f a i r s of other countr ies 
and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the t e r r i t o r y of sovereign 
na t ions ; and 
(4) Soviet cont r ibut ion to the c rea t ion of a regional 
s ecu r i t y ayatem without both superpowers •> the 
1 3 . S3asU3JMik' Madras, February 11, 1980. 
14. The TJBMis of Ind ia , Mew Delhi, February 20, 1980. 
13S 
contxibutiois toeing In the f (»IB of pulling out of 
troope £roai Afghanistan and a declaration of as^coval* 
in principle* of a regional ayatcHi autonomous of the 
great" potMira* 
IS 
oromyko rafuned to make anyone o£ these g^itures* The 
Zn<3iAn goveriKBen^ fa i led to convince Moscow that i t must withdraw 
troops from Afghanistan as part of Soviet contribution to 
normalising the s i tuat ion in the region* Qromyko* on the other 
hand, fa i led to convince Xndia ent ire ly of the Soviet union's 
16 
military intervention in Afghanistan* However* as Mrs. Gandhi 
to ld reporters on February 20* 1980 that she had been assured by 
the sovie t union that i t would withdraw i t s troops from Afghanistan 
i f Pakistan stopped training and sendir^ guerri l las for raids . 
She indicated that the fooisi of Indian diplomacy was not on the 
withdrawal of Russian troops but on the stopping of iyaerican 
17 
arms transfer t o Pakistan* Hoiiiever, i n the f i r s t week of April 1980, 
came the annouiKzement of the Soviet-Afghan treaty formilisinQ 
18 
the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan. I t had a freeaing 
15. Bhabani Sen Gupta, aSLM&l^» PF« 123-124. 
16. Tin. iPtfJLft,B &mm§* ^^ Delhi, February 14, 1980. 
17. TIW Ifefffiffi ,ffi,f JMJM' New Delhi, Peferuary 27, 1980. 
18« YIW 3.n^iB fi^fP,git«i New Delhi, April 10, 1980. 
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e f fec t on I n d i a ' s <3iplon*tic e f f o r t s . 
The Foreign Minister of Cuba, Mr I s idore Malemiera Peoli 
v i s i t e d New Delhi in April 1980, He made i t c lear to Mrs. Gandhi 
t h a t Cuba was t ry ing t o bring Gen. Zia and Babrak Karmal together 
a t Havana or anyvvhere e l se# c a s t r o , the President of Cuba, 
himself i n a oomrounication to Mrs. a ndhi asked for her help to 
r e a l i z e t h i s shared ob jec t ive . But Gen. Zia turr»d down the 
20 
Cuban proposal . 
After r e j ec t i ng of Ciiban i n i t i a t i v e Gen. Zia to ld New 
Delhi that he would be del ighted to receive a specia l envoy of 
Mrs. Gandhi. So.Sardar Swaran Singh went to Pakistan on April 10, 
1980. He found Gen. Zia su rp r i s ing ly relaxed about Afghanistan. 
he had p r a c t i c a l l y ceased fue l l ing the Afghan insurgence. He 
was s t i l l stubbornly r e s i s t i n g Soviet pressure to meet with 
Babrak Karmai. in any case/ he was now looking a t the Afghan 
21 
c r i s i s throvK^h the eyes of the Islamic conference. Ho%rever^  
difference between India and Pakistan on Afghanistan had 
narrowed as a r e s u l t of his v i s i t , India wished to seek Pakistan 's 
22 
co-operat ion to promote peace and secur i ty i n the region . At the 
meeting between Gen. zia-ul-Haq and prime Minis ter , Indira Gandhi 
a t Sal isbury, Gen. Zia offered to have a UN supervisory groves 
20. The Tiroes of Ind ia , New Delhi, April 9, 1980 
21. Bhabani Sen Gupta, op.qi^,.., p . 131. 
2 2. The Hindustan Times^ New Delhi, April 15, 1980. 
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s t a t i o n e d In Pakistan, arawn from countr ies l i k e India , to 
ensure that Afghan rebe l s were not armed, tra ined and sent 
across the border to carry on gtaerri l la wars. This o f fer v«8 
23 
transmitted by nev Delhi to Moscow. After her ta lks v i t h Leonid 
Brezhnev i n Belgrade on May 8, 1980^ Mrs* Gandhi s ta ted that 
Brezhnev was to happy to keep troops i n Afghanistan and vas keen 
o a pul l ing them o u t . He only wanted the c r e a t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n 
24 
which would make t h i s p o s s i b l e . 
Meanwhile,the Afghan government o f fered to work out a 
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n through b i l a t e r a l or t r i l a t e r a l t a l k s with 
Pakistan and Iran, I f Pakistan and Iran pledged that t lwy would 
rK>t support the Afghan r e b e l s , and i f t h e i r ple<Hiea were under 
underwritten by ti% imited States and the Sov ie t union, t h i s 
would pave the way for withdrawal of Sov ie t troops* on the 
r e l e a s e of t h i s proposal , Mrs. G ndhi s e n t mm Sathe t o Kabul on 
May 16, 1980. The main thrus t of h i s v i s i t was to emphasise 
India ' s sImport for t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s •> among Afghanistan, 
25 
Pakistan and Iran or for the convening of a larger forum. Also 
on May 16, 1980, the Is lamic Conference began in Islamabad. Ihe 
Conference s e t up a three membei; committee headed by the Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan and including the Foreign Minister of Iran 
t o explore a l l p o s s i b l e ways of a p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement including 
23 . lUg, Hla^lii Madras, May 10, 1980, 
24* .Ttif „ TtotI ffijg te<tta# ^®v Delhi , May 15, 1980. 
2 5 . I ^ 3>a^4#II fiffgyfiff* ^^ Delhi , May 17, 1980. 
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26 
tal loi with thB Soviet lIBlon. 
On Narsimlm Reo*s v i s i t to Mosoow on Jwoe 3« I98Q, i t 
became c lea r t h a t the Soviets vere i n no mood to accept the 
Islamic Conference framevork £or t a lks betiimen Afghanistan^ 
Pakistan an€ Iran* I t was sculpted to deny the Kabul regime 
the legitiRficy i t ii)i<^t have* I ran ana Pakistan ty^refore mvmt 
s i t down with Afghanistan a t the negot ia t ing t ab l e as equals and 
thrash out the agreed frane of an accordi t h i s would then be 
guaranteed by the Soviet imion and tim united S t a t e s . If India 
wished to help , i t should bring whatever pressure i t could on 
Pakistan to t a l k to Afghanistan* Aiso^lndia could even work for 
a »iniH3eneva-^ype conferenca with only those countr ies which 
had not taken s ides in tb« Afghan c r i s i s to hawner a t the 
basics of a p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion t l ^ t vould be aa ;ep tab le to the 
27 
Soviet union« Afghanistan* the united S ta tes and otSters* 
However* as Rao affirmed, I n d i a ' s a b i l i t y to influence Soviet 
act ion with regard to Afghanistan was very limited* 
In Ju ly 1980, mrsiniha Rao met the foreign minis ters of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan separa te ly i n !«ew York carrying message 
from one to the o the r . But nothing could take place to pave the 
way for solut ion* 
26. lUi Anfiifift SXPIlti* Nev Delhi, May 20, 1980. 
27. Bhabani Sen Gvqpta, o p . e i t . ^ p , 135* 
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During Brezhnev's v l a l t t o New Delhi i n DeceiBiser 1980, 
i t became e x p l i c i t t h a t l » t h India and the Sov ie t Union di f fered 
on the i saue o continuing S o v i e t m i l i t a r y presence i n Afghanistan. 
Hovrever, Pakistan'a refusal to work with India or the USSR and 
Gen, Zia 's stubborn dec i s i on to anchor h i s fore ign p o l i c y on the 
Is lamic conference rabbed India of i t s des ired ro le as South 
A s i a ' s peace Keeper and s e c u r i t y provia»r« and d i l u t e d the edge 
of India 's pressure on the Sov ie t union to withdraw i t s arraed 
28 
forces from Afghanistan, 
Gen. z i a * s f i r s t diplomatic triumph to reso lve the Afghan 
problem v/as tiie spe4:ial s e s s i o n o£ the Foreign Ministex« of 37 
i s lamic countries teld a t Islamabad from January 27« 1980. Gen. 
Zia exhorted the i s lamic vorld t o j o i n hands not only to make 
the Sov ie t Union withdraw i t s troops from Afghanistan but a l s o to 
consider ways and means for the o d l l e c t i v e <tefenoe of the Islamic 
29 
limma rather than the defence of indiv idual cx>untries* The 
s e s s i o n d e c i ^ d t o suspend Afghanistan from the ncRnbership of the 
organiseation o£ the Islamic s t a t e s and asked member s t a t e s to 
withhold recogni t ion to the JBabrak Kamal Government and suspend 
2 ' * I b i d . , p . 139. 
29. Extraordinary session o£ the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers (Islamabad* 1980}« p. 20 
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aiploroatic r e l a t i one ivith Afghanistan t i l l the complete 
withdrawal of a l l sovie t trocqp>» from tha t o junt ry . I t a l so 
c a l l e d \^3on member s t a t e s to extend economic a id to the 
coun t r i s neighbouring Afghanistan. I t s^^ported the us ca l l 
30 
for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics« Hiese decisior^s of the 
ext raordinary sess ion of the IF^ 5C (islamic Foreign Min i s te r s ' 
Conference) did not help i n fin<?ing a so lu t ion for the Afghan 
probl«n. 
After r e j ec t ing the us $40O mi l l ion economic and mi l i t a ry 
a i d 'as peanuts '« Gen* Zia sought t o have an aco^BMBOdation with 
t h e Soviet union. A r e t o r t from Islamabad sa id t h a t Pakistan 
had offered three a l t e r n a t i v e s to s a t i s f y Moscow and Kabult 
(1) t h a t i t was not feeding ins i rgence (2) any in te rna t iona l 
body could ver i fy the f a c t or Afghanistan could sea l i t s borders 
with Pakistan (3) an in te rna t iona l force could be s ta t ioned in 
Afghanistan to see t h a t no foreign power in t e r f e red i n i t s 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . I t could be drawn frc»n the Muslim countries 
31 
or n3n*aligned osuntr ies or be r a i sed by the tAl. Gen. zia 
t o l d a neiM conference on March 2&« 1980« t h a t a l l doors t o r a 
32 
dialogue with Moscow m\mt remain open. in view of such 
developn^nt Soviet diplomacy sought to bring about an 
understanding between Afghanistan* Pakistan and Iran* with o r 
30 . IPM,. pp.76-77. 
3 1 . Tte Yia t i gl, lU^§,t l^w celhi* March t« 1980 
3 2. I b i d . , March 26* 1980. 
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without I nd i a ' s he lp . 
The second conference of lelainio Foreign Minister held 
i n May 1980 i n Islamsbad <!Nsicided a t the i n i t i a t i v e 6£ Pakistan 
t o appoint a panel to explore ways and means ot impleroentinB 
the reso lu t ion passed by the extraordinary sess ion of the IFfC 
i n January 1980, The ser ious differences ®«erged among the 
i s l amic s t a t e s on the assessi^ent of the s i t u a t i o n i n Afghanistan. 
There were tlx>se who wanted Afghanistan t o be reaamitted to the 
IPMC and to hear i t s views on the i s s u e . They a l so ref vased to 
33 
l i n e vip behind the an t i -Sovie t l ine t h a t Pakistan was advocating. 
The IWHC panel was de«Raed to f a i l frora i t s very incept ion. I t 
wanted to t a l k to Afghanistan without recognizing the mbrak 
Karroal Government. Also^the IFMC had re jec ted package of 
proposals wade by the Afghan Government on the eve of the 
Conference. The package included proposals t o r regional 
normalination and for b i l a t e r a l agreements on border secur i ty with 
I r an aik3 Pakistan to be j o i n t l y underwritten by the Soviet uoion 
34 
and the US. The Soviet Union repeatedly made i t c l ea r t h a t 
without adequate aesuranoe of Afghanistan's s ecu r i t y from external 
aggression from pakistanr i t s forces would not be withdrawn. 
3 3 . Bhabani Sen Gi;qpta« India Ties with Russia for i^k i s tan , 
Aitirit Bazar patrolky. Calcut ta , May 13, 1980, 
34 . paK^stan Tirf.es. Lahore, May 12, 1980. 
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The Soviet In tervent ion in Afghanistan espoused 
reactioDB a l l over the inrorld l ike laost ot the con f l i c t s i tua t ions 
posis g t h r e a t to i n t e rna t i ona l peace and s ecu r i t y siwh as Korea, 
Suez, the Lebanon, the Congo, Ca»choslova.vla e t c . In these 
cases the Securi ty Council raet almost iraroediately a f t e r the armed 
c o n f l i c t occurred. But in case of the Afghanistan s i t u a t i o n i t 
roiiabout two weeks a f t e r the Soviet in te rven t ion . Alsojfifty-two 
Members had to make a iformal request to convene the secur i ty 
35 
Council . While under the ru l e s any one M«Bber could have made 
i t . The uni ted Sta tes and otlt^r Western powers adopted a 
co r r ido r diplomacy, took a back sea t in the formal proceedings 
and non-aligned countr ies and otlvsr took the i n i t i a t i v e in 
sponsoring a draf t r e so lu t i on . The 6-power(Bangia-Desh, Jamaica, 
( l iger ia , the Ph i l ipp ines , Tunisia and Zambia) draf t reso lu t ion 
was miia iy worded.it avoided condemnation; i t merely deplored 
the recent armed in tervent ion i n Afghanistan which was described 
as Inconsis tent with the fundamental p r inc ip l e s of the m 
Charter I and i t m l l e d " for the withdrav^l of foreign troops 
36 
£rom Afghanistan." But the Soviet tffilon was not named. 
35 . UN Doc. 5/13724 and Add 1 and 2, of 3 Jant^ry 1986. 
36. K.p. Saksena, Afghanistan conf l i c t and the United Nations, 
. (Octobc 
' p . 665. 
|H|gri»IAgmA 8l^^ | f f t er-D»c«Bber IJNU, New Delhi, 
143 
Among the a>untrie» in t he imroediatc v i c i n i t y of Afghaniatan only 
Pakis tan joined the debate while India and I ran declined t o jo in . 
The 6-power draf t r e o lu t ion fa i l ed to secvare an adoption 
because o£ the veto by the Soviet Iftiion. Two days l a t e r , on 
January 9, 1980 the PTtilippines and Mexico i n i t i a t e d a procedural 
r e so lu t ion under the provision* of "'-j^iiting for peace which lee 
t o the convening of the Sixth Emergency Special Session o£ the 
General Assembly on January 10, 1980. About Seventy-four delegates 
pa r t i c ipa t ed i n t i » ensuing debate. A draf t reso lu t ion s imilar in 
content as the one vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security 
Council was presented by peidLstan on behalf of i t s twenty-four 
sponsor*, i t was adopted by an overwhelming major i ty . India 
vObstained from vot ing . The reso lu t ion • 'strongly deplored the 
r ecen t armed in te rven t ion in to Afghanistan as incons i s ten t with 
a fundamental p r inc ip l e of the UK Charter" and ca l l ed for an 
"immediate* unconditional and t o t a l withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Afghanistsn in o^rOer to enable i t s people to determine their 
form of government and choose tt^^eir economic* p o l i t i c a l * and 
s o c i a l system fron outs ide intervent ion* subversion* coercion or 
37 
cons t r a in t of any kind whatsoever^i In t h i s r eso lu t ion the USSR 
was nei ther named nor condemned as such, while India gave a 
ca t egor i ca l explanation of the Soviet in te rvent ion in Afghanistan 
t o the aninoyance of Pakistan and other c o u n t r i e s . The 
3 7. gn^T y«i9X«Ugfl SS-6/2 of January 1980* para 4 
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repr«««ntatlve of ln<3ia B*C. Mishra* recal led India's v i ta l 
concern for peace ana security in the area# reiterated i t s 
opposition to the presence of foreign troops and leases in any 
country. B.C. Mishra said "the Soviet Governroent had assured 
our Government that i t s troops went to Afghanistan at the requast 
of the Afghan Governments a request that was f i r s t made by 
president Amin on 26 i::«K:etnber 1979 and repeated by his successor 
38 
on 28 December 1979. we have been further assured that the 
Soviet troops wi l l be withdrawn when requested to do so by the 
Afghan Government." Such instance adopted by India at the 
United Nations on the s i tuat ion in Afghanistan was against the 
stances taken by In<Sia during earl ier Soviet military 
39 
interventions — in Hungry and in Csoechoslovakia. And on January 
14, 1980 when cal led upon the stand up and be counted* India 
joined the ranks of those non««ligned countries which 
abstained on the General Assembly resolution. Mhile Pakistan 
with a large number of non-aligned countries Joined otiiers in 
voting for the resolution call ing for immediate withdrawal of 
40 
the foreign forces. 
But both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union rejected the 
united Nations resolutions adopted at i t s emergency session in 
3 8» GA. A/ESI«6/PV-1. January 10, 1980, pp. 11-12. 
39 . K.P. Saksena, o p . c i t . . pp. 673-74. 
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January 1980 a t the regular ••«Blon in Viovember 198|p and 
November 1981. 
Besides Ult| resolu t ions other e f fo r t s have a l so been 
Biadte t o resolve the Afghan e r i s i s . Very b r i e f ly s ta ted* these 
inc lude! the declara t ions of the organisa t ion of Islamic 
Conference (extreordioery and regular conferences of islamic 
Foreign Ministers in Isianmbsd in Januf&ry and May 1980 
respec t ive ly whieh have already been discussedy and the Taif 
summit in j an \ e ry 19811 the B r i t i s h proposal for neu t ra l i sa t ion 
of Afghanistan (January-February 1980); the then French 
Pres ident Vilery Discard a ' £staing*s proposal for an in te rna t iona l 
conference (January 1981} i the European CK>ininianity*s plan for a 
tii#o-stage in t e rna t iona l oonfereix:e (July 1981} i pres icent Jisiy 
c a r t e r ' s t r a n s i t i o n a l arrang«nent (March 1980) envisioning a 
neut ra l i n t e rna t i ons l peace-keeping foros in« and in te rna t iona l 
guarantees t o Afghanistan; and I r a n ' s pro^^Msal for t a lks (March 
1980} and another f ive point peace plan (l^veBiber 1981} ca l l ing 
for a t h e o r e t i c s t ructwre for Afghan i n s t i t u t i o n s and for an 
41 
Islamic peace-keeping fo rce . The Fin landisa t ion of Afghanistan 
has a l s o been proposed* After V^rld war I I , the Soviet Finnish 
4 1 , P.B. Sinha. aSUfiUA* P« 121, 
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treaty led to the evacuation o£ the s>viet base at porkkala in 
return for a pledge that Finland vould not join a military 
arrangimient hos t i l e to the Soviet union aotd that Moscow would 
retain the right t o intervene i f Soviet security were 
42 
threatened. HoweveryKabul and Moscow considered a i l these 
proposals es amounting to interference in the internal affairs 
of Afghanistan. 
m SHOTiy: pipwu^K 
u^ secretarv^General's Mediations Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union both had repeatedly rejected the resalutions passed by the 
UN General Assembly and other ef forts outside the UN on the 
Afghan s i tuat ion . However^ Afghanistan had shown i t s desire to 
enter into discussions with Pakistan and Iran but without 
cx>mproinising on i t s basic stand. Pakistan accepting UM 
resolutions on Afghanistan a l so accepted to cooperate in any 
43 
move by the Secretery-Ceneral in that regard. 
In February 1981, the then US Secretary'-General Mr Kurt 
waidheim named Javier perex de Geullar as his special 
representative on Afghanistan to bring the concerned parties 
to the negotiating t a m e . The NonHillgned Foreign Ministers 
4 2. Jagat S. Mehta, A Neutral Solution, Foreign Policy. Summer 
1982, wasMi^ton, t i . C , pp. 145-146. 
43 . P.B. Sinha, iaa^SjUfc., p. 123 
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i n New Delhi in February 1981 provided an opportunity in this 
respect but Pakistan** insistence on Iran's simultaneous 
participation in any direct talks with Afghanistan and Iran's 
refusal to have anything to do with siich talks undermined this 
44 
opportunity* 
On Kovember 18, 1981« the m General Assembly requested the 
SecretaryoQeneral to continue his e f forts to promote a po l i t ioa l 
settlement of the Afghan cr i s i s* After his shuttle diplomacy in 
Islamabad, i<5Bbul and Tehran in April 1982, Diego Cordovez, the 
UH under Secretary-General for po l i t i ca l Affairs ac^ Peres de 
Cuellar's personal representative announced the agreement of the 
three countries to participate in indirect talks in June 1982 in 
Geneva under his good ot f i ces to f a c i l i t a t e the search for a just 
4S 
and last ing p o l i t i c a l solution* 
According to reports - a fa ir elasnent package was put 
forward on behalf of the ItJ secretary General as a frame of 
renotiations. I t envisagedi 
withdrawal of foreign forces from between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and similarly betuwen Afghanistan and Iran, 
bending the parties to mutual non-interference and 
respect for sovereignty across established frontiers* 
^^' MMA* P* 124. 
148 
international guarantees respecting Afghanistan's 
non-aligned s ta tus . 
46 
voXuiitary return to ttieir hcHnes o£ Afghan refugees. 
J ^ US^%, mm^ ^ IKf l During the f i r s t ro nd talks at Geneva in 
June 1982, the consultations centred on substantive contents of 
a comprehensive settlmnent. The four inter-related elements of 
a comprehensive settlement as agreed a t CSeneva were -
withdrav?al of fozeign troops; 
non-interference and intervention; 
guarantees of non-intervention and non-interference in 
the internal af fa irs of the s tates in the region; 
arrangwuent for return of refugees to their home. 
During the discussions Iran did not participate but kept 
informed through a representative in Geneva. Careful consideration 
%«s also given to modalities and timing of a consultative 
mechanisms that wil l be s e t in motion to consult refugees in 
47 
order to ascertain the voluntary character of their retuorni.''' 
XUft HISQM RftWltf Tllhl,. i^ HTAl t^^) i ^ ^ second round of 
indirect talks between thm foreign ministers of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan opened in Geneva on April 4« 1983» Like the f i r s t 
4 7. Tbm A f^^ R aacorder. Kew Delhi, ^ y 28-June 3 , 1982, 
Vol. JOCVIIl, Ho. 22. o. 16«19-
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round t h i s time a l so i r sn dia not p a r t i c i p a t e in the discussions 
ba t i t s represen ta t ives i n Geneva tMO^kept informed about the 
progress in t a l k s . Thii time representa t ives of Afghan 
refugees were allowed to be present outs ide the Conference Hall , 
aitho\igh no formal consul ta t ions were made with them. Soviet 
a d v i s e r s , too* were ava i lab le for consul ta t ions in t h i s 
occasion. According t o repor t s Jcoth Afghanistan and Pakistan 
s e t down non-interference in each other*8 in te rna l a f f a i r s as 
a Condition for any agre«N»ent. Pakistan sources disclosed t h a t 
the t a l k s r e s u l t e d in ident i fy ing f ive broad areas for 
negot ia t ions on which both Pakistan and Afghanistan held 
divergent p o s i t i o n s . 
•Ihf Ili^^ffl BaWA TtlHl .(JJffit, l^^}),t 7 ^ <3raft of agreement 
under discussions in t h i s round va^a based on the following 
four main points t (1) withdrawal of the estimated 105000 
Soviet t roops frcxn Afghanistan; (2) cessat ion of a id t o the 
g u e r i l l a s ; (3) r e p a t r i a t i o n of refugees; and (4) in te rna t iona l 
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guarantees t h a t the se t t lement w i l l be ot«erved. 
However^talks f a i l ed t o make any major progress on the 
s i g n i f i c a n t i ssues which were passed on to t h i r d round t a lks to 
4 8 . P.B. Sinha, o p . ^ i ^ . . 128. 
Ytif Mi^n mS^S^Ft Ju ly 30^AUQU8t 6, 1983, VOL XXIV, 
NO. 31 , p» 17289. 4 9 . ^ 
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b« held in 1984. In the third wettk o£ June 1983 Mr Geogi A. 
Ar*batov« director o£ the &>vlet union's Inst i tute on USA and 
Canada said in Geneva that USSR waa ready to pull i ta troqpa as 
socm as suf £ ic ient guaranteiMi vwre obtained fron Pakistan. 
Meanwhile,Pakistan's foreign Minister, Mr Sahibzada Y^qub Khan 
o££ered in Moscow to l e t ittJ observer check if Afghan rebels 
opeEttte £rocB Pakistani terri tory. Al8o*the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops and the fomation o£ non-aligned governnent acceptable to 
Afghanistan people and the return o£ refugees should form part 
of any coa^rehensive settlement that was %forked out a t Geneva 
SO 
tal loi . 
Fourth Itound Talks (1984)» llie talks began in Geneva on August 
24» 1984, in the sha^w of Pakistani accusation of air and 
a r t i l l e r y attacks across i t s border by Afghanistan* According to 
UH uunder-secretaryo'General Mr Cor doves, although both sides 
seeraed ^te tn ined to make progress in the ta lks , there was 
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treniendous distrust between them. 
i 
l.tft,^ fiQMBti T^l¥M UnP) i The f i f th round oi talks began fro« 
August 27, 1985 to August 29, 193L. According to the UN 
representative Mr Di^go Oordovez tim US and the Soviet union had 
SO. Ii4^^ 
^^* The Km^mn ^^ico^^^. Mew Delhi, September 30,. October 6, 1984, 
Vol. XXX, No. 40, p . 17961. 
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be«n ASkea forio&lly to guarantee « united tjatlons peace plan 
for the Af^i^n conf l i c t and tootii had expressed interest* But 
Afghanistan and Pakistan had ayreed during; the UN sponsored 
talks i n Jittie to ask the suqper«po%rers t o ac t as guarantors. 
According to Mr Oordovez (4) agreeotent on iion»interventlon 
and non-interference v ir tual ly oexnpleted, (2) agreement on 
international guarantor for eettleraent was also completed (3) 
agreement o» repatriation of more than 3 mil l ion Afghan refugees 
i n Pakistan who almost cxxnpletedt but (4) finding a way to 
aadress the question of the \^tharai*al of Soviet troops fro» 
Afghanistan vas under discuis ion. 
Pakistan ins is ted to s e t a time-table for the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops which remained a major obstacle . Despite 
Afghanistan's insistence that the talks be held face to faoe» 
there was l i t t l e chance for Pakistan to accept i t in the next 
round. 
Both the US and the Soviet union had addressed theiMelves 
to th i s talk. The written response of the Soviet union i^ ^d 
reached to Mr Cordovea who presented i t to Pakistan for study. 
A representative of the US also had a meeting with Mr COrdovez 
during which he gave verbal response. The US was to follow i t 
up with a written response. In their responses both the S^per-power 
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had strongly and unambiguously sui^orted the Geneva process. 
6 2. TlW ilMI,lf,n.„Rttt9r^ir' »«« tmlht^ November S-11, 1985< 
vol . XXXI, NO. 4S, p . 18587. 
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sfxth Round TAlka (Dcc«»toer 198S) i A draf t agreement had been 
drawn wp for three of the four pa r t s of a f i n a l accord -
non-interference in Afghan a f f a i r s ; i n t e rna t iona l peaoe guarantees; 
an<? the re tu rn of Afghan refogees• But the Pakis tani and 
Afghan negot ia tors continued t o d i f fe r on the i n t e r - r e l a t l o n s h l ^ 
of these issues with the ac tua l withdrawal of foreign Soviet 
t roo 3 froro Afghanistan* Also, there was another source of basic 
disagreement whether the t a l k s should be continued in an iiMiirect 
form as favoured by Pakistan, or conducted d i r e c t l y , as deroan^d 
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b y i-';iJ^iaHi^•<'..'» 
Thttfy^kespite diplomatic consul ta t ions to work out the 
de t a i l s and e s sen t i a l refinements of these s t ep by s t ep propoeals, 
a s e t t l ^nen t of the Afghan probleta &>e8 not se^n to be a t t a inab le 
i n the iimnediate fu tu re . This may be explained by t l ^ indifference 
to the v iable so lu t ion by the Svqper-powers. Buc^eearch to r a 
p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion in Afghanistan has relevance for the s t a b i l i t y 
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of the uhole area from the Sub-continent to the Middle East . 
Given Such so lu t ion India-Pakis tan would c e r t a i n l y undergo more 
and more normalisat ion, confidence-building and co-operation in 
various f ie lds^as has been BBen i n the previous chapter . 
5 3 . Tliff Ttogff Qi tn^ffi. New Delhi, December 21 , 1985. 
54. j aga t S. Mehta, iJfiiSiU' P* 1S2. 
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Zn the preceding pages an atteanpt Mas been nade to 
sketch the story o£ the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and 
i t s impact on India-Pakistan relations* I t i s a coiaplex story 
whicli permits £e%r generaliseations or firm conclusions. But i t 
i s not without i t s lessons . The concludine chapter highlights 
the changing tren^i in India-Pakistan relat ions hrought aboui^  
by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the lessons which 
have been learnt iron the locperience. 
As frequently noted* the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was, frcxQ the very beginning, the categorical imperative of 
the Soviet eeononnic and railitary aid to Afghanistan* In 1921 
Afghanistan conclu^d a treaty of neutrality and non<-aggression 
with the Soviet ISnlon, which was again revived in 1931. I t has 
a l so been seen hew having been rebuffed by the United States, 
Daoud Khan approached the Soviet Union for arras aid and sought 
soviet support on pakhtoonistan issue* The internal struggle 
for power brought the Saur Eevol^^ion of April 1973. Then, 
i n September 1979, Noor MohanirDad Tarakki was ousted by 
Hafizuilah Ainin without having an adverse impact on the 
Soviet-Afghan Relations. However, the Soviet intervention took 
place in December 1979 when Hafisullah Ainin was replaced by 
Ba)»rak Kam«il . The various geo-pol i t ica l and geo-strategie 
coBipulsions of the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan 
IM 
h&v« a l s o been mtmrnltm^* 
SisiultAneously* tlie pert pleyed ts^ Afghaoittan i n 
Zndia-peklstan relat ion* Inmm a lso been reviewed* before and 
after the «»viet intervention in Afghanistan. The variotie 
efforts laaae so far to resolve the Afghan c r i s i s in the context 
of Zn(3ia ana Pakistan have also been studied. 
As regarai India-pakistan re la t ions | there has been a 
mutual ecrimony bet%f©en the two countries s ince 1947. what forms 
the real iispact o£ the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 
India-pekistan relat ions? As a l r e a ^ made clear* following 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan Pakistan bec^ae a 
frontl ine s ta te in the US global strategy in the Second Cold 
war, which i s quite different from the lis-pak relat ions in ths 
f i r s t Cold Mar. After the e x i t of the Shah of Iran* only 
pekistan could play a v i t a l role i n tiw overall US strategy 
for the Peraian Oul£* serving as an extremely important enterport 
for the nw (Rapid Deployment Force) mounting into the Persian 
Gulf from the e a s t . Such atvelqpments have cwcessary implications 
for India's security. Indian ocean i s v i t a l to India's external, 
p o l i t i c a l and economic re la t ions . India's entire £oreign trade 
and heavy coastal trade depends on the freedom of Indian Ocean. 
In case o£ any turmoil therein* India shal l be very adversely 
effected. Also, the m i l i t a r i l y strong Pakistan i s l ike ly to 
threaten the security of India on i t s northern border. Apart 
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from the p o s s i b i l i t y of th rea t s to^ Pakistan to I n d i a ' s s ecu r i ty , 
the Soviet in t s rven t ion has affected India vis<-a~vis Pakistan i n 
t h e following v^ayst 
(1) I nd i a ' s s tand v i s -a -v i s the Soviet in tervent ion in 
Afghanistan crea ted more d i s t r u s t and suspicion betvfeen India 
and Pakis tan. Incla took a regional view of the Afghan problem 
and s u g ^ s t e d p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion on a regional bas i s without 
involving the super-powers, India e:'!pre8aed concern more on 
Pak is tan ' s acqu i s i t i on of arms from the US trsan the Soviet 
presence in Afgh&nlstan. India made c e r t a i n at tempts by sending 
Mr Ram S. the I n d i a ' s Foreign Secretary and Sardar Svraran Singh 
t o islawabad to resolve the Afghan c r i s i s . But Pakistan, though 
i n i t i a l l y agreed t o , however, refused to seek Ind ia ' s cooperation 
t o resolve the problem. Ins tead, she in te rna t iona l i zed the 
Afghan c r i s i s and sought to resolve i t through the Islamic 
conference and the UN. Such a divergence i n the approaches 
of the two countr ies created fur ther misimderstanding bet%ie«n 
them. 
(2) As has been seen, the Soviet in tervent ion in Afghanistan 
added the vigorous i n t e n s i t y t o the arms r ace , both quan t i t a t ive 
and q m i i t a t i v e , including the nuclear one between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan in June 1981 was offered to receive $ 3,2 
b i l l i o n worth of a ins and economic ass i s t ance including the P-16 
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and other u l t r an ioph i s t i ca t ed arims from ttm USA. In addition* 
the US ad to in i s t r . t lon a l so agreed in 1985 to s e l l $ 103 mil l ion 
worth oi arms including arrooured personnel c a r r i e r (APC) and 
155 rnin Bovritzer. Both h i s t o r i c a l l y as vwll as s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
there i s more p o s s i b i l i t y o£ these arms being used agains t India 
than aga ins t Afghanistan. As a r e s u l t , I n d i a had t o match the 
c a p a b i l i t i e s of Pakistan by purchasing arms frorrs the USSR, 
Franee« England and other %MHitern countr ies and by modernizing 
i t s own defence* Besides conventional arms race* nuclear arms 
r ace a l so s t a r t e d . Pakistan i s reported to have achieved the 
c a p a b i l i t y to go nuclear . This has espoused intense reac t ions 
i n India where many people have been advocating t h a t India should 
have niK:lear bomb to guarantee i t s s ecu r i t y vis*a-viS"paki8tan. 
Sucti r i v a l r y i s very harmfully having an adverse impact on the 
confidence-building measures between them. 
(3) Such an in tense arras race has been act ing as the 
permanent dra in on the scarce resources of both the coun t r i e s . 
SudA e: penditure has only blocked resources i n non-prodiM^ive 
s e c to r s of economy iaringing inf la t ion^ eat ing the r e a l income 
of the lower income grouqps and thus creat ing inequa l i ty and 
poverty i n the long run . In the shor t run m i l i t a r y expenditure 
h s s t imulated demand and boosted employnMant, In the long rim, 
however, these expenditures a r e l i ke ly to have a negative 
impact on investment, i n f l a t i o n , employment, balance of payment. 
I ndus t r i a l production and economic growth. AS discussed e a r l i e r . 
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ttie various poverty allevl&tioii progranne incluaing dev«lqpmeauil 
would have been more e f fec t ive ly employed, had even tmXi o£ tha 
resoisrces spent on arms and equipments been u t i l i s ed there* 
thsre i s l ikl ihood oi the negative i ^ ^ c t on Pakistan's e«onosiy 
making i t more and more dependent on the foreign aid in the 
long run* Pakistan i s l ike ly to hsim negative impact on i t s 
investment# affiploynent* balSK^e of payment and industrial 
productivity* and thiMi creating obst ic les to the aciiievement of 
a s e l f • re l iant ecoraKsic growth* Further, such a huge foreign aid 
sha l l impose a great deal of burden on hor futiare generation. 
(4) The support and en®3urag«»ent given by Pakistan to ant i -
Indian extremists and secess ionis ts has also adversely affected 
the relat ions betunen India and Pakistan* This factor i s 
eotmon between India and Afghanistan* wherein Pakistan and i t s 
mentor the united States Iwve been making ef forts to destablise 
the two countries* *» the Afghan rebels contin«K to get arms* 
atnntmition* equipments* medicines and cash to arrive at ths 
military solution of the Afghan |uroblem« so there i s a l so 
suff ic ient evidence to show that some Indian extremists have 
taken refuge in Pakistan receiving training in gueri l la warfare. 
Their nuBdser* According to different sources* varies from t\K> 
thousand to ten thousand* Further* there %#ere also reports of 
maas migration of the Sikhs irom various parts of India and 
then push them across-Indo*pak border* t h w se t t ing ii|> Sikh 
refugee camps on the Indb-pak terder* Further, tht role of 
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Pakistan media in diatortiog events during army action in 
ptmjab* ana carrying tba intervievrs with known extranists , 
createa severe apprehension in India and thus making the 
relat ions between the two countries more acrii^nioiMi. 
Recently armed conf l ic ts between the two countries in the 
Sia<^en glacier have further added a new and disconcerting 
dimension to the routine Zndo-pak low-level tension. The 
Glacier i s located in the mrmkortm Range and thus occupies a 
posit ion-str&tegical ly very important* AS discussed already^both 
India and Pakistan claim th i s region as the part oi Uieir 
t e r r i t o r i ^ while the Indian Army occupies a commanding pet i t ion 
in the region* The r ^ i o n missed demarcation during the Simla 
Agreement (1972) between the two countries. 
Besides the above mentioned irr i tant factors , we have 
a l s o detailed the various confidence>building measures in i t ia ted 
betv«en India and Pakistan. Xsmaediately after the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan# Mrs. Gandhi, the then Prime Minister 
of India sent the Foreign secretary of India, Mr R-m sathe, in 
February 1980 and her special envoy s^  rdar Swaran Singh in May 
1930 to Islamabad. General Zia»ul«*Haq agreed to India's 
cooperation in resolving the Afghan c r i s i s . Hov«ver,later he 
categorically ruled out India's cooperation and re l ied on the 
Islamic conference and the UM for the purpose. The i s i imic 
conferences (January 1980 and May 1980) fa i led to f a c i l i t a t e the 
resolut ion of the Afghan c r i s i s . Also^the indirect talks between 
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Pakistan and Afgiwnistan through the m outerHiecretary 
Mr Diego Qaraovaz iMtrw reauned in June 1982. Since then s ix 
round talks have taken plaoe a t Geneva between Afghanistan and 
pakiatan through the 8«ditatlon of the m Under-Secretary. But 
no viable solut ion has been arrived et« The agreed dra£t 
includes * non»inter£«rence in Afghan affairs# international 
peace guerantecA and the return to Afghan refugees* But there 
i s disagreement regarding tlM» actual withdrav>al of the Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. 
AS iri&g&rm bi lateral relat ions between India and pakistan« 
a major step was taken on 10 March 1983 when a joint commission 
having four sub-commissions dealing with various f i e lds was 
signed* Since then there have been three meetings of the 
CotBTOission with four sub-commisslons* Consequently« both the 
countries have agreed for cooperation in agricultural research 
and pronotion in travel and tourismf but fa i l ed to reconcile the 
differences i n the crucial tc&Oe sector. Recently* the Finance 
Minister of India, V#p» Singh's delegation, followed by the 
other led by Defence Secretary S.K. Bhatnagar with peripalet ic 
Foreign Sec etary Rcmesh Bhendari promise the speeding of the 
process of nornalisation* v^ have already discussed that V.P. 
Singh and his aids \vere able to extract a pledge by the Pakistan 
s ide to expand the l i s t of 42 items permitted for private trade 
t o bet%«een 200 and 250 items within the March 1906. The second 
^ l e g a t i o n led by the defence secretary discussed the recent 
armed clashes between the two sides in the Siachen glacier whi<m 
l «o 
Is extended for farther ta lks . While Bl*inaari»» talks with 
his coimterparts enbracs the entire gamut of Xn€b»paki8tan 
relations* The iRunediate areas of agreement aret ^ne; the 
acceptance by Pakistan of India's t^etnand over Indian defence 
personnel who have been reported missing i n action* Two» 
release of the c i v i l i a n detainees from both sides on or before 
March 31 th i s year, vmile Pakistan's non-aggression pact 
proposal and India's counter i^oposal for a treaty of peace* 
friendship and co'-operation have found no agre«iient. The 
major hurdle in the vAy are> (i) the concept of bilateralists 
as a means o£ solving dispu es bettneen the two countries (in 
view of the mshmir problim; and the ( i i ) question of allowing 
foreign bases on each other's territory (in view of the Afghan 
problem) • while a draft agreemint was f inal ised on the separate 
issue of mutual pledge not to attack each otlM»r*s nuclear 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
The less ions the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan make 
i t incumbent upon usi to find a po l i t i ca l solution in Afghanistan 
which i s not only relevant but very important for the s t a b i l i t y 
of the region. I t would halt arms race* and thus reduce the 
defence expenditisre i^ich can be ut i l i zed for the ecorxsmic 
development and amelioration of the Socio-economic conditions of 
the people of India^nd Pakistan. It wi l l also help in the 
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{iomi«liasftti.on of the relations faetiMttn the t>io countrieii and 
would bring confidence in ftttyre by ending mittiiel d is trui t and 
suepicion^the chief character i s t i c s of the ir re lat ione. 
(2) The confidence resulting irom the Soviet withdrawal and 
the motuel understanding shal l exercise benign influence on 
India*pakistan r e l a t ^ n s . The Zndo*paKistan boundary represents 
the p o l i t i c a l divis ion of a s ingle geographical,ecological« 
economic and defence \mit« The Hinaiyas and the Karakoriw 
mountains constitutiny a conamon l ine ot defence for both the 
countrias impose a ^;^K>policical convulsions on both the s tates 
not to deploy their amed farces against each other and thus 
weaken the external security of the entire 8ub->continent. 
(3) Apart frcm p o l i t i c a l considerations India's expansion of 
trade relations with Pakistan including other Asian countries 
would praaK>te the diversi f icat ion of trading areas and the ecoaosiy 
in transportation costs* Since Pakistan and Incia belong to the 
same ecoliogical regions # their economies are mutually conplenwntary 
in many v^ys. There se^as to be real i sat ion of th is fact on the 
part of both the countries and# as has been seen earlier* efforts 
are being made in the direction to promote better economic and 
trade relat ions whiidi might ensure the mutual ut i l i zat ion of 
natural resources and economic development lAiidn are essent ia l 
lor both s e c i r i t y and develc^pment* Besides* socio-cultural 
cooperation between the two countries shal l help in the mutual 
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unaerstandlng of ttm people o£ tx>th the o^imtries provldlc^ 
lUGentive for the aforesaid p\irpoee> The efforte have a l so been 
naae in th i s direct ion. 
(4) The resolution oi the Afghain problem shal l reduce the 
8 uper-powers presence in the stib»eoi^inent. B«K:ause i t i s the 
mutual distrust and suspicion and i t s resultant rivalry against 
each other %«hich creates the problnn of security against each 
other inviting the super powers^ inv3lv<«Bent in the region* Also, 
i t might reduce tensions in the Indian ocean region which i s 
v i t a l factor for the defence and developsient of both India and 
Pakistan. The UK Adhoc conmittee on Indian ocean* original ly 
scheduled to be held i n Colombo in 1981 could not be l^ld due to 
the opposition of the US and vas postponed for 1983 and again 
for 1984. T i l l now, the Cotmnittee has rx>t been held due the 
negativism of the United states and others which have taken the 
pos i t ion tbat a conference on the Indian ocean was inopportune 
so long as Soviet military presence in Afghanistan continued. 
Thus,the resolution of the Afghan problem would ixing 
s t a b i l i t y in the region and one of the irr i tant factors in the 
nomai ies t ion of India-Pakistan relat ions • the concept of 
foreign baees - as discussed ear l i er , would be removed* Oiven 
the favourable regional environment* other irr i tant factor* 
namely, the concept o£ bilateralism in the context of the Kasimir 
problem, could a l so be resolved. The recent diplosiatic efforts 
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on the part a£ both the countrli^ are major steps as regardte 
the future hopes but a l i t t l e as regards the past experiences. 
As a matter o£ fact* more than thirty e ight years o£ 
confl ict* mutual a i s trus t and suspicion cannot be resnoved so 
e a s i l y even after the solution of the Afghan problem. The 
part i t ion of the sub-conti^ -*j*; and the c ntinued hcwti l i ty 
between India enr Pakistan since then have exercised considerable 
infli»Bnce both on the internal s i tuations i n the two c»untries 
and on the external po l ic ies pursued by them. Each country 
fvasctions as a domestic compulsion tor the other. The Kashmir 
problem - a real issue in both countries • has internal po l i t i ca l 
overtones which makes i t s solution extrwnely d i f f i c u l t . 
Furthermore* both the countries have tr i ed to project in 
international af fa irs an image quite different frcHn each-other. 
Pakistan has not resolved the question of i t s national 
ident i ty . She has based her ident i ty not on territory* cultural 
and heritage of the people as in case of India but on the 
external heritage o£ the people namely* Islam. Due to i t s 
fa i lure v is*a-vis India to es tabl i sh a stable p o l i t i c a l order, 
Pakistan continues not only to advooate the t%iO -nation theory 
but a lso to speak on behalf- of Muslims in India. Also,there 
i s anxiety in Pakistan about India not being reconciled to an 
independent sovereign Pakistan. All these factors have abiding 
af fec ts on India-pekistan re la t ions . In addition* serious 
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difference* in the perceptions of the two countries in regard 
to s trateg ic envirc»siient» bilateralism* iK>n*>aXignRient and 
disposit ions of the amed forces; Pakistan's non««cceptanoe of 
India*8 pre-eminence despite her geography* economy and 
technology aiu9; basic differences in the approaches of both the 
countries - Pakistani approach being mil i tary and security 
x iented underlying the adversary relationship with India^ 
While IivSian approach bmtr^ p o l i t i c a l envisaging friendship 
and cooperations are ijmportanfe factors standing in the \vay of 
confideiKse"building bet%ie«n the ttro countries. 
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan has not influenced 
India-Pakistan relat ions entirely on a new basis- in an abrupt 
manner* All aspects of their r e l a t i o n having an impact of the 
intervention,vias;~ mutual distrust and suspicion due to lndia'5 
stand v i s -a -v i s Afghanistan* increasing arms race* nuclear 
threats, negative impact of the defence spending on the 
development of both the cotmtries* Pakistan's im^lvemenfc in 
India's internal affairs* particularly in the Indian s tate of 
Punjab and the endeavotars by both countries to have cooperation 
i n various f ie lds* existed before the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. The intervention only intens i f ied them, Tterefore, 
the resolution of the Afghan probl«m must be accompanied by 
considerable goodwill* tei»eious ef forts and people-to-people 
understanding to Improve the entire gamut of India-pakistan 
re la t ions . 
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